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A DIFFERENT GOSPEL

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GAL. i. 6.

"A DIFFERENT GOSPEL WHICH IS NOT ANOTHER GOSPEL"

EXAMINED BY

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"'CRITICISM,' AS MADE IN GERMANY, AND COMMON SENSE"
"TEKEL, THE PAPACY AND THE WAR," ETC.

WITHDRAWN

FOREWORD

ON SCIENCE AND MIRACLES

BY

F. A. DIXEY, M.D., F.R.S.

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

This is a short criticism of what is called 'Modernism,' chiefly as it is embodied in the report of the Cambridge "Conference of Modern Churchmen," which discussed "Christ and the Creeds"—that is to say, the 'fundamentals' of the Christian religion.

The small book is the outcome or extension of a correspondence in the *Guardian* towards the end of 1921 (October to December).

It would have been completed and published earlier but for illness and other hindrances.

Since 'Modernists' are fond of assuming, hinting, or claiming that modern Science necessitates some such views as theirs, Dr. F. A. Dixey has been so kind as to write a Foreword on Science and Miracles, stating the facts on this part of the subject as they really are.

A. C. C.

July, 1922.

FOREWORD

ON SCIENCE AND MIRACLES

By F. A. Dixey, M.D., F.R.S.

The questions raised by recent utterances of the 'Modernist' School involve problems of theology, of metaphysics and of literary criticism. With these it is not within my province to deal. But in the present discussion of the modernist position, the author has found occasion from time to time to appeal to certain considerations belonging to the domain of natural science. With regard to these portions of his argument, I am able to say at once that I do not find anything at variance with the present state of knowledge as to scientific fact.

The question whether miracles are possible may be regarded as sterile. Whether they actually occur is purely a matter of evidence; and in considering the credibility of the witnesses of alleged miraculous events, it should be remembered that in the history of human experience it has frequently happened that phenomena have been observed which the then existing knowledge of natural "law" was unable to explain. Natural science is perfectly justified in saying that many of the recorded occurrences in the New Testament cannot be brought

under the operation of any of the ascertained uniformities of natural process; but in order to meet these records with a blank denial, it is necessary to make the assumption that our knowledge of cause and effect, admittedly imperfect in the past, is at the present day complete and unalterable. Recognising the danger of *a priori* dogmatism, most sensible men will be content to allow their belief in the record to depend upon their judgment of the evidence in its favour.

I have already disclaimed the function of a critic with regard to the philosophical aspect of the present treatise; but I may perhaps be permitted to say that I cannot see that the attack on orthodox Christianity has anything to gain by an appeal to natural science. It may be freely granted that many statements of the creeds do not fall into line with ordinary human experience. It is with this ordinary, everyday experience that natural science has to deal; and it has happened before, and will assuredly happen again, that the content of human experience has been so far enlarged as to include in the general scheme of uniformity events that once appeared to stand entirely outside it. It may also happen, nor would science be in a position to deny it, that after all reductions to "law" which may be effected by increasing knowledge, certain events may ultimately prove to be unique in the scheme of the universe.

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I

INTRODUCTORY

In the various papers read at the Cambridge Conference of Modern Churchmen a number of opinions were expressed which could not possibly be made to harmonise; in fact, one wonders how some of the writers got into the same company at all. There is no general agreement among them, except perhaps (besides the rejection of miracles) a general disposition to emphasise our Lord's human nature, both on more or less orthodox and on unorthodox lines. Some of the former class of papers are well put, in parts, though they hardly open up views which have not been stated before; and, in general, the contention that this aspect of Him has been largely lost sight of is not and has not been true to anything like the extent claimed. Other papers are frankly revolutionary—preaching "a different gospel, which is not another *gospel*," [1] as St. Paul would certainly have said, for some 'Modernist' views were already rejected or ruled out by him. However, there is not in the coherency and cogency of any of these papers any temptation to regard them as inspired by "an angel from heaven"; and if there were anything

[1] Gal. i. 6 ff.; the italics are, as it happens, correct in giving emphasis, as well as in their ordinary meaning in the translation.

angelic about them at all, they would be the voices of an angel choir singing in discord.

The Preface, by Mr. Major, would not suggest this fact. On pp. 196 and 197 he appears to claim 'Modernists' in general as agreeing in his chief theory or dogma, the essential, natural divinity or deity of all men; the difference between *being already* and *becoming* is hopelessly confused, and the theory is supported by one quotation which is altered so that it suits and by others which do not prove it in the least (pp. 196-197). These matters, as well as the absolute denial of miracles, will be dealt with in connection with the papers read. But the point at present is that the more moderate speakers are tied to the extremists' chariot and represented as pushing it along. That is the impression necessarily produced by the Preface.

The demand that any parish, with certain safeguards, shall be at liberty to draw up its own creed seems to offer a sort of 'comic relief' to the consideration of serious subjects; it would certainly tend to increase the liveliness—though perhaps not the reverence—of meetings of the Parish Council. The picture suggested of the Parish representatives struggling with cloudy metaphysics mixed with texts is certainly humorous, though its details would soon become profane.

Mr. Major has obtained office in the Church of England (which, like other societies, has its own principles and rules) on terms which he now finds irksome and wishes to have varied or done away; the wish is natural, but hardly reasonable. The ethical question involved will be discussed later on, separately from the truth or falsehood of the new (or resuscitated) dogmas.

II

SOME SPECIMENS OF 'MODERNISM'

It will make things clearer if we first put down a few specimens of revolutionary 'Modernist' views:

"If we believe that every human soul reveals, reproduces, incarnates God *to some extent*; if we believe that in the great ethical teachers of mankind, the great religious personalities, the founders, the reformers of religions, the heroes, the prophets, the saints, God is more fully revealed than in other men: if we believe that up to the coming of Christ there had been a gradual, continuous, and on the whole progressive revelation of God (especially, though by no means exclusively, in the development of Jewish Monotheism), then it becomes possible to believe that in one Man the self-revelation of God has been signal, supreme, unique." (Dr. Rashdall in *The Modern Churchman*, Sept. 1921, p. 283.)

With this we may compare a statement not made at the Conference:

"Modernism fits in exactly with evolution, because it simply believes that a time came in the evolution of the species man when the highest point was reached, and man, always God's child, developed at one step into God's perfect child." (Archdeacon Beresford Potter, letter in *The Guardian*, Nov. 11, 1921.)

Also:

"The fact of evolution *must* enter into any modern synthesis of Christianity. The main facts of historical criticism *must* affect the Christian outlook." (Douglas White, M.D., *The Modern Churchman*, as above, p. 340.)

And again:

"He [Jesus] is the perfect expression in time and space of the personality of God: no sudden intrusion on the

historic process, but its perfect product, the scion of many forefathers to be the firstborn of many brethren." (Professor Bethune-Baker, p. 299.)

III

"LAWS OF NATURE"

It will be best to consider first of all this theory of deity in man, and of the claims which are made for that theory as 'up-to-date' and scientific, and thus calculated to make Christianity (or something resembling it) credible.

Now Evolution (as we know) is a great principle or "Law of Nature," according to which the universe and the world and man were made as they now are, not at one step but by degrees, often imperceptible. This theory or principle has a certain grandeur of its own, and is in no way antagonistic to Christianity. In fact, it may give us a glimpse of the reason why our Lord came into the world when He did, and not before—when men would be able to some extent to understand and to appreciate Him—as to which there are also hints in the New Testament.[1] But we must be careful not to extend the 'law' beyond what it really is. "Law of Nature" is a metaphorical expression, useful but apt to be misleading; for these laws are formulated by *us*; they may, or they may not, give us a sound knowledge—so far as they go—of the way in which God usually works in His universe.

Thus Professor J. H. Poynting says, in an address to the British Association delivered so long ago as 1889,

[1] Acts xvii. 17, 30; Gal. iv. 1 ff.

which is quoted with approval by Professor J. A. Thomson (*Introduction to Science*, p. 50) :

" We must confess that physical laws have greatly fallen off in dignity. No long time ago they were quite commonly described as the Fixed Laws of Nature, and were supposed sufficient in themselves to govern the universe. Now we can only assign to them the humble rank of mere descriptions, often erroneous, of similarities which we believe we have observed."

And again, a little further on :

" A law of nature explains nothing."

And (on p. 57) Professor Thomson says of Science :

" It is descriptive formulation, not interpretative explanation."

But it is this belief in " the Fixed Laws of Nature " which is the cause of disbelief in miracles, however well attested ; nothing is to be believed unless we can fit it into a pigeon-hole which we already possess—which we have already constructed ; in this process the account, or the evidence for it, is apt to be broken or distorted to make it fit. Thus the facts of hypnotism, since there was no pigeon-hole for them, were at first (as some of us can remember) represented as a collusive or fraudulent trick by Renan and others. And *all* the ' miracles ' in the Gospels were alike rejected, until certain facts ascertained in recent times as to the cure of certain bodily diseases through the mind led to the acceptance of those miracles only (looked upon as not being miracles at all) which could be brought into some real or imaginary relation with these facts, though " the evidence, externally considered, is equally good for all classes of miracles " (Sanday, *Outlines of the Life of Christ*, p. 108). It is therefore plain that it

is on *a priori* grounds, resting on an amount of knowledge of the real working of 'nature,' of 'natural causes,' and of God, which it would be flattery to call imperfect,[1] that a selection is made, regardless of evidence, of accounts to be believed, and that our Lord's life is to be re-written and words of His rejected. The whole perverse method seems to point to a fatal want of proper intellectual humility. To put aside or distort evidence because we cannot (at present, at all events) place or group what it recounts, reminds one of the love of the Middle Ages for 'deductive' methods, and, if applied to science, would stop all discovery.

The view, now becoming more or less obsolete with many of those who really do know something of science (but which, like some other obsolescent views, has still much power to mislead), reminds one of the scene in the Book of Daniel: "Know, O king, that it is a law of the Medes and Persians, That no interdict nor statute which the king establisheth may be changed" (vi. 15). But one does not quite see who correspond to the distinguished conspirators in keeping the king to his duty—or in bondage.

To return to the special case—the 'law' of Evolution. This is an enormous and far-reaching generalisation, and in such cases the main law is apt to be modified or annulled by exceptions, which are formulated into special 'laws.' Thus in the science of Comparative Philology 'Grimm's Law,' as to the shifting of consonants in various languages or groups of languages, had to be modified so that it might correspond to facts.[2] And plainly if God "bringeth in the first-born into the world" (Heb. i. 6); if "the Word

[1] See Bacon, *Novum Organum*, Aphorism XLVI.

[2] See *e.g.* Whitney, *Language and its Study*, pp. 97, 98, 307.

became flesh and dwelt among us" (St. John i. 14), this enormous event was likely—or certain—to alter, for the time at all events, the previous state of things. If this was a real event, there can be no argument from the normal state of things—that is merely false analogy. Even a very small quantity of something else added to a chemical will make it behave quite differently, will change the 'laws' which it obeys.[1] And if we look at the 'law' of Evolution, as it really works in nature and in human society, we find that it is not a paramount, universal, all-embracing 'law' "sufficient in itself to govern the universe," overriding all other 'laws'; the stream of progress or development has backwaters and even back-eddies.

In human society more especially there has been both absence of progress and retrogression. Not only savages, but the Chinese and, to a large extent, the East generally have progressed hardly or not at all in thousands of years. As regards the human race as a whole, it is more difficult to make assertions, since our knowledge of its history is so very partial, only portions of it really coming within the beams of the flashlight (as is also the case with many other branches of knowledge). But it is plain that there was retrogression in the West (and perhaps no general progress anywhere) between 500 and 700 A.D. The rule of Evolution would correspond to a limited and not an absolute monarchy, its power, besides, being often

[1] "In mechanics and the general sciences, causes compound their effects. . . . In Chemistry and Physiology a contrary law holds; the causes which they embody generally uniting to form distinct substances, and to introduce unforeseen laws and combinations" (Note to Bacon's *Novum Organum*, ed. J. Devey, p. 402).

checked or superseded by rebels. It is therefore, to say the least, an exceedingly insecure assertion that we must find its action everywhere—that events must be forced to agree with it, otherwise they cannot be true.

But, to put these considerations aside, it should be noted that in trying to bring our Lord Jesus Christ under its rule and to explain Him by it, 'Modernists' are not consistently doing so at all. He is confessed to be "signal, supreme, unique" (p. 283), in degree, though not in kind. But when the new type has once cropped up, one would naturally expect that it should maintain itself, or appear again, and, in 1900 years, also be improved upon—which is allowed not to have occurred. Even as treated by 'Modernists,' with all their arbitrary or *a priori* selection and distortion of evidence, our Lord's character and life does not fall in with the 'law' of Evolution. Archdeacon Potter's statement in the *Guardian* (quoted above) that His perfection was reached "at one step" is even more obviously inconsistent—the sentence, speaking of Evolution as it does, is grotesque.[1]

[1] On this Dr. Dixey says: "Our Lord's human body was no doubt a product of evolution. In any other respect I think the calling in of evolution to explain Him is absolutely profitless."

IV

PHILOSOPHICAL GUESS-WORK

It appears that a certain school of modern philosophy would welcome the theory as being a ' law.' But something has been said above on this point ; as was the case even in Bacon's time, " the human understanding, from its peculiar nature, easily supposes a greater degree of order and equality in things than it (really) finds " [1]—just as ordinary people are so ready to make a generalisation from a few instances, or even from one, and, like Procrustes, to mutilate, by lopping or stretching, such facts as should fit it, but do not. Philosophers are by no means exempt from these infirmities—" idols," as Bacon calls them, though not in the usual sense of the word, but they do often act as false gods too. Now metaphysical (as well as other) philosophy has been of enormous value to the world. It has given a practice-ground for deep thinking —on things beyond our ordinary experience : it has suggested various splendid ideas and explanations (as well as others by no means splendid) [2] some of which—or something more perfect and finer still—may be true. It has, to some extent, supplied forms in which religious truths

[1] *Novum Organum*, Aph. XLV.

[2] Thus the ancient Greek philosophers, to whom the enquiry into the greater facts or ' laws ' of the world was very much on the same lines as that into metaphysics (as this both was and is), made some wonderful anticipations (including the nebular hypothesis and the development of men from animals and of animals from each other ; see Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato*, ii. p. 528), but these were mixed up with quite untrue notions, such as that of the Four Elements, and undistinguishable from them.

may be expressed. But its theories, especially some of the more important ones, rest on slender and doubtful grounds and are incapable of verification. Metaphysical philosophy has established very little as certain; it often starts from some assumption which is by no means self-evident and may be wholly or partially untrue. Not only are the final results arrived at incapable of being verified by experiment or otherwise, but the steps towards them cannot be checked or verified either, and the words or symbols used cannot be used with accuracy or certainty (since we do not know accurately the things described), so that fallacies—especially false analogy—cannot be guarded against. It is like trying to find your way through a wood in the dark, without sure landmarks and with stumps and exposed roots in plenty, or like trying to cross a river in which the ice is broken up; each leap gives an insecure footing, and one is not likely to reach firm land safely on the other side. Even if the particular theory explains the facts which we know, another one may also do so, either one which is known or, quite possibly, one which is not.[1] As regards metaphysics, for a good deal more than 2000 years philosophers have been searching (among other things) into the nature of God (or of some substitute for Him); His (or its) relation to the Universe; the inner or real constitution of this; the nature of the soul, and whether it is immortal or not. And they have given various answers which have

[1] Thus, in astronomy, "The Ptolemaic system was, in a geometrical sense, defensible; it harmonized fairly well with appearances, and physical reasonings had not then been extended to the heavens. To the ignorant it was recommended by its conformity to crude common sense; to the learned, by the wealth of ingenuity expended in bringing it to perfection" (Agnes Mary Clarke in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1910 and 1911), ii. p. 810).

seemed to them and to their special followers not merely consistent but certain. But, besides the weaknesses above mentioned, the trouble is that "their witness agrees not together"—not even that of contemporary philosophers, still less that of succeeding generations. Philosophical opinion is "fluctuating"; it shows "lack of finality," say some 'Modernists' (pp. 319 and 325). That is most true; and the approval of some philosophers can hardly prove the truth of a 'law' which seems not particularly consistent with facts—still less can this be proved by its convenience to 'Modernism' as supplying a means of (apparently) agreeing that our Lord is "both God and Man," though by no means in the sense which that statement was meant to convey.

V

"SONS OF GOD"

The Christian belief is, really, very different from this 'Modernist' theory of the nature of Man and of Christ. "But from the beginning of the creation, male and female made He them," said our Lord (St. Mark x. 6, R.V.). God "made the world and all things therein . . . [he] made of one every nation of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth," said St. Paul at Athens, and these verses give the limited sense in which he agrees that "We are also his offspring" [1] (Acts xvii. 24 ff.). But in general

[1] In this speech St. Paul, "becoming all things to all men," makes a special effort to find common ground with the Stoic philosophy. But he soon "felt that he had gone at least as far as was right in the way of presenting his doctrine in the form of the current philosophy" (Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller*

what St. Paul says falls in with the ordinary Christian view: that we are—in a way—God's children, since we owe our existence to Him, and are made to some extent in His likeness, and able to enter into filial relations with Him; and since He shows a Father's care for us [1]—both through and in spite of the "Laws of Nature." But this figure of sonship is 'swamped' or superseded by the real and unlimited sonship which we can have through Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, represented either as adoption (a very common, real, and effective thing in the Roman Empire), as often by St. Paul, and otherwise as "a new creation." [2]

With this view the other Apostles unmistakably agree. There are certainly quite startling statements in the New Testament as to the extent to which men are intended to *become* like God—destined to become so, if they choose—and these have justification in some of our Lord's own words.[3]

and the Roman Citizen, 1895, p. 252), and that too without success. Accordingly shortly afterwards at Corinth, "I determined [he says] not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified. . . . And my speech and my preaching were not in persuasive words of wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power; that your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God. . . . But we speak God's wisdom in a mystery, even the wisdom that hath been hidden, which God fore-ordained before the worlds unto our glory" (1 Cor. ii. 2 ff., compare i. 18 ff. and Eph. i. 3 ff.). That is to say, instead of following *a priori* speculations, he preferred to ground his teaching upon the great facts which he knew certainly, and on those which the Corinthians could see going on among them, and to build such philosophy as was possible and necessary on the sure foundation of these.

[1] Acts xiv. 17; Romans i. 21; compare St. Luke xii. 6, 7, and 22 ff.; St. Matt. v. 45.

[2] Rom. viii. 14 ff.; Gal. iv. 5 ff.; Eph. i. 5; 2 Cor. v. 17.

[3] *E.g.* St. Matt. v. 48.

Thus it is said of Christians, "Now are we children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that, if he (or, it) shall be manifested, we shall be like him." [1] We are "heirs of God, and joint-heirs with Christ; [2] we are to reach "the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." [3] But the notion that we are divine to begin with and only need to develop this, is most distinctly and emphatically excluded; any such position is due to the grace of God working in and upon us: "As many as received him, to them gave he the right to become children of God." [4] We are, to begin with, "children of wrath"; "without God in the world." [5] We need "reconciling" "to God"; "God was in Christ" —not in every man—"reconciling the world unto himself" [6]—not developing the part of Himself that was already in them. So entirely was the movement of man towards God and to a godlike nature to be a fresh start from the very beginning that it is constantly spoken of as a new birth: "Ye must be born anew"; [7] "The God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ . . . begat us again unto a living hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, unto an inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled, and that fadeth not away"; [8] "Having been begotten again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible." [9] A similar view as to our beginning to become sons of God

[1] 1 John iii. 1 ff.

[2] Rom. viii. 17.

[3] Eph. iv. 13.

[4] St. John i. 12.

[5] Eph. ii. 3, and 12.

[6] 2 Cor. v. 19.

[7] St. John iii. 7.

[8] 1 Peter, i, 3, 4; this is just like St. Paul's "heirs of Godand joint-heirs with Christ," Rom. viii. 17.

[9] 1 Peter i. 23; which is strikingly like St. John i. 13.

comes out, as we have seen, in St. Paul's comparing conversion to adoption : " that we might receive the adoption of sons." [1]

This view of the case was emphasised, fixed, and brought home to every Christian by the universal practice of baptism, considered as (normally) necessary for salvation. " Except a man be born anew, he cannot see the kingdom of God " ; [2] " Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." [3] Whether baptism was looked upon as a new birth, or as the resurrection of the soul to a new life in Christ, " having been buried with him in baptism," [4] in either case it was the beginning of a new life. And it was (except in case of necessity) by immersion, the person raised out of the water seeming to come again into the world ; or to rise from the grave ; if ' affusion ' had been the normal form of baptism, it might have been interpreted, however perversely, as nothing but the watering of a seed already there.

Dr. Rashdall, defending his theory in the *Guardian*,[5] says, " Does Mr. Champneys deny that all Christians may be called in a true sense ' sons of God ' ? " The fallacy of this argument, as used to support his metaphysical theory, should be plain to anyone from what is said above —it is an example either of partial and misleading quotation or of want of clear thinking, neither of which is very uncommon among ' Modernists.' If due accuracy is

[1] Gal. iv. 5, 7 ; Rom. viii. 15, 16.

[2] St. John iii. 3 ; on " *ἄνωθεν*," see Westcott, *The Gospel according to St. John*.

[3] St. John iii. 5. [4] Col. ii. 12.

[5] Nov. 25, 1921.

observed as regards the whole of what the authorities referred to really say, the argument will come out somewhat as follows :

All (real) Christians have become sons of God ;
Some men are (real) Christians ;
Therefore, All men are by nature sons of God.[1]

Such a mass of fallacies needs no comment.

There seems to be another faulty ' Modernist ' argument in Dr. Rashdall's paper :

" All modern philosophers who recognise that the knowledge of God is possible are agreed that we can only attain such knowledge by thinking of Him in the light of the human mind at its highest " (etc., p. 282).

But if this is the best knowledge that we can get, it does not at all follow that such knowledge is adequate—or even altogether correct ;[2] we cannot conclude that man's mind and God's are in fact so much alike that man's mind must be a part of God's. The fact that this fallacy seems to be adopted from (or shared with) some modern philosophers does not increase one's respect for their clearness of thinking—or for their intellectual humility.

To return to the teaching which the Christian religion gives, Mr. Major (in citing various passages where God is spoken of as Father of men) quotes as an " indubitable saying " of our Lord's " ' Ye *are* the children of the Highest ' (Luke vi. 35) "[3] (p. 270 ; also p. 196) ; but as

[1] " Formal " Logic is, still, not a bad way of testing an argument.

[2] " For it was not possible that the Divine Nature (τὸ Θεῖον) should be spoken of as it (really) is," says Clement of Alexandria (*Stromateis*, ii. 16).

[3] See above, p. 2.

it stands (so far as I can make out in *all* the MSS.) it is "Ye *shall be* the children of the Highest," that is, from the context, "if you behave in such-and-such a way." This sort of inaccuracy, especially in passages cited as arguments (it does not stand alone), does not give confidence in the carefulness or correct thinking of 'Modernists.' The 'sonship' is potential only, not already in being, to be developed—and so our Lord's disciples understood it to be.

This conclusion is clinched by looking at another side of the picture (here again the 'Modernists' seem to look only on what suits their views). While God's will is that all men should be or become His Sons, some of them are certainly not so. Our Lord is reported in "The Fourth Gospel" as saying of the Jews who were murderers at heart (as well as liars), "Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father it is your will to do." [1] And if this saying was 'created,' at all events the unknown author and St. Paul used similar words on their own account—to St. Paul (who was "filled with the Holy Ghost," St. Luke thinks) Elymas, as being an "enemy of all righteousness," was a "son of the devil," [2] and the unknown author gives a sign for distinguishing "the children of God and the children of the devil." [3] Is this, too, to be treated as a mysterious metaphysical fact? It will lead to a strange kind of Dualism.

The new theory or dogma about the human soul certainly does not coincide with or find support from the views of the Apostles and of the earliest generation of Christians; St. Paul and St. Peter and the author of "The Fourth Gospel" absolutely contradict it. And

[1] viii. 44. [2] Acts xiii. 9 and 10.
[3] 1 John iii. 10.

that the levelling up of ordinary human nature to a likeness, in kind, with our Lord's Deity is wholly inconsistent with what is said about Him in the Nicene Creed hardly needs demonstration. This fixes Jesus Christ as "the *only*-begotten Son of God" (not 'uniquely' so—an ambiguous word); it goes on to make statements about Him which hardly anyone in his senses would dare to make about any man however wise and good; and then contrasts Him with "us men." The case is (if possible) still stronger owing to the fact that the Arians used a similar levelling up as against the Catholic belief;[1] therefore what in the Creed directly contradicts the idea does so deliberately.

The 'Nicene' Creed expressly limits its attribution of Deity to "one Lord Jesus Christ," who, when the Christian religion was formulated, was described as the Second Person of the Trinity. Now 'Modernists' are rather fond of hurling accusations of "Tritheism" at those who disagree with them. But if all men are, *in kind*, the same as He is, having a share in Deity, we have not "Tritheism" but something much worse, which might perhaps be described as "Myriotheism"—though, unless we regard only the more conspicuous examples of indwelling deity, "the great ethical teachers of mankind, the great religious personalities, the founders, the reformers of religions," etc. (p. 283)—such as Plato, Mahomet, Luther, General Gordon, Jeremiah, St. Francis—even this word is inadequate. The Trinity has vanished in indefinite plurality.

[1] See St. Athanasius, *De Decretis*, 20; see also letter of Alexander Bishop of Alexandria, and of Eusebius of Nicomedia in Theodoret, *Eccl. Hist.* i. cc. iv.-vi.

VI

PRE-EXISTENCE AND IMMORTALITY

But out of this preliminary 'Modernist' dogma—through which "it becomes possible to believe"—a further question at once arises. If our Lord's nature was only like that of a man raised to the highest power or degree, had he any personal pre-existence, as the Creed distinctly affirms—a point which is most intimately and necessarily concerned with our belief as a practical matter, and with our motives (see *e.g.* Phil. ii. 5 ff.; 2 Cor. viii. 9 ff.).

Dr. Rashdall's theories definitely exclude all possibility of our Lord's personal pre-existence. "It is equally unorthodox to suppose that the human soul of Jesus pre-existed. . . . It has been held [by the Church] that what pre-existed was the divine Logos, not the human Jesus" (p. 280). But, according to what he says, as quoted above, Jesus is not the complete Logos; His Deity is only identical with that which (as Dr. Rashdall asserts) exists in all men, only that it was in a much higher degree. Thus all personal pre-existence is excluded for Him, from the two sides.[1]

On the other hand, Archdeacon Potter (whose letter has been quoted already) fills out the theory, enabling us to retain some distorted fragment of the earliest Christian

[1] When challenged on the point, Dr. Rashdall, in the *Guardian* of Nov. 4th, 1921, declined to say that (in some way which one cannot imagine) he did believe in the personal pre-existence of *Jesus Christ*. "I have not denied (he says) and I do not deny the pre-existence of the Second Person of the Holy Trinity." What this may perhaps mean will appear later, in a quotation from an article by Mr. Major, in the *Hibbert Journal*.

belief by providing another preliminary dogma—quite unproved—for us to believe, though Dr. Rashdall will not have it; those who are founding this new modern religion which is to supersede Christianity are at variance among themselves.

"As regards pre-existence, there need be no difficulty in conceding this to Christ, as we must concede it to man, if man is immortal. He could not be immortal *a parte post* unless he is immortal *a parte ante*"[1] [why?], and he proceeds to quote as proof of this by no means self-evident dogma the well-known lines from Wordsworth's Ode on *Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood*:

"Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting," etc.[2]

The fancy, however beautifully expressed, of a poet hardly helps to prove a tremendous fact—if it is a fact. If points in metaphysics are to be proved from poets, someone will be likely to quote Lucretius,[3] and many (without giving up the assurance of future immortality which they have or may have through Christ and His religion) will think that, of the two, the Latin poet's argument to the effect that the soul is born and dies is the more forcible. However, it was not even a settled conviction of Wordsworth's; some years later he wrote:

> "Dear be the Church, that, watching o'er the needs
> Of Infancy, provides a timely shower,
> Whose virtue changes to a christian Flower
> A Growth from sinful Nature's bed of weeds!"[4]

[1] Letter in the *Guardian* of 11th Nov. 1921.

[2] *Works*, pub. Macmillan, 1889 ed. p. 357 ff.

[3] iii. 417 ff.

[4] Ecclesiastical Sonnets, "Baptism," same ed. p. 634.

The opinion of that able but erratic pioneer of Christian philosophy, Origen, on our pre-existence has not been endorsed by the vast majority of Christian thinkers; and obviously this version of the belief in pre-existence—that an immense number of eternal spirits have a share in the Godhead in varying degrees—is undistinguishable from Polytheism, providing a whole Pantheon of greater and lesser gods.

About the whole notion of pre-existence two sane statements are:

"The non-Hebraic idea of pre-existence has failed to find a genuine home in Christian thought; as a speculation in regard to what lies beyond all experience, it hardly admits of proof or disproof";[1] and

"None of the arguments advanced is convincing, and the phenomena observed can be better accounted for on other grounds."[2]

And in general this 'Modernist' argument is singularly 'precarious' and uncertain. Archdeacon Potter first assumes that immortality is established as a necessary and unquestionable characteristic of the human soul. But it can hardly be maintained that even any sort of immortality or survival is a certainty,[3] apart from Christianity; most of us who believe in a future life do

[1] Hastings, *Dictionary of Religion and Ethics*, vol. xi. p. 727 (H. Wheeler Robinson).

[2] The same, vol. x. p. 241 (R. Moore). Pre-existence does not at all obviously or necessarily involve eternal pre-existence—nor even immortality. (See Plato, *Phaedo*, § 85 ff.)

[3] See *e.g.* "*Science and Immortality*, by William Osler, M.D., F.R.S., Regius Professor of Medicine at Oxford." One has got to be candid and face facts, whatever we may *wish* to believe, while welcoming, for what they are worth, such indications as appear to buttress our faith.

so because of our belief in the supreme will of God, in His love and His justice [1] (and apart from our Lord's teaching we could be certain of neither, whatever we might wish to believe) and because of our Lord's Resurrection. But the evidence loses most of its weight when that religion, as it has been known right down the ages, is discredited—when the belief which has always been its centre, the pre-existent personal Godhead of our Lord Jesus Christ, and in consequence the certainty that what He said was true, is practically eliminated; and when His Resurrection is (against all the evidence) resolved into a sort of ghost-story. To this now uncertain foundation of a belief in some sort of immortality are added the unproved and by no means self-evident assumptions that *all* souls are *necessarily* immortal and that they are eternal. But 'conditional immortality,' or survival (for few or for many), has been believed in by many persons both heathen and Christian at various times; and some statements in the New Testament (if that is still of any weight) seem to point to this.[2]

[1] Plato makes the Supreme God say to the inferior Gods, "My creations are indissoluble, if so I will. Everything that is bound together may be dissolved, but that which is nobly fitted together and in a good state only an evil being would be willing to dissolve. So, since you have come into being, you are not altogether immortal nor indissoluble, but you shall certainly not be dissolved nor meet the lot of death since you have in my will an even greater and more certain bond than those by which you were bound together when you were coming into being." *Timaeus*, § 41.

"We are more certain of the existence of God than we are of the immortality of the soul, and are led by the belief in the one to a belief in the other" (Jowett, The *Dialogues of Plato*, i. p. 395, 1871 ed., Introduction to the *Phaedo*).

[2] Romans vi. 23; Phil. iii. 11; 2 Thess. i. 9. It is apparently impossible for us to fit together the statements about the future life contained in the New Testament. But, like parallel straight

This dogma, which is to enable us to believe in some sort of personal pre-existence of our Lord, does not seem to rest on any assured ground whatever.

Belief in the soul's eternity obviously fits in very badly with belief in Evolution, or in progress, as a universal law. Souls can hardly have been improving from all eternity and yet only have reached the stage of the best of us, much more that of the average man. And the notion is made even more incredible when we take into account the marked and extraordinary improvement in the character of many (in the majority of cases through the old Christian religion) in a short lifetime, or in only a part of it. The rates of progress might be (inadequately) compared respectively to that of a snail and a swallow, or of a glacier and lightning.

However, as has been said already, Dr. Rashdall will not have this theory or dogma : " It is equally unorthodox to suppose that the human soul of Jesus pre-existed, etc." (p. 280). So that, according to him, even this distant approach to what has so long been believed as to our Lord's *personal* pre-existence, securing some small, or apparent, salvage of the immense practical results which, as being a fact, it has been believed to involve, must be given up too.[1]

lines, they may meet in infinity. It is, perhaps, helpful to remember that some few centuries ago all that was known of electricity was (1) lightning ; (2) the sparks produced by stroking a cat the wrong way ; (3) the attraction of amber when rubbed ; (4) the magnet. No one could have imagined that these could be in any way combined, and yet electricity is a fact of this world or sphere of things.

[1] Mr. Major, quoting Wordsworth as regards " every human infant," suggests " leaving the question of pre-existent consciousness unsettled " (p. 277), though Dr. Rashdall thinks the supposition that the human soul pre-exists " unorthodox."

But this is not all that there is in this extraordinary letter—for which one would hardly think that the authors —or rather resuscitators—of the main ' Modernist ' dogma which it is meant to support will thank its writer. ' Modernism ' appears to be a mainstay of belief in the Resurrection of men :

" Modernism teaches the enormous value of Christ's Life and Resurrection, because it ensures for man an approximation towards such a life (man's nature and Christ's being alike) and an assurance of a resurrection. What is called the orthodox view destroys any value in the Resurrection, because Christ, being essentially, according to it, different from man, might rise while man could not." [1]

As for " the enormous value," I notice that one sketch of a ' Modernist ' creed which is to supersede the creeds of Christendom does not mention the Resurrection at all (p. 342).[2] But, as regards Archdeacon Potter's own opinion, whatever may be " *called* the orthodox view," the orthodox view *is* that our Lord is " Perfect Man " as well as " Perfect God " ; " He became Man " ; Archdeacon Potter is free to think that the two are inconsistent (and to whittle down His Godhead) but that is not the belief of the Church. Nor was it the belief of St. Paul ; he was convinced that our Lord had existed before, not as a man, but that " being [already] [3] in the form of God

[1] The *Guardian*, Nov. 11, 1921.

[2] Line 4 of this (as well as its interpretation above on the same page) " By which Spirit man is made divine," fits badly with the main dogma : would it not be as well for ' Modernists ' to agree as to what is truth before pressing it on our acceptance ?

[3] " *ὑπάρχων.*"

. . .[1] [He] emptied himself . . . becoming in the likeness of man ; " and yet (though thus holding the " orthodox " view) he is quite certain that Christ being raised from the dead (on " the third day ") is " the first-fruits of them that are asleep." The Resurrection of Christ is to him not only the certain proof of what our Lord was, but the sure guarantee of the Christian hope of a full and far better life after death. St. Paul says one thing ; Archdeacon Potter contradicts him absolutely. " Which do you believe ? "

It appears that the main theory or dogma which is offered us needs supplementing by another theory or dogma if it is to bear some resemblance to Christianity ; and that this is—to say the least—an extremely doubtful one.

VII

DEITY IN MAN

But the main theory cannot be proved or even made probable. For there is and there can be no direct evidence of its truth. It will hardly be contended that we have any direct knowledge that we are naturally divine. And we cannot isolate an infant from all subsequent influence, whether directly from God or through man, including " the light that lighteth every man, coming into the world "[2] and the example of good people (whether they

[1] " Though the divine nature was his from the beginning, yet he did not look upon equality with God as above all things to be clung to, but impoverished himself by taking the nature of a servant, and becoming like men ; he appeared among us as a man," etc. *The Twentieth Century New Testament* ; Phil. ii. 6. Weymouth's translation in *The New Testament in Modern Speech* is substantially similar.

[2] St. John i. 9 ; see Westcott, as above.

are consciously Christians or not), and then see whether there is an innate deity which breaks out. The fact acknowledged by Christians that man is made to some extent in God's image, with a capacity for getting into touch with Him,[1] together with the "light that lighteth every man," and (in most cases) with the 'means of grace,' of all kinds, which are intended (if we choose) to make us in a real sense "Sons of God,"[2] will amply account for anything godlike that there may be in us.

Moreover, these influences are 'a real cause'; they are sometimes strikingly exhibited in conversions—such as that of John Newton, and of many thousands who, having been heathens, have become respectable and sometimes excellent Christians,[3] reaching a high and a divine standard. This is a proved fact; the older account explains the 'phenomena,' and "*causae non sunt multiplicandae praeter necessitatem*"—as one of the most revolutionary of the

[1] 1 Cor. xi. 7; Acts xvii. 27; Heb. xi. 6. If it should be contended that our knowing anything of God and entering into relation with Him implies actual community of nature, few people would believe in the community of human nature between a high-class dog and a man, though the dog does, in a vague but effective way, know a good deal about men generally, and about his master in particular. The Stoics would have found no difficulty about it; both men and dogs shared in the world-soul; but few of us, probably, would now go so far towards Pantheism as to attribute deity to dogs, however highly we may think of them: "Of which [*i.e.* the world-soul, the Stoics say that] the souls in animals are parts" (Diogenes Laertius, vii. 156). And if we are to have Pantheism at all, this is the more consistent view.

[2] See above, p. 12 ff.

[3] At the time of the war between Japan and Russia it was stated that the Japanese Government had chosen Japanese Christians (principally or exclusively) to attend on the foreign Military Attachés, on the ground that these could be depended on not to discredit the Japanese nation.

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'Modernists' quotes (p. 290). Moreover, Dr. Rashdall thinks that "in . . . the saints God is more fully revealed than in other men" (p. 283), and most people would say that in matters of religion they are experts—and yet the vast majority or all of the Christian Saints would have repudiated with horror any notion that they were by nature partly divine, and in particular that in any degree whatever they shared the divine nature of their Lord (who, though He had become their Brother, was their Saviour, Master, and God), except by His special grace and His Spirit working in them in ways known (partially) and unknown.[1]

Further, if it were possible clearly to see and identify Deity in any part of man's nature, that would certainly be in the conscience, which is sometimes spoken of as "the voice of God in the soul." But conscience seems rather to be an organ—no doubt divinely given (or developed)—for applying laws of right and wrong or for enforcing them—and not a piece of infallible Deity. It enforces many unreasonable or horrible customs among savages, and has driven men to human sacrifices, suttee, and various abominations.[2] It has "a capacity of opposites," and an unenlightened conscience may be valueless—and worse. Even Dr. Baker's half-educated God could hardly be guilty of some things that it has ordered.

[1] See, *e.g.* 1 Cor. x. 16; Rom. viii. 9 ff. 14; Gal. ii. 20.

[2] If anyone thinks that this is due to the corruption of a heavenly gift, it is equally impossible to most of us to believe that a part of God can be corrupted, though 'Modernism' does tend to lower our ideas of Him.

VIII

AN ANCIENT FANCY RESUSCITATED

However, the dogma which Dr. Rashdall offers us as the door to belief in what poses as the Christian religion is not even (as one might have supposed) a new 'discovery' of metaphysical philosophy—that 'fluctuating' thing. It bears a close resemblance to the Stoic doctrine, which was practically copied from Heracleitus. "Each human soul," the Stoics taught, "is a fragment of the universal divine force, yet not completely sundered from its parent stock." [1] "The inner air perceives, being a small part of God." And they speak of "The [inferior] deity whom Zeus gave to every man as a comrade and guide, a part torn off from Himself; and this is the mind and reason of each." [2]

This doctrine St. Paul—though he knew it well—would not have at any price, as we have seen already; and the early Christian philosopher, Clement of Alexandria, expressly and emphatically rejected it—"God has no natural relationship to us, as the founders of the heresies claim"; "God's mercy towards us is richly shown—to us who are in no way akin to Him, either by our being, I

[1] Hastings, *Dict. of Religion and Ethics*, xi. p. 862 (E. V. Arnold).

[2] "Οτι δὲ ὁ ἐντὸς ἀὴρ αἰσθάνεται, μικρὸν ὂν μόριον τοῦ θεοῦ—
Theophrastus, *De Sensibus*, 42.

Ὁ δαίμων, ὃν ἑκάστῳ παραστάτην καὶ ἡγέμονα ὁ Ζεὺς ἔδωκεν, ἀπόσπασμα ἑαυτοῦ, οὗτος δέ ἐστιν ἑκάστου νοῦς καὶ λόγος.
Marcus Antoninus, *Meditations*, v. 27.

For Heracleitus, see extracts in Ritter and Preller, *Historia Philosophiae*, pp. 20-22.

More or less similar notions have been held in various quarters in later times.

mean, or by nature, or by power that properly belongs to our being, but only by our being the work of His will." [1]

The Stoic system is Pantheistic (though of Pantheism there are various forms). In Professor Bethune Baker's paper (p. 287 ff.) this character is unmistakable. Since man's progress must, on this theory, be attributed chiefly to the divinity or God in man, it will naturally follow that this divinity or God has made progress or developed or 'evolved.' Dr. Rashdall appears not to face this conclusion from his theory, but Professor Bethune Baker clearly seems to realise and accept it:

"It is not only that 'in Him we live and move and have our being,' but also, however much bigger His being may be, it is true that 'in us He lives and moves and has His being'" (p. 292).

And on the next page:

"And though we can quote none of the standard expressions of Catholic doctrine for it, there has been much Christian thought that tends to support the belief that the historic process of human experience—to use modern terms—is in some real sense God's own experience. He is the subject of it as well as we."

No, certainly "none of the standard expressions of Catholic doctrine" can be quoted for this strange and, to most of us, repulsive idea of God being educated, developed by Evolution, to which, like everything else, He is made subject. In the *Clouds* of Aristophanes the old man who (as a good 'Modernist' of his time) has been taught to substitute a natural process or 'law' for the action of

[1] "Ὁ Θεὸς δὲ οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς ἡμᾶς φυσικὴν σχέσιν, ὡς οἱ τῶν αἱρεσέων κτίσται θέλουσιν."

"Θεοῦ δέ τὸ ἔλεος εἰς ἡμᾶς πλουσίως τοὺς κατὰ μηδὲν αὐτῷ προσήκοντας, ἡ οὐσία ἡμῶν λέγω, ἢ φύσει, ἢ δυνάμει τῇ οἰκείᾳ τῆς οὐσίας ἡμῶν· μόνῳ δὲ τῷ ἔργον εἶναι τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ." *Stromateis*, ii. 16.

deity as a full and sufficient explanation of rain and thunder, concludes that "Whirl rules as king, having driven out Zeus" (l. 365 ff., 825 ff.). Evolution has not driven out God, but—on this theory—governs Him, as supreme ruler, like Fate or necessity in some systems. And it is really not great enough, for all that we can be certain about it is that this 'law' is "a description of similarities . . . which we believe we have observed." [1]

This notion of the evolution, development, or moral education of God seems to many of us both wild and repulsive. But, putting this aside, it runs counter to indications from facts that we know. The world as it was hundreds of thousands of years ago was a very different place from what it is now, but it does not seem to show a lower degree of intelligence in its design [2]; animals and plants were adapted to the conditions then prevailing. And the animals must on the whole have had an interesting and happy existence (with whatever drawbacks such as there still are), as they have at the present time, so that it appears that even then "God's mercy was over all His works"—quite as much as now, which is the point—indicating the same moral character in Him, however obscurely; we have learnt about this more clearly and definitely from our Lord. And, to come lower down, there are, dating from times before our Lord's birth, fragments, notably in some of the Psalms and in the latter part of the Book of Isaiah (which has been called "the Fifth Gospel"), and in a lower degree (or to a less extent) in some heathen writers, passages which for moral grandeur can hardly be surpassed—a fact which is

[1] See above, p. 5.

[2] On this Dr. Dixey says: "Granted a Creator, there is no evidence that He has profited by experience."

quite inconsistent with God's being gradually educated, though such teaching appealed to few until those principles were perfectly embodied and illustrated in a human life, with strong, new motives for its imitation.

Further, this theory shows a very ' provincial ' or rather ' parochial ' outlook. For we know now that this world is not the centre of all things, with sun, moon, and stars made solely for its benefit. If not in the planets that we know, in those of other solar systems it is quite possible (some would say, it is almost certain) that there are or have been reasonable beings more or less like ourselves, in which therefore God could have found experience and education so that He need not have been dependent on " the historic process of human experience." ' Modernists ' would cut a better figure, as regards their claims to special ability and wisdom, if they would work out the results or implications of their theories.

As another example of this, the theory, as stated by the Professor of Divinity, like all Pantheistic doctrines, goes badly with any belief that is worth having in the immortality of the soul. For, if the soul (or the higher part of it) is a part of God joined to the body, it is natural to suppose that, when this connection is dissolved, it should return whence it came and be re-absorbed. There is no fresh independent personality created—a thing of some worth in itself, and intended to become much more so, like Christ Himself, such as " only an evil being would be willing to dissolve." [1] The Christian religion—if the Resurrection is a fact, and if our Lord's statements on all such matters are infallibly true—guarantees complete personal immortality in a higher and better life.

[1] See above, p. 21, note.

It does not appear that 'Modernism' is going to make belief in what it leaves of Christianity an easy thing. In order that it may "become possible to believe," we have to accept one or more dogmas which are in no way established and are rather incredible—these are the door; one had supposed it was Someone else, and faith in Him. Now there are many persons who want something fresh—who are eager to change 'old lamps for new.' But certainly the exchange is less attractive when the 'new' or 'modern' lamps are not new at all but very old ones which were thrown on the rubbish-heap a long time ago, and are now furbished up to look like new.

And the price to be paid for the exchange is a heavy one.

IX

PRACTICAL RESULTS

The extent to which the 'new' theories deviate from Christianity and tear out its heart is still clearer if we look at their practical results.

In the first place, nothing has moved men so much—making Christianity in its best examples the splendid and divine thing that it is—as the belief that fixes itself on Christ, "Who loved me and gave Himself for me," which was the special inspiration of St. Francis and of thousands before and since. "Huxley once said that in his earlier experience of sickness and suffering he had found that the most effective helpers of the higher humanity were not the scientist or the philosopher, but 'the parson, and the sister, and the Bible woman.'"[1] Much the same testi-

[1] Quoted in *The Modern Churchman*, as above, p. 251; from Huxley's *Life*, i. p. 351.

mony comes from Japan; Mr. Tokamami, the Minister for Home Affairs, remarked to a Tokyo business man:

"We are finding that organisation, equipment, and scientific training are not enough to make a success of social service. We are looking to Christian circles more and more to supply the spirit of self-sacrifice and unselfishness, without which welfare operations cannot be operated." [1]

Now gratitude and love to our Lord, and the desire to imitate and to please Him would certainly, beyond question, be, as a rule, the chief motive of this. The same is certainly (under "the Spirit of Christ" and "of God," [2] as Christians believe) the cause of most of the conversions, often of most unpromising subjects—of persons like John Newton [3]—and that whether or not they have 'a sense of sin' already; they can appreciate the 'unspeakable' self-sacrifice of the gift, even if they hardly realise its worth to themselves. In consequence of something that was said, I showed a not very religious friend of mine, a private on leave from the Flanders Front, a photograph of a crucifix deliberately mutilated by Germans (as was, unhappily, not uncommonly done); he said only, "They can't win after that." It is much the same with heathens—for instance, the women of the criminal (and outcaste) tribes of India:

"'Why were we not taught so before,' cried one; 'we could never have been so bad if we had known of the love of God.' When after a course of lessons on the life

[1] Taken from Mrs. Bickersteth's *The Christian Opportunity in Japan*, S.P.G., p. 15.

[2] Rom. viii. 9.

[3] See Palgrave, *The Treasury of Sacred Song*, pp. 179, 180, and 352—"In evil long I took delight."

of our Lord I showed them a picture of the Crucifixion, they went down on their faces in adoration. 'Give us a picture like that to take away with us when we go, then we can never go back to our sinful way of life,' said another." [1]

It is not only the suffering nor the endurance that moves such people; they have seen plenty of both (though hardly on a greater scale); but that the "one Lord Jesus Christ, the *only-begotten* Son of God, . . . Very God of Very God, . . . came down from heaven and was . . . made Man, and was crucified *for us*."

Is it necessary to point out how absolutely any substitute, taken from the 'Modernist' theory, must fail? According to Dr. Rashdall's doctrine, our Lord, having no personal pre-existence, could not be consulted as to whether He would come into the world any more than one of us is—the superhuman grandeur of the self-sacrifice is gone. We must accept Archdeacon Potter's not very credible dogma (which Dr. Rashdall rejects as unorthodox) of the pre-existence of "every human infant" to retain even an attenuated ghost of this central motive of Christianity. What is to be put instead? Is the criminal Englishman or the native sunk in vice or crime to be told that he really shares the nature of God "*to some extent*" and must develop it? He would either look quite blank or (if an Englishman) would use strong language, with the favourite adjective largely in evidence; and some of us might feel that the 'value' of his criticism was correct even if its expression was faulty.

Closely connected with this is another triumph or

[1] The *Criminal Tribes of India*, by Miss C. M. Edwards, in *The East and the West*, Jan. 1922, p. 16.

miracle of Christian belief which centres round such words as, "We know that to them that love God all things work together for good"; and, "He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not also with him freely give us all things?"[1] It is this belief which has enabled thousands and tens of thousands of Christians, from St. Paul[2] down to the present day, to bear almost intolerable pain, or crushing trouble or disappointment, with patience and resignation and sometimes even with happiness, to the wonder and admiration of many who are not Christians (some of us have known such cases; they are not very uncommon). And 'natural religion' or philosophy cannot supply a living belief of this kind. What we know of the world or 'Nature' is exceedingly little really, but we can hardly help treating our knowledge as larger and clearer than it is, and this knowledge, though it does suggest a general benevolence in the Maker of the Universe, certainly does not point to any special care for the individual. Some may be able to verify the fact of there being such providence for themselves in their lifetime by their own experience, but such proof is of little value to others; it can hardly be communicated. It may perhaps be said that, without the supreme proof given by a tremendous fact, we may believe on our Lord's authority that "there's a special providence in the fall of a sparrow," and that we "are of more value than many sparrows."[3] But the new

[1] Rom. viii. 28 (the other reading gives much the same sense), and 32.

[2] See, *e.g.* 2 Cor. xii. 7-10. This refers particularly to a very special 'trial' of faith in God's loving providence—where the trouble, to all appearance, hampers and spoils the effort to do work for Him.

[3] St. Luke xii. 7.

(or rather, revived) 'Modernist' dogma plainly makes this far less reliable; our Lord's divinity is of the same kind (we are told) as ours, and the very last thing that our (supposed) divinity does for us is to make us infallible (though many of us seem to think that we are). All that we could say of the words of Jesus Christ (about this and about other matters of religion and of morals) is that He was probably right—that He would make few mistakes; but this might be one of them. It is a beautiful thought; but how did He know?

X

SUBSTITUTES

Here, however, we are offered a way out of the difficulty by the doctrine of "values" (the amount of preliminary beliefs which we have to accept in approaching the new presentment of Christianity is becoming considerable). There are a good many allusions to this and partial statements of it in the papers read at the Cambridge Conference, but it will perhaps be clearer if we first take a statement made by Mr. Major in the *Hibbert Journal*:

"The Modern Churchman, then, has no desire to destroy or dissolve the great dogmas of the Christian Faith. He is convinced that they contain inestimable spiritual values. He is convinced also that the Christian Church cannot enjoy fulness of life without them. But he is equally sure that the Church cannot do with them in the form in which it has inherited them from a distant past. They need criticism and reformulation, and he knows there can be no finality in the process."[1]

[1] Jan. 1922, p. 212.

Again :

" The Modern Churchman demands not the abolition of dogma, but its reformulation or reinterpretation." [1]

And again (though this would refer to certain dogmas only, such as the Resurrection) :

" An alleged historical fact can only be proved to be a fact by its proper historical evidence.[2] Nevertheless, it may contain, though purely mythological, certain moral or spiritual values which ought to be retained in the Christian Faith ; and it is the duty of the theologian to discover how this can be done ; but he will only achieve this if, in addition to the rational test of the truth of dogma, he has also a moral and spiritual test." [3]

That is to say, there are certain statements forming part of the Christian religion (as hitherto understood) which are obviously and indisputably meant to be statements of fact. Certain lessons are, or may be, learnt from them, or conclusions proved by them. The ' Modernist ' claims to turn them into parables and to deduce from these any lessons which seem edifying. But plainly these are left in the air, without proof. They may be ' beautiful thoughts,' and so on, having " a high religious value," but they have no support from, and may have no real or necessary relation to the dogma at all. They are merely wearing a mask to look like it. No, certainly " there can be no finality in the process." It is

[1] Jan. 1922, p. 212.

[2] Certainly ; but the evidence must be taken as it stands, not rejected or twisted because it does not suit an *a priori* theory ; both these are constantly done. The story of Procrustes may be a myth, but it contains some important " values."

[3] P. 215.

limited only by the 'theologian's' power of imagination and his ingenuity in making words mean anything you please.[1]

It may be well to give one or two specimens of the process.

A good many years ago, in a controversy with the present Dean of Carlisle as to the ethical aspect of a clergyman's claim to interpret in a "symbolic" sense the Creeds which he has pledged himself to recite as his belief, Professor Henry Sidgwick, speaking of the words in the Creed, "Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary," said:

"Mr. Rashdall suggests that the phrase may be used to mean that Jesus was without sin from His birth; but I find it difficult to treat the suggestion seriously. A metaphor, to be undeceptive, must be accepted as such by hearers as well as speakers,"[2] etc.

An example from Professor Bethune-Baker's paper is more difficult to summarise; the argument wanders backwards and forwards; it seems to begin on one plane and end on another; a part of it is:

"God had sent His Son into the world to save it, and the Son had come of His own free will. 'He loved me and gave Himself for me': that is the authentic note of Christian faith and experience. And nothing can ever more convincingly commend to us the concept of God as Love than this picture of Father and Son alike and

[1] One is really reminded of "Lewis Carroll's" idea that words used out of their meaning should be "paid extra"; but that would be a terrible drain on the funds of 'Modernists.'

[2] *Practical Ethics*, p. 146. He was Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge, 1883-1900. Besides being an expert, he was certainly impartial; he was not an orthodox Christian.

together agreeing in the great redeeming purpose and action." [1]

Quite so; then why not leave it at that, confessing, if necessary, that our knowledge of God's being is, naturally, not sufficient to enable us to answer all the questions which might be asked about the Blessed Trinity, and that the philosophical conception of It, no less than the (supposed) popular conception, described as "Tritheistic," [2] is quite certain to be most inadequate compared with the Reality; we do not possess words accurately corresponding to facts to reason with or for defining, and must be content with seeing 'in a mirror,' darkly, a mere indistinct, though beautiful, outline.

Next, after some cloudy metaphysical talk, and the usual 'Modernist' exaggeration as to the part played in Christian theology by ancient philosophy (it was really more a servant—an instrument of expression—than a master), he quotes some recent philosophical arguments for the substantial truth of the received Christian doctrine.

"It is argued that the great sacrifice which the belief that God is Love implies, which is manifested in the life

[1] P. 297. But this depends for him on "an inference from an inference." How many stages is his Pantheistic theory removed from observed facts?

[2] This is really, often at least, merely speaking to the best of one's power of one side or aspect of the Blessed Trinity—"The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God," —while we have the Unity too 'stored up' in our mind, though one cannot reconcile them. It is not unlawful to speak simply of a geranium as being red because the colour, from a scientific point of view, is or depends on vibrations, which we cannot fit in with our sensation, or make the one explain the other. And yet these are facts of the 'material' world, which we might expect to be more within the grasp of our intelligence.
Is the last verse of 2 Cor. "Tritheistic"?

of the Incarnate, must belong to the very Being of God.[1] It must be pre-temporal, pre-historic. The Son Himself is involved in it, must share in it *ab initio*, in person, not only in idea. The relationship Father and Son, as representing the actuality of love and its inherent activity of sacrifice, must be rooted in the Being of God. So the Son must be as eternally existent as the Father. The religious value of the idea is obvious. I do not think we can escape the logic of the argument or entrench ourselves behind the thought of an ideal existence outside Time in contrast with a real one in Time." [2]

Quite so; but that is very much what the Professor proceeds to do. "By faith in God to-day we mean the conviction that Power and Love and Purpose are the characteristics of ultimate reality." (I pass by this curious account of faith—which leaves one rather cold, and, apart from Christianity, may or may not correspond to facts.) "And the Pauline conception of pre-existence, to which I have referred, may be found to have its true religious and scientific [3] value for us as the expression of the conviction that the personality and life of Jesus was

[1] "Being" must = *οὐσία*, the only philosophical term, if it really is technical at all, which is used in the 'Nicene' Creed. Then what is the sense of talking about, "We may drop the category of 'substance' etc. (on the same page, 298)? "Substantia" was taken and used as the equivalent of *οὐσία*, and various notions became attached to this; but the best English equivalent of the Greek word is used by the Professor himself; we are not concerned with the notions which became attached to a word that has its own plain meaning; *ὁμο-ούσιος* = "of one Being with the Father."

[2] P. 298, 299. The note as to the source of the argument is: "*E.g.* H. R. Mackintosh in *The Person of Christ*, pp. 445 ff. (as indeed by A. B. Bruce, in *The Humiliation of Christ* before him)."

[3] I do not know what Professor Bethune-Baker means by this; metaphysics is not "scientific" at all. A somewhat similar argument is next stated involving pretty complete Pantheism.

the crowning manifestation of this divine power and love and purpose," etc. And, after a few lines bringing in Evolution, which is an obsession, like 'King Charles' Head,' to some 'Modernists': "Where it is the eternal and inherent creativeness of God that is in action, the highest manifestation of it in human experience and history 'always' 'was.'"

It is a sort of metaphysical conjuring-trick; and, as to its "value," the argument plainly, to begin with, cuts out all special gratitude to our Lord Jesus Christ. It also *assumes* God's love; the root out of which this—not self-evident—belief grew and grows being cut away. As the Professor leaves it, the argument reminds one of the Indian conjuror who (as we were told) throws the end of a rope into the air, and then climbs up it.[1]

That the real value of the belief is in no way preserved in its 'Modernist' form is, one would suppose, clear enough to the ordinary intelligence. But it is just possible that a comparison may make it clearer still. A boy, an orphan, let us suppose, has as his guardian a fine man, whom he has always looked up to and tried, in his way, to imitate. This is largely because he was told by his nurse that when he was a baby, his friend had gone into a burning house to save him, and was badly and painfully burnt in doing so, though he came through alive, having saved the little boy. One day a friend of his who knows (or thinks he knows) informs him that that is all a great exaggeration; that his friend happened to be in the burning part of the house and did not throw himself into

[1] This is now said to have been proved, by photography, to be altogether an illusion—and Professor Baker cannot really perform the corresponding feat, either.

danger at all, but that the story (though mainly fiction) has an excellent moral—how splendid self-sacrifice is, and so forth. Will the revised "symbolical" version make no difference to the boy? Will it have the same value as the gratitude and admiration for something actually done?

In general, this doctrine of "values" rather suggests a child that plays at keeping a banking-account. A penny or two will provide him with a passbook in which he can put down what sums he likes, and draw cheques on them as his father does. But the reality—the fact of money actually paid in to his credit—is wanting.

Plainly, if the 'Modernist' dogmas are true, Christian Baptism will have to go. No ingenuity can possibly make it reasonable to speak of being "born again," "born of water and of the Spirit," and to act accordingly, when we already have deity within us.[1] And as regards the other great Sacrament, at least the Service must be completely re-written, particularly, in the beginning of the Prayer of Consecration, the words "thine *only* Son," which is a flat contradiction of the metaphysical dogma through which "it becomes possible to believe."

But, in general, the theory of "symbolical meanings" and "values" makes the use of the Prayer Book and of the New Testament a sort of perpetual deciphering of messages in code, where no word or sentence has its natural meaning. And the dogmas, while they preserve their names, having lost all guarantee that they correspond to facts, are very much like the "substitutes" used in Germany during the War; to call a drink "Kaffee" did not make it anything but an infusion of burnt acorns—as our men who were prisoners knew.

[1] See above, p. 14.

But those who hold these views are mainly or largely clergymen, and they have got to preach and to teach religion—and that to those who are not 'intellectual.' How will they do it? Will they teach these 'orthodox' dogmas just as if they were facts or grounded on facts in the way that most Christians hold them? In that case they can hardly escape being demoralised themselves by saying what they *know* will be misunderstood—"a metaphor, to be undeceptive, must be accepted as such by hearers as well as speakers."[1] And their audiences, or such among them as see through their position, will mostly leave the Church with a special contempt for 'parsons' as people who say what they do not believe for the sake of a job—as they would crudely put it. Though they could not cite Homer, or even Pope, to support them, they would (many of them, at least) feel that they "hate like death the man who hides one thing in his mind and says another."[2] In teaching boys, who have a wonderful 'nose' for detecting insincerity, the results will be simply disastrous. And if the preacher or teacher is quite candid and tells them about the notion of "values" and other 'Modernist' dogmas, with the metaphysical grounds on which these dogmas rest (for they cannot be supported from the New Testament, fairly quoted[3]), while people will hardly be satisfied of his honesty in reciting Creeds which are so plainly fixed to mean facts by such words as "the third day," they will not understand the very words that he uses. It is quite

[1] See above, p. 37.

[2] Ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κεῖνος ὁμῶς Ἀΐδαο πυλῇσιν
ὅς χ' ἕτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ.
—*Iliad*, ix, 312, 313.

[3] See above, p. 11 ff.

hopeless. The Founder of Christianity thanked His Father because He had "hid these things from the wise and prudent and had revealed them to babes"; and that is true of the essentials of His religion, as it has been commonly understood. But it is certainly not true of this 'Modernism,' which (whether true or not) is "a different gospel," and believed in on different grounds.

When some Christians at Corinth declined to believe in the Resurrection, St. Paul (though his teaching about it was by no means materialistic [1]) did not tell them that a belief in the immortality of the soul came to much the same thing and had the same "value" as the Resurrection. On the contrary, as a straightforward man [2] facing the facts, he told them that Christ's Resurrection and theirs went together (so to speak), and, if Christ had not risen, the whole religion was vain and St. Paul must be telling lies about God.[3]

XI

CONTRADICTORY INSPIRATION

We may here notice, as shortly as is possible, a claim made for the 'Modernists,' which is really essential to their position if we believe that Christianity is at all "of God":

"The more part [of Churchmen] treat the fourth-century theologians as the ultimate authority; others believe that the same 'Spirit of Jesus' Who guided St. Paul in one age and taught the Nicene Fathers in

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 44 ff.; 2 Cor. v. 1 ff.

[2] See, *e.g.* 2 Cor. i. 12; Eph. v. 8, 9.

[3] 1 Cor. xv.

another is inspiring His disciples in this age, but is requiring that the inspired should do their part in the act of inspiration "[1]

(and so on in explanation of the last clause, which, however, is clear enough).

One may pass over the statement as to "the ultimate authority," which is inexact.[2] But, as has been shown above, the 'Modernist' views run counter to the beliefs and statements of the earliest Christians about as much as they do to the formulas of the fourth and fifth and earlier centuries.[3] So we may (for the present) leave the 'theologians' out of consideration, and it is then clear that the Holy Spirit must be supposed to have taught at two different times—in the Apostolic age and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—things contradictory to each other. Nor can it even be contended that if these earliest believers had known the later theory or explanation they would, or might, have endorsed it. For, as we have seen,[4] St. Paul knew a form of the main 'Modernist' theory or dogma quite well, and refused to touch it.

Further light (if this is necessary) is thrown by the history of the early Church on the absurdity of the con-

[1] Dr. John H. Skrine in the *Guardian* of 2nd Dec. 1921.

[2] The ultimate authority on the subject in the Church of England consists, first, of the facts and words recorded in the New Testament, and secondarily of these as stated and formulated by the Church; this is clearly asserted in the Articles (*e.g.* vi. viii. xx. xxi.), and implied in the Prayer Book.

[3] The Creed agreed to at Nicaea was an amended version of an older Creed. The date of the "Apostles' Creed" (as regards most of it, including its most important part) is now agreed to have been between 100 and 150 A.D. (see, *e.g.* Burn, *The Nicene Creed* and *The Apostles' Creed*). Both creeds, in their early forms, contain statements quite inconsistent with 'Modernism.'

[4] P. 11 ff.

tention. For 'Modernist' views, or any approach to them, would have made things much easier for Christians. The Church could have made terms with the Stoic philosophy—at all events as to its view of the soul. It would have been fairly content with the eclectic religion of Alexander Severus. It would not have been hampered by belief in abnormal occurrences consequent upon God's coming into the world, which called for faith and some intellectual humility—such as the Resurrection, which Celsus [1] attacks in quite a 'modern' fashion. And if there had been persecution after all, the tests could have been faced with no greater mental gymnastics or evasions than 'Modernists' now require. Incense could have been offered to the deity incarnate in the Emperor; and as to the other gods, the theory of Euhemerus might have made the same homage possible. Perhaps, too, few people would have thought it worth while to give up their lives for such a religion. One can hardly believe that God, if He really rules things and taught the Church by His Spirit, would have arranged that those who specially desired to do His will should have been so misled as to face and to suffer torture and death for nothing. Certainly, as regards this 'Modernist' claim to inspiration, we must "prove the spirits, whether they are of God: because many false prophets are gone out into the world." [2] And this particular inspiration will hardly pass muster. In this way, too, it does not appear that the 'Modernist' 'aids to belief' are themselves very credible.

[1] See, *e.g.* Origen, *Contra Celsum*, ii. 55.

[2] 1 John iv. 1.

XII

FICTION AND FACT

It is, however, contended by ' Modernists ' that the old ways of looking at things *must* be altered somehow, since we are so much better and wiser than our fathers—who, therefore, for the purpose of the argument, must be made to appear as foolish as possible. We may look first at a contention which runs through a good many of these papers which do not otherwise agree, that our Lord's human nature, as opposed to His Godhead, was for a long time wholly disregarded. There is a percentage of truth in this ; certainly His human nature and His character have within the last fifty or sixty years been studied widely, freely, and sometimes with special care, though with results of varying worth. But the contention, as made, is, like many other ' Modernist ' statements, quite absurdly exaggerated.

" The wonder-working superman and demi-god which Apollinarianism, masquerading as orthodoxy, has for so long presented as the object of the Church's worship,"

are words which occur in one of the more sane of these papers (p. 307).

As regards modern times, most people will be able to criticise these wild words in detail for themselves. Canon Glazebrook says :

" More and more Christ came to be regarded simply as a deity, while his humanity was either depreciated or ignored. . . . They gradually lost the early conception of Jesus Christ which made Him a fit mediator" . . . and the Blessed Virgin was substituted (p. 209).

Then, again, Canon Barnes says :

" We do not affirm that the Lord's Person and work have been central in Christianity in the past. There is much to be said for the view that they were, from the end of the second century to the close of the Middle Ages, concealed beneath alien ideas derived from the mystery-religions ; that the Reformation was the hammer which broke the husk within which, under God's providence, the kernel had been preserved during the decline and eclipse of European civilization " (p. 255).

Now hardly anyone who is not a Roman Catholic (and not all who are) would deny that in the Middle Ages the Blessed Virgin [1] and other saints too were in some cases, or to some degree, put in our Lord's place, and that devotion due to Him was to some extent diverted. But any notion that there was not an immense amount of devotion paid to Him, and that with a very real recognition of His human nature, is simply an extravagance. To begin with, there were the statements in the ' Nicene ' Creed, and in what is called the ' Athanasian Creed ' (much used in England and abroad, and translated into English and French)—" He was made Man " ; " Perfect God and Perfect Man," with the following words which deny Apollinarianism.[2] The fact of our Lord's humanity was, of course, further stated in the Missal and the Breviary. And, the doctrine of " values " not being then in use, the words were taken in their natural and necessary

[1] But a good deal (though not all) of the devotion to her has explicit reference to her connection with our Lord, and can hardly be said to be diverted from Him.

[2] In a (northern) English translation of about 1240 :

" Fulli God fulli man livand
Of schilful saule and mannes flesshe beand."

Quoted by Gibson, *The Three Creeds*, p. 270 ff.

meaning. In the Litany (or ' Procession '), a very popular service, and translated in the Prymer, the chief facts of our Lord's human life and death are set forth in detail.[1]

There is a like appeal in the verses of the " Dies Irae," " Recordare, Jesu pie " and in the one that follows. There are quite admirable things said on the subject in Langforde's *Meditations for Ghostly Exercise in the Time of the Mass*,[2] (of the second half of the fifteenth or the early sixteenth century), for instance :

" Have in meditation the most pure, gracious, and innocent life of our Saviour. . . . Have remembrance of the continual prayers, hymns, psalms and other orisons, which our Saviour did offer for us to His eternal Father both nightly, daily, and hourly. . . . Have meditation how our Lord, the Saviour of all mankind, most wilfully (*i.e.* willingly) offered Himself to His eternal Father, to be the sacrifice and oblation for man's redemption; and offer your self to Him again, both body and soul, which He so dear bought. . . . Remember the seven words of great mystery which our Lord did speak, hanging quick upon the Cross, in His great agony, distress, and pain of death, and specially follow the example of that holy word in the which He prayed for His enemies, that they might be forgiven the cruelty they did to Him at His Passion. See now that you likewise forgive all injures, displeasures, wrongs and occasions for the love of Him that thus meekly and mercifully did forgive His trespassers. Then shall you be His disciples ; then shall you be the chosen vessels apt to receive His grace. . . . Have in meditation with perfect remembrance and holy mind, considering the most tender mercy and love of our sweet Lord and

[1] See, *e.g.* Maskell, *Monumenta Ritualia Ecclesiae Anglicanae*, ii. p. 106.

[2] In *Tracts on the Mass*, ed. Wickham Legg, Henry Bradshaw Society, p. 22 ff. I have altered the spelling and punctuation, but nothing else.

Redeemer Jesu, which would take our nature upon Him, in that not only to suffer these great torments and pains aforesaid, but also to suffer in our said nature most shameful, terrible, and cruel death, and all to win our love."

We may add from the fly-leaves of a *Processional of the Nuns of Chester* [1] a sample of the hymns and prayers there, of the fifteenth century, almost all addressed to our Lord and sometimes in terms almost too much like what might be used to a human friend or relation :

" O dear-worth (precious) Jesu, I beseech thee also
That I may love my neighbour as I should do,
Even as myself, do he me good or ill,
For Thy love, Lord, and for none other skill (reason).
O mightful Jesu, I beseech thy grace.
That I may hate deadly sin in every place,
And specially for thy love and for no fear
Of pain (punishment) neither here nor elsewhere."

And again :

" Jesu, give me grace that I may see
Thy great goodness done to me,
And I unkind again have be (been) ;
Forgive me, Lord, that art so free.

Jesu, thy love and fleshly thought
Won (dwell) together they may nought,
As honey and gall together brought,
Sweet and bitter accordeth nought."

One more specimen must be cited, from a rather free translation of a part of St. Bonaventura's *Vita Christi*— " Medytacyons of the soper of oure lorde Jhesu " made

[1] Ed. by Wickham Legg, Henry Bradshaw Society, pp. 26 and 33. The spelling and stops are altered.

probably by Robert Manning of Brunne, c. 1315-1330.[1] After describing the washing of the disciples' feet, the verses go on :

When Christ this service had all y-done,
To the supping place again then they come.
By this ensample, and many other,
He comforted (encouraged) them to do to their brother.
Man, here bethink, in each degree,
How fair ensample Christ shewed to thee ;
Ensample of meekness to thee he let,
When he washed his disciples' feet :
A great ensample of meekness look,
When he his flesh to thy food took (gave).
A fair monishing his sermon shewed,
That the lered (learned) men should teach the lewed (unlearned) ;
Patience he shewed, his traitor suffering
So shamely to the death as a thief him (to) bring ;
In going to the death, he shewed obedience
In fulfilling his father's commandments.
Steadfastly for to pray here may'st thou lere (learn),
For he prayed first thrice ere his father would hear.
By these virtues follow him, I rede (counsel),
And into his bliss they will thee lead."

This is perhaps not very poetical, but it is very sound Christianity—certainly not a " husk."

Perhaps it may be well to give one or two rather earlier examples of mediaeval Christianity from homilies of the twelfth century, translated or compiled from others of the eleventh century :

" He suffered for us on the Cross and gave everlasting freedom to as many as would receive it. He is his only Son, not adopted but begotten, for he begot him as the

[1] Ed. J. Meadows Cowper, Early English Text Society, p. 6. It is here put into modern English form, more or less ; ' reverential ' capitals are not put in as we now use them.

sun generates light which he spreads abroad into all this wide world. And the Father is in the Son in three ways: in strength, for he is great and mighty above all things; in beauty, for the sun and moon darken before his fairness; in virtue, for he is full of all goodness." [1]

Our Lord is the "one Mediator":

"This man who came thus from heaven into earth and took man's nature upon him for man's sake, what need had mankind that he should become man? Man had lost the right of speaking before God; then came this man who had never sinned and who might speak everywhere. This man became spokesman. He reconciled God and man." [2]

And one example concerning Christian conduct:

"Thy friend thou lovest for the good deeds he doth thee, and he thee also. That is nothing. But thou wouldest indeed be his friend before (or, toward) Christ, if, when thou sawest that he will foolishly fall into the devil's hand and into his works, thou didst check and restrain him if thou wert able; and Christ hath commanded that thou shalt love thy enemy for love of him, and restrain his sins if thou wert able, and pray for him daily that Christ may bring him to turn from his wickedness before the day of his death. What availeth thee wrath, when God almighty, having come upon this earth, hath commanded each Christian man thus?" [3]

Sacraments too, though they are highly valued, are described from anything but a non-moral, magical,

[1] *Old English Homilies and Homiletic Treatises*, First Series; E.E.T.S.; ed. and tr. Richard Morris, pp. 74-77.

[2] As above, pp. 82, 83. I have not inserted 'reverential' capitals not in the original.

[3] As above, pp. 16, 17. Another sermon, for Palm Sunday, describes our Lord's entry into Jerusalem, and draws most excellent teaching from His example, as to humility, and the looking on God's gifts in the right way (p. 2 ff.).

"mystery-religion" point of view: it is explained again and again that they and other means of grace are useless or harmful without a change to right Christian living. Unless a man has "true shrift,"

"there is no need that anyone here in this life should pray pater noster for his soul, nor sing mass, nor do any other good thing. Ah, how should another man's good deeds do good to him who never in his life took thought of any good thing? Ah, who is he that may water the horse that will not drink himself? No more may anyone do good for their souls that in this life would not begin to do good." [1]

Mediaeval Christianity, as taught by a good and intelligent priest (such as Chaucer's "parson"), was anything but a "husk."

Evidence in the same direction is given by the specially Christlike lives of some of the saints in (or shortly before) the Middle Ages, such as St. Aidan, St. Hugh of Lincoln, St. Francis of Assisi, St. Richard of Chichester. Some of us will believe that this was made possible by the Spirit of God and of Christ and through the Sacrament of Christ's Body and Blood, but 'Modernists' at least will not ignore the 'natural causes'—the study of His life in the Gospels; these really were largely read and preached on too, in the later times as well; to Thomas Gascoigne, for instance, who was a great preacher, our Lord was very "central" indeed.[2] As an outward sign of all this, the most impressive thing ("central" in more senses than one) in all English Churches—much more than any Altar—was the Rood; and crucifixes, at first often more or less sym-

[1] Pp. 8-11; see also pp. 24 ff., 36 ff., 48 ff.

[2] See *Loci e Libro Veritatum*, ed. Thorold Rogers; Gascoigne died in 1458.

bolical, became realistic and human (with nothing 'docetic' about them); their lesson was driven home by the frequent carvings of the Instruments of the Passion; they were the cause too, naturally but unfortunately, of various mediaeval oaths which long survived.[1] Thus no one was likely to doubt that our Lord was "very man"; and the great central fact of Christianity, which is destroyed for practical purposes by revolutionary 'Modernism,' was constantly taught—"Jesus Christ was openly set forth crucified,"[2] in image and picture as well as in words. And, whatever our opinion on the mediaeval Mass may be otherwise, there is no doubt that our Lord was "central" in it—in the great principal service. It is at least doubtful whether the Reformation increased the total of devotion to our Lord (for the time, at all events), though it certainly diminished that to the Blessed Virgin and other saints.[3]

It seemed worth while to state and prove these unquestionable facts, for it would certainly be a 'trial of faith' if we had to believe that for many centuries God's revelation had been useless. But there is no reason for supposing anything of the kind. And what must one think of the judgment or care for truth of those who, setting

[1] One of them (probably) is still in constant use.

[2] Gal. iii. 1.

[3] Probably the great majority of those who have studied the history—not legends—of the Reformation and of the period preceding it would agree that some reformation of the Church was necessary, and inevitable, largely because its recognised principles and laws were paralysed by sordid worldly abuses, such as 'Provisions.' But it was like the case of a man who undergoes a grave and unpleasant operation to save his life; it is a long time (at least) before he recovers health. Certainly Calvinism, whose horrible logical or philosophical consistency captured so many of the reformed Churches, did not tend to raise men's estimation of our Lord and of His work.

out to instruct us, state large historical generalisations which suit their argument and their prejudices without taking the trouble to find out whether these are true, or are largely or for the most part simply contrary to facts?

XIII

MORE FICTION

However, there are other grounds alleged for a radical change in Christianity, about some of which something has necessarily been said already. These are (principally, at all events) the new teaching of Modern Philosophy,[1] of Science,[2] and of History.[3] These are often, both in the nature of things and by their treatment in these papers, none too easy to separate. Something has already been said about the weakness of metaphysics; and heaven forbid that we should have an attempt at what is called "Christology" in terms of modern metaphysics, defining things which cannot be defined. Many of these writers seem to be obsessed with the notion that the 'Nicene' (or Chalcedonian) Creed is largely metaphysical. There is one metaphysical word in the English version of it, which is perhaps not a very good word, since it has acquired materialistic associations, but, except to a student of ancient philosophies, carries no technical meaning at all, and one of these 'Modernist' writers is compelled to employ its equivalent—"being."[4] Otherwise, the

[1] See, *e.g.* (in the *Modern Churchman*, Sept. 1921), pp. 202, 204, 281 ff., 286, 289 note, 297 ff., 326, 338.

[2] *E.g.* pp. 297, 338, 340.

[3] *E.g.* pp. 326, 332, 340.

[4] See above, p. 39 note.

'Nicene' Creed is largely made up of quotations from the New Testament, and the rest of it out of paraphrases (obviously fair ones) of one, or sometimes two passages combined in each clause. Anyone who has a good knowledge of the New Testament can test this for himself with an old Bible, scissors, some foolscap paper, and a paste-pot. Even the theological explanations given by the Council of Chalcedon do not use many technical terms except "being" (or, "substance") and its compounds; the nearly untechnical Creeds of Nicaea and Constantinople are declared by the Council of Chalcedon to be sufficient "for those who receive it (or, them) faithfully." There were decrees (with the approval of the letters of Cyril and Leo) as foot-notes directed against notions which, as stated, are apparently contrary either to the New Testament or to common sense. But the Council had no desire to make Christianity more limited or more technical, and, instead of embodying the 'foot-notes' in the Creed, ordered "that it shall not be lawful for anyone to bring forward, or write, or compose, or devise, or teach any other Creed"—even for converts "from heathenism or Judaism or from any heresy whatsoever."[1] But the quarrel of the revolutionary 'Modernist' is not with the foot-notes any more than with the Creed, nor with the technical term in the Creed, or the Creed in general, any more than with the statements in the New Testament which it embodies.

We may just notice here two remarkable historical statements:

"Theological speculation and construction ceased not

[1] See *Canons of the First Four Councils* (pub. by Parker, 1869), p. 83 ff. The prohibition was renewed by the Sixth General Council, A.D. 680, 681.

long after Chalcedon, not because men felt that finality had been obtained, but because the barbarian invasions, which broke up the Roman Empire, put an end to all intellectual activity. The true successors, therefore, of the Fathers of the Church are not the ecclesiastics who for long ages held on to an unchanging tradition, but those who in recent times have applied the best modern thought in order to interpret the Divine Master to their contemporaries," etc. (p. 204).

"Creed-making did indeed continue to be fashionable until the development of theology came to an abrupt stop with the collapse of civilization in the fifth and sixth centuries" (p. 324).

The beginning of the second quotation seems to be due to a hazy recollection of the various more or less Arian creeds composed in the fourth century. Both statements are misleading and inaccurate. Neither writer seems to be aware that there was an Eastern Empire,[1] for a long time much less disturbed than the West, in which theological speculation certainly did not cease and reacted on the West as well. Neither writer appears to have heard of the Monophysites and the Monothelites, or to know that the Monophysitism of the native Egyptians and their consequent hatred for the more orthodox official Church greatly helped the Arab conquest of Egypt about 640 (nearly two hundred years after Chalcedon); that Emperors tried hard, at any cost to the faith, to make some sort of compromise between the two views, in order to secure political peace and unity; that one Pope was practically martyred in 655 for adherence to the view which made our Lord a real and complete man, and that another was persuaded to represent our Lord's humanity as a sort of play-acting; that a council was held at

[1] It included parts of the West for a considerable time.

Constantinople in A.D. 680 and 681, and was accepted both in East and West, which finally made our Lord's real and perfect humanity the faith of the Catholic Church; but that Iconoclasm was in origin and in spirit a recrudescence of Monophysitism and did not come to an end till 842.[1]

Would it not be well, before making historical statements to be used in argument, to see that they are at least approximately true? 'Modernists' are much too fond of constructing history *a priori* to suit their views.

XIV

SCIENCE, ANCIENT AND MODERN

There is a more important sentence (in part of a paper which has been commented on before) which seems to touch all three—History, Science, and Philosophy; and not to 'adorn' any of them. Professor Bethune-Baker says:

"Again, to early Christian religiosity, with its background of angels and daemons, its world of physics in which there was nothing that could not happen because no one knew how or why anything happened, the idea of the pre-existence of Jesus was an almost inevitable inference from the belief in His Godhead—an inference from an inference" (p. 297).[2]

[1] See *Dict. Chr. Ant.* i. 444 ff.; *Dict. Chr. Biog.* iv. 312 ff.; and articles "Martinus, Pope," and "Honorius"; and iii. 291 ff.; also Mansi, *Concilia*, vol. xi., especially pp. 539-542.

[2] There is a somewhat similar contention on p. 338:
"It is not possible to believe that the Fathers of the third and fourth centuries, after innumerable and bitter controversies, carried on through the medium of a very imperfect philosophy

The causes do not seem very clearly connected with the result or the thing to be proved, and probably most people —even the enlightened—would still think that the second inference (at least) was fairly obvious. In the first part of the sentence I am afraid that I do not know what is meant by 'daemons'; spelt with a diphthong it is rather a part of Greek than of Christian religion. As to the existence of other spirits besides God and human souls, some persons who are not 'Spiritualists' think that there are indications (or even, some would say, proofs) of this as a fact. But 'Modernists' would probably rule out any such evidence without investigation (see p. 288) as 'superstitious'—they have much of the 'cock-sureness' of the last century which is now on the decline. Of more importance is the remarkable view of knowledge and of thought in the ancient world—a world which, when one really gets into touch with it (for instance, in the letters of Cicero and Pliny, and in St. Chrysostom's sermons), is in many ways so strangely modern. Now no one, learned or unlearned, ancient or modern, can possibly help noticing a number of 'uniformities'—an apparently invariable succession of consequent to antecedent, as by a 'law.' And the more things anyone attempts to do—in agriculture, or manufacturing things, or in building—the more does he prove these successions or substitute others. Even if he is mistaken as to the real cause (as about the 'humours' which some centuries

(on this see above, p. 54 ff.) and in complete ignorance of physical and biological fact, arrived at absolute conclusions on the greatest and most fundamental problems, which would hold for all time. Now their conclusions are expressed to us in our creeds," etc.

This is practically covered by what is said on Professor Bethune-Baker, and in the part referred to above.

ago were supposed to play so great a part in the health or disease of the body), that does not disturb his belief in the relation of cause and effect—the effects are real, and the cause is quite real to his imagination. And no one, educated or uneducated, expects things to happen in a way which he has never seen. The experience was bound to be there, constantly used; it was ready to be formulated, and no one could state the 'reign of law' more uncompromisingly than Lucretius, shortly before the Christian era, where he speaks of Epicurus 'passing in thought beyond the limits of the world, and through the immeasurable universe, and bringing back victoriously as spoils the knowledge of' "what can and what cannot come into being; in short, on what principle the power of each thing is limited, a deep-set boundary stone." [1]

But, besides this, the Professor appears to bracket the 'how' and the 'why.' One had thought that this confusion of thought was nearly obsolete,[2] among those who make any attempt at clear—not to say, philosophical—thinking. Science is "descriptive formulation, not interpretative explanation": "a law of nature explains nothing." [3] Even in the last century, though the con-

[1] i. 72 ff. But, like so many persons since, he does not really explain *why* things happen—what is the ultimate cause. Even if his theory were true, *why* are there atoms, and *why* do they move, and for that matter, *why* do 'results' follow each other? See below.

[2] *E.g.* "But all clear thinking and all advance in knowledge (as the history of thought shows quite conclusively) depend on keeping two separate questions clear. The first is, How do things happen?—which is the business of science. The second is, Why do things happen so?—which is the task of theology to explain." [At all events science cannot, and does not now profess to do it]. F. R. Barry in *The Pilgrim*, Jan. 1922, p. 192.

[3] See above, p. 5.

fusion was very common, a good many persons saw through it.

" Even Herbert Spencer allows that in ultimate analysis all natural causation is inexplicable[1] . . . . Although science is essentially engaged in explaining,[2] her work is necessarily confined to the sphere of natural causation [the relation of antecedent and consequent] ; beyond that sphere (*i.e.* the sensuous) she can explain nothing."

If this is wrong ; if science knows so much more than the ancient world about the ' why ' as well as the ' how ' in nature, will Dr. Baker explain (to take a few instances from familiar things) *why* bodies attract each other—like the bubbles in a tea-cup or the tides as drawn by the moon ; *why* a body once in motion continues to move ; *why* electricity passes quietly through metal ; *why* a seed manufactures a plant or a tree—or, for that matter, *why* anything happens ? The fact is that, though we know, scientifically, a great deal more than used to be known as to the ' how,' we know, scientifically, just as much as the ancients knew about the ' why '—that is to say, nothing at all.

And as with the connection of particular ' causes ' and ' effects ' (or rather antecedents and consequents) about which no one can say *why* things should be so, so it is with ' causation ' as a whole ; science can give no reason why there should be this wonderful thing at all.

" Everything that *happens* has a cause. The same happening has always the same cause—or the same consequent the same antecedent. It is only familiarity with

[1] Romanes († 1894), *Thoughts on Religion*, ed. Gore, pp. 124-126 (ed. 1904).

[2] The apparent contradiction in this word with what has gone before is obviously verbal only.

this great fact that prevents universal wonder at it, for, notwithstanding all the theories upon it, no one has ever really shown why it is so. . . . The knowledge of this fact is purely empirical; we can show no reason why it should be a fact. Doubtless, if it were not a fact, there could be no so-called 'Order of Nature,' and consequently no science, no philosophy, or perhaps (if the irregularity were sufficiently frequent) no possibility of human experience. [Perhaps this fact may give us a clue to the reason for it.] But [so far as science is concerned] although this is easy enough to show, it in no wise tends to show why the same causes should always produce the same effects." [1]

There is a fact which may throw some further light upon the subject:

"Now, although familiarity with this fact ["the great phenomenon of causality"] has made us forget its wonder to the extent of virtually assuming that we know all about it, philosophical enquiry shows that, besides empirically knowing it to be a fact, we only know one other thing about it, viz.—that our knowledge of it is derived from our own activity when we ourselves are causes. No result of psychological analysis seems to me more certain than this. . . . [2]

"Hence the plain man will always infer that all energy is of the nature of will-energy, and all objective causation of the nature of subjective. Nor is this inference confined to the plain man; the deepest philosophical thinkers have arrived at substantially the same opinion, *e.g.* Hegel, Schopenhauer. So that the direct and most natural interpretation of causality in external nature which is drawn by primitive thought in savages and young children, seems destined to become also the ultimate

[1] Romanes, as above, pp. 126, 127.

[2] Therefore, whenever we lift up a stone, we do something like a miracle, mind acting upon matter.

deliverance of human thought in the highest levels of its culture." [1]

Thus, if the people of 1800 or 1900 years ago had been as Dr. Bethune-Baker describes them, they would not have been fundamentally irrational after all, though they would have handicapped themselves for doing things. This seems to go with what our Lord says about things being "hid from the wise and prudent, and revealed to babes."

XV

MIRACLES

It will be no surprise that, a little later on, Romanes says that he purposes

"to show that, provided only we lay aside all prejudice, sentiment, etc., and follow to its logical termination the

[1] Romanes, as above, pp. 117, 118.

This is so important that it may be well to add another statement of the facts, by another author:

"We have come to see with increasing clearness that physical causes are not causes at all, in the sense which our reason or causal instinct demands. They are only antecedents or conditions that transmit causation which they cannot themselves originate.

For our whole notion of cause is confessedly derived from what takes place within ourselves. As self-conscious beings we can be also self-determined; we can frame our own ideals, fashion our own plans, choose which, of many suggested motives, we will make our own; and all this without any compulsion from without. . . . Thus our will is an agent whose reason for action is contained within itself, and as such a self-explanatory agent. When we have traced an occurrence to the intervention of the human will, we are at once content. It is fully accounted for. We know not merely how it began, but why (its *raison d'être*), and have, therefore, reached its absolute beginning. This then is the source of our conception of cause, and this is what we mean by the term," etc. (Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, 1903 ed., pp. 106, 107).

guidance of pure reason, there are no other conclusions to be reached than these. Namely, (A) That if there be a personal God, no reason can be assigned why He should not be immanent in nature, or why all causation should not be the immediate expression of His will.[1] (B) That every available reason points to the inference that He probably is so. (C) That if He is so, and if His will is self-consistent, all natural causation must needs appear to us 'mechanical.' Therefore (D) That it is no argument against the divine origin of a thing, event, etc., to prove it due to natural causation." [2]

Further,

"On any logical theory of Theism there can be no such distinction between 'natural' and 'supernatural' as is usually drawn, since on that theory all causation is but the action of the Divine Will.[3] . . . The real distinction is not between natural and supernatural, but between the explicable and the inexplicable—meaning by those terms that which is and that which is not accountable by such causes as fall within the range of human observation." [4]

It is wholly consistent with this, and is merely its necessary complement, to say that

"The antecedent improbability against a miracle being wrought by a man without a moral object is apt to be confused with that of its being done by God with an adequate moral object. The former is immeasurably

[1] Including, of course, the creation (by whatever steps or stages) of men as independent personalities.

[2] Romanes, as above, pp. 120, 121.
The immediate connection of this is that he is going to show, as against Pantheism, "the possible union of immanence with personality." See Illingworth, *Divine Immanence.*

[3] On p. 92 ff. there are some excellent remarks on some difficulties connected with this, quoted from a paper read by Romanes —not the unfinished notes.

[4] As above, p. 125.

great; the latter is only equal to that of the theory of Theism—i.e. *nil.*" [1]

These considerable extracts are quoted from one who, not so very long ago (he died in 1894), "occupied a distinguished place in contemporary biology," and was also a student of metaphysics and theology. As many people know, he had on grounds of reason and of conscience given up religious belief and practice, but gradually became convinced, first, that "it was reasonable to be a Christian believer," and "returned before his death to . . . full, deliberate communion with the Church of Jesus Christ." [2] As will be clear even from these extracts, and clearer still from other parts not here quoted, the faith to which he returned as reasonable was substantially the old 'orthodox' belief of the Church,[3] not any 'Modernist' substitute.

Thus it does not appear that Science, reasonably considered, has anything to say against the truth of ordinary Christianity. And this belief is confirmed by the number of men of the very first rank in scientific knowledge and achievement who have been believing Christians—any one of whom had a better and sounder grip of science than the whole of the Cambridge Conference put together; one may instance (to take fairly recent examples only) Faraday, Brewster, Lord Lister, Lord Kelvin, Pasteur; [4] and the

[1] As above, p. 180.

[2] As above, p. 184, note by the Editor (Bishop Gore).

[3] *E.g.* In the Incarnation and the Trinity, pp. 174-176; the Resurrection, p. 145; the Atonement, p. 182; and he "agrees with Pascal that there is virtually nothing to be gained by being a theist as distinguished from a Christian" (p. 165).

[4] Romanes speaks of "a galaxy of genius" in Mathematical science at Cambridge in his time, in which "all the most illustrious names were ranged on the side of orthodoxy" (p. 137).

breed has not died out. These are facts; and that in spite of the special, non-rational difficulty that a student of science has to get over—that he is constantly studying uniformities and looking out for more, which is likely to become a habit of mind. And then a 'Modernist' says that, if we will only 'scrap' the present creeds "there are not, I believe, lacking signs of possible convergence from the scientific side"! (p. 339).

It may be well to glance for a moment at a popular form of the argument against miracles, which has done much service to disbelief but is radically unsound. It is said that "miracles are contrary to experience." Now this must mean either "contrary to ordinary experience," or "contrary to universal experience." The former is merely tautological, or a truism; if the occurrences were not contrary to ordinary experience they would not be called 'miracles.' But if what is meant is "contrary to universal experience," this is the common fallacy called *petitio principii*, 'begging the question,' assuming what has to be proved. For a miracle well attested is itself a part of experience.

If anyone is convinced—on whatever grounds—of the Deity of Christ, to argue from the state of things apart from His presence in the world (or that of His Spirit in a very special way and when testimony of a striking kind was required) is merely false analogy. It might as well be argued that the presence of a lake somewhere is impossible, through not considering human activity in the past; that there cannot possibly be sparrows in Bermuda or red deer in New Zealand. These denials would ignore the work (or 'interference') of man as a factor; the other ignores the

presence and work of Christ, and " the witness which God gave of His Son."

But for all that, we must, apparently, add to the list of ' Modernist ' dogmas, " Miracles do not happen."

This *a priori* elimination of ' miracles '—strangely called " the main facts of historical criticism "—(p. 340 ; see also pp. 339, 288, and elsewhere) does not arise simply from a perverted intellectual view of science. Bacon saw long ago that the human intelligence has not a " dry light but is coloured by will and feelings " ; [1] " Reason is very far indeed from being the sole guide of judgment that it is usually taken to be—so far indeed, that, save in matters approaching downright demonstration . . . it is usually hampered by custom, prejudice, dislike, etc., to a degree that would astonish the most sober philosopher " [2] if his mental processes were laid bare to himself. And only some non-reasonable (or unreasonable) process will account for ' critics ' saying some of the things that they do say or have said, for the resolve of ' Modernists ' to be ' modern ' at any cost, and for the naïve way in which some of them, when they meet with some fact or recorded saying which they do not like (according to the ancient story of the bishop consulted on a difficult passage) " look it in the face and pass on," merely asserting—without any proof—that it cannot mean what it naturally does mean.[3]

[1] See *Novum Organum*, Aphorism, XLIX.

[2] Romanes, as above, p. 136.

[3] See, *e.g.* at bottom of p. 279, " Even Luke x. 22, though it implies a very high conception of His own Divine Mission, does not imply Godhead " (Dr. Rashdall) ; and (by another author) bottom of p. 267. The latter remarkable statement appears, so far as words go, to be an ill-expressed denial of Sabellianism, but this is doubtless not the meaning intended.

There are many non-rational motives that work against belief. One of these—a habit of mind that must beset the student of science, unless he discounts it (as has so often been done), has been mentioned above. Again, "It is easier to attack than to defend. There is little point in writing a book which repeats what has already been said well, whereas destructive criticism finds no difficulty in producing attractive novelties." [1] "Truth is one, error is manifold" and leaves far greater scope for 'originality,' and the winning of an intellectual reputation. This is and has been, for various reasons, a specially strong and widely spread temptation in Germany (often, no doubt unconscious), from which country, both as to origin and development and elaboration, the present school of destructive criticism has so largely come. Besides these there is a sort of mental inertia which, unless it is guarded against, is apt to warp the judgment both of educated and uneducated—the difficulty or the trouble of imagining to oneself something actually happening of which you have had no experience and which you cannot readily account for, or 'place.' It may be quite true, but minds find it easier to run in their accustomed grooves. The woman in Mrs. Gaskell's novel who would believe in mermaids of which she had often heard before, but not in flying-fish, is quite true to life. Herodotus declined to believe evidence that, when sailors had gone very far south, the sun was to the north of them,[2] and boys in 'Central Africa' refused some years ago to believe in aeroplanes; [3] it was easier for them to think that a most

[1] *Theology*, Feb. 1922, *The Acts of the Apostles in recent Criticism* (W. K. Lowther-Clarke), p. 69.

[2] iv. 42.

[3] Randolph, *Arthur Douglas*, p. 238.

admirable man who was teaching them was a liar; they probably know better now from experience. This state of mind is, unless we happen to have full knowledge of precisely similar conditions, not reasonable, but it is very common indeed. "It is much more easy to disbelieve than to believe. . . . Unbelief is usually due to indolence, often to prejudice, and never a thing to be proud of." [1]

However, as regards reason (as we have already seen), for a Theist to disbelieve in miracles on *a priori* grounds is inconsistent—trying to ride two horses at once, a position of very 'unstable equilibrium.' Such disbelief fits in rather with a belief (which was 'modern' in the nineteenth century, but is tending to become obsolete) in a self-existent mechanical Universe with 'laws' "sufficient in themselves to govern" it.[2] Or God might be thought of as having made the machines (or, as would have been said later, one great complex machine called 'Evolution'), wound them up and left them to work; this also was a

[1] Romanes, as above, pp. 144, 145.

[2] See above, p. 5.
Perhaps the high-water-mark of this notion was shown at the Belfast meeting of the British Association in 1874; Tyndall's address was frivolously paraphrased by *Punch*:

"Oh, first, let us honour the atom,
So lively, so wise, and so small;
The Atomists next let us praise,
Epicurus, Lucretius, and all;
Let us 'damn with faint praise' Bishop Butler,
In whom many atoms combined
To make up that remarkable structure
Which it pleased him to call his mind"

(quoted from memory, I am afraid). This may be partly libellous, but it suggests fairly enough the notions of some of Tyndall's disciples, at all events. The atom, as we know, has now 'fallen from its high estate' as an ultimate, creative fact.

favourite conception—the " best thought " [1] of an earlier ' modern ' period.

But, to a Christian,[2] all that goes on in ' Nature ' is due to God's will, working continuously. It is plain that, normally, uniformity (which, by a metaphor, we describe as ' laws ') is for the good of mankind; it gives them responsibility, and causes them both to develop their wits and to make their lives easier by inventions; it seems necessary in order to fit the world to be ' a state of probation ' (and of education too), and " only by means of this theory of probation is it possible to give any meaning to the world, *i.e.* any *raison d'etre* of human existence." [3] We may also think that such consistency is worthy of the dignity of God, somewhat as a man of character will lead a regular life and work methodically, and can be depended on to act in a similar way under similar circumstances. But, if the circumstances are altered, such a man will change his action accordingly; if he did not, we should think him unreasonable. If he managed his children all alike and at all times by absolutely undeviating rules, we should think him quite unintelligent and a very poor kind

[1] P. 289. It was apparently then ' rational ' ! The note rather suggests that Dr. Bethune-Baker's views were quite too puzzling or incoherent for many of the Conference. One can sympathise.

[2] See, *e.g.* Hebrews i. 3; Acts xvii. 25 ff; Psalm civ. Thus the Jewish and the early Christian Church already held a view now prevailing in philosophy. There is clear and interesting teaching of ' Divine Immanence,' combined with Transcendence, in an English sermon of about A.D. 1000—in those hopelessly ' Dark Ages.' (See Thorpe, *Analecta Anglo-Saxonica, Homilies of Ælfric*, pp. 69, 70).

[3] Romanes, as above, p. 142. The theory of the eternally pre-existent human soul makes the career of each more or less a ' goose-step,' or " balance-step without gaining ground "—see above, p. 22.

of father. And (as we have seen) [1] God can hardly be under a sort of obligation always to observe His own 'laws,' 'the laws of nature,' if some new mode of action would better secure the ends He has in view. In fact, the whole notion of 'Modernists' as to what is 'natural,' or 'above nature' or 'contrary to nature' has no reality about it.[2]

XVI

THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE

In the last thirty or forty years a great change has taken place in the position of the written evidence—"the outcome of the great textual battle is impartially considered a signal victory for Christianity." [3] The sort of dates assigned by tradition to the Epistles of St. Paul ("displaying the belief of the apostles") are generally agreed to, and there is "the certainty of the publication of the Synoptics within the first century. An enormous gain has thus accrued to the objective evidence of Christianity." [4] The bulk of the revolutionary 'modern' continental scholars had relegated the bulk of the canonical books of the New Testament to the second century. "That position was looked upon as untrue by the great body of English scholars"—by such men as Lightfoot, Westcott, Hort, Sanday, Driver, Armitage Robinson, Swete, "supported by some in Germany." And the

[1] See p. 6. [2] See p. 63.

[3] Romanes, p. 155. The 'victory' was much less far-reaching when he wrote.

[4] Romanes, pp. 155, 156.

'majority of critics' are now convinced that these were right.[1]

The methods, therefore, and the tone of mind, of the revolutionary school of critics—largely centred in Germany—have been a good deal discredited, and not only certain particular conclusions reached through these. And in particular it has become far harder (or impossible) to explain away the miracles and with them the proofs of our Lord's Deity—or, we may say, at least of His being something more than man—given by His Resurrection as well as by His birth. For, plainly, in order that a 'myth' may grow up, time is required; if an interval of something like a century is available, we can imagine legends on such matters forming, and no one would be left alive who could say that what was being told went beyond their own experience, or beyond what eye-witnesses had told them. With the record near the events, there is no time for any considerable growth; also, the somewhat later written records (such as "The Fourth Gospel") do not show any substantial growth as in progress in regard to miracles.

But this will not stop the ingenious 'critic' with a 'fixed' idea.

"The real problem is how myths grew up. But the story of a miracle may well have been repeated in its present form on the morrow of the alleged event." . . . The problem of St. Mark is a specially strange puzzle, "namely, that 'presented by the fact that the legendary traditions concerning Christ actually took form within the *Primitive Community* during the first thirty years,

[1] See Dr. Headlam, *Church Quarterly Review*, Jan. 1922, p. 206.

and under the very eyes of those who had witnessed the events themselves.' " [1] It is a puzzle indeed, stated thus with the usual 'begging of the question.' The position is illustrated by another quotation: "Strange as these things have become to us, we cannot too earnestly make ourselves familiar with the thought, that the old Christianity understood the 'new life' not merely as a new mode of thought or moral conduct, but as a wonderful equipment with new powers, the work of God." [2] That is candid and good. It is not surprising that persons belonging to 'the old Christianity' should have found no difficulty in believing in God's action in 'nature' (as well as in minds and hearts)—especially if they had seen it; they were not aware of His exclusion from that part of His universe or of His limitations in it.

XVII

'CRITICS' AND CRITICISM

But the 'critic' with a fixed idea can nearly always find arguments of some kind for his theories, and it is quite impossible for the average person to follow refutations in detail. It may be of use therefore to look at a few examples of the state of mind in which such conclusions are arrived at.

There are (as we know) two accounts of the Ascension given by St. Luke (after the work of Sir William Ramsay

[1] Quoted in substance in *Theology* (Feb. 1922, p. 70, "*The Acts of the Apostles in Recent Criticism*," W. K. Lowther Clarke), from Harnack, *Acts of the Apostles*, p. 158.

[2] The same, p. 76, quoted from Johannes Weiss, *Das Urchristentum*, p. 188.

it is not going too far to assume that much as to the authorship); in the Gospel, the words "and was carried up into heaven," and "they worshipped him and" are probably not by St. Luke, but inserted very early.[1] One would naturally say that St. Luke was in a hurry to finish, having his second book in view; this would naturally begin with an account of the Ascension, which inaugurated, and (with Pentecost, its sequel) dominated, the second stage of the Church's history; also (if further explanation is necessary) there were reasons, in the ancient as in the modern world (though they were not altogether the same) why books should be limited in length. But such common-sense explanations do not suit the 'critic'—or his theory. "The Ascension is a myth. St. Luke substituted the Acts version for the earlier and truer version of St. Luke xxiv."[2] This may appear to involve—what was certainly said by 'critics' some twenty years ago—that St. Luke, in the Gospel, regards the Ascension (or our Lord's finally leaving the Apostles) as having taken place on Easter Day. If anyone will look at the Proper Preface for Ascension Day in the Prayer Book, or in the old Roman Service, he will see that these suggest the notion precisely as much[3]—no more and no less—but it would hardly be claimed that they were meant to endorse it.

But there are further incredibilities behind. For in his first letter to the Corinthians (c. xv.) written in or about

[1] xxiv. 51, 52. See Westcott and Hort.

[2] W. K. Lowther Clarke in *Theology*, Feb. 1922, p. 70, summarising Harnack's contention.

[3] See, *e.g. The Gregorian Sacramentary*, ed. H. A. Wilson, Henry Bradshaw Society.

A.D. 54 or 55,[1] St. Paul gives a considerable list of our Lord's appearances after His Resurrection; "which he also received"; these obviously could not have taken place in one day. Since the Gospel of St. Luke is generally or universally believed to be of a date considerably later, we should have a 'legend' growing smaller, as time goes on, which is, one would think, unusual. This is perhaps the greatest absurdity. But what St. Paul says cuts at the theory of some 'critics' that there were two sets of legends, which fixed the appearances respectively in Jerusalem and in Galilee.[2] (Of course they could not be in both!) But St. Paul's list, reasonably regarded, in general agrees with and bears out the accounts in the Gospels where the appearances take place in both places. Now from what he says in his letter to the Corinthians (c. xv. "which I also received" and from his statement about the "500 brethren") combined with what he tells us elsewhere, he will have got his information from St. Peter and St. James (Galatians i. 18, 19), and from other witnesses who were on the spot at the time; this would probably be about five or six years (certainly not much longer) after the Resurrection;[3] but St. Peter and St. James were already, it appears, under the influence of legend, and did not know for certain whether their experiences had been in Jerusalem or in Galilee. This is more than one can be expected to believe. As regards

[1] "About 54 A.D.," *The Twentieth Century New Testament*; "In the latter part of autumn, 55," Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller and the Roman Citizen*, p. 275 (1895 ed.).

The time when St. Paul 'delivered' the evidence was of course two or three years earlier.

[2] See, *e.g.* Lowther Clarke in *Theology*, as above, p. 78.

[3] See Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 376 ff.

minor 'discrepancies,' whether apparent or real (*e.g.* St. Matt. xxviii. 9; St. John xx. 16 ff.), anyone who has tried to recover the less important details of some occurrence of several years back from those who should remember it will be rather surprised that there are here so few. (If there had been only one absolutely consistent account, it would certainly have been said that this was the one officially drawn up—what all the Apostles and Christians were to say.) It should be borne in mind that there are two irreconcilable accounts of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps, two views of important points in the Battle of Hastings; but no one doubts the main facts. It is unlikely that the Apostles, or the Women, kept diaries, and quite certain that they did not look forward to the 'mentality' of the nineteenth or twentieth century 'intellectual' or 'critic.'

The account of the beginning of our Lord's earthly life seems also to exercise a fatal effect on the intelligence of many 'critics.' 'The Virgin Birth is not mentioned by St. Mark'; since he begins with John's Baptism there was no reason why he should mention it—any more than the Day of Pentecost. 'St. Paul does not speak of it.' It is by no means impossible that he did know of it; Galatians iv. 4 is otherwise surprising, especially if we remember that in the ancient world the greater share was attributed to the father; also that our Lord's descent from David (officially and legally, at all events) was through Joseph—his father by adoption or otherwise. 'It is only mentioned in one verse in St. Luke' (*i.e.* in i. 35). It is really implied distinctly in vv. 36, 37, and 45; but 'critics' and 'Modernists' (as we have already seen) are apt to turn a blind eye to verses that they "can make no use of."

(There was some years ago a hope that two freshly discovered MSS. gave some help to the ' critical ' view as regards St. Matthew's Gospel, but they proved not to be of any great value to the ' critic '—" the eccentric reading has found its level.") [1]

We have seen some instances of what seems marvellous want of judgment (to put it mildly) in the ' critics,' and more instances of this—some of them quite ludicrous—will be found in Sir William M. Ramsay's book, *The First*

[1] See Sanday, *Outlines of the Life of Christ*, pp. 197 ff. and 207. Many people know, but I think it more candid to state, that Dr. Sanday changed his opinion very considerably on the subject of miracles. In or about 1914 he came to the conclusion that a distinction should be made between those which were ' *supra naturam*,' which he would believe, and those which were ' *contra naturam*,' which he disbelieved.

It appears probable that this change of view was largely due to a yielding to German prestige : " It is surely a fact of some significance that the Protestant scholars of the foremost nation of the world for penetrating thoughtfulness, thoroughness, and technical knowledge have arrived with a considerable degree of unanimity just at the kind of conclusions which the Bishop condemns." (*Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*. p. 29—of May, 1914). Within a very few months the " Image of Gold " was seen to be in many ways, intellectual and moral, of very base metal indeed. And Dr. Sanday's letters to the *Times*, saying that he would shake hands with any of these German Professors who (with very few exceptions) either disbelieved—against all evidence—or condoned their country's crimes, and that nothing hard ought to be said of their country's conduct, does not raise one's opinion as to the continued soundness of his judgment ; one can hardly imagine his holding such a view earlier.

As to his later opinion regarding miracles, even if it were not in itself unreasonable (see above, p. 63), it would be astounding that anyone should think that we know enough of ' nature ' to say what is in accordance with it, or ' contrary to it,' or ' above ' it, and what is not. It would be like a man attempting to make a map of a country from what he had seen in driving through it at night on a motor-car, small patches being lit up with the head-lights, and the rest in darkness.

But Dr. Sanday's reasons, with the conclusions from them, as written earlier, remain as sound as before, and, having made this statement, I shall continue to quote them.

Christian Century. But there also appears in many of them a want of impartiality which must be the greatest hindrance in the way of really discovering truth. The book by the same historian, *Was Christ born at Bethlehem?* brings out very clearly, not only how historical investigation should be conducted, but also, incidentally, how it should not. Thus

"a disposition is sometimes shown to terrorise the investigator by the array of learned opinion on the opposite side, and to treat it as the necessary mark of a reasonable scholar in this subject, that he should be always searching for and finding proofs of the late date, and inaccuracy, and composite character of Luke's History . . . and it would almost appear that a few English scholars attribute to the German commentators on the Bible that inerrancy which our parents or grandparents attributed to the text. . . . We appeal to fact and reason against the dogmatism which seeks to close the case, refuses to admit further argument, and brands as an 'apologist' any defender of Luke's character as a historian."

And that too when

"not long ago it was reckoned by many as essential to a respectable scholar that he should pooh-pooh Luke as a second-century writer. Now we are permitted, on the highest German authority, to date him in the first century. We are permitted also to speak of certain parts and scenes in the Second Book of his History as showing marvellous accuracy and great power of conceiving and setting before the reader a life-like picture of what actually occurred. But we are not permitted to infer that he is a trustworthy historian, and that the presumption is in favour of his accuracy, even in cases where no clear external evidence corroborates his statements" (pp. 38-40).

And again :

" It is a matter of interest to observe how slow some very learned New Testament scholars are to appreciate the principle, which is regarded as fundamental by the historical and antiquarian students, that no conjecture which is not founded on clear evidence has any right even to be propounded, if it contradicts the direct statement of an ancient authority " (pp. 268, 269).

Perhaps a fact will best illustrate the bias of most of the ' critical ' school. A certain inscription had been found in Italy (and recorded) ; the stone was afterwards lost. It " was condemned by Mommsen and many others as a forgery," though " absolutely the only reason for thinking it to be a forgery was that it mentioned the census of Quirinius, and therefore seemed to give some support to Luke." It " was recently found to be genuine, when half of the long-lost stone on which it was engraved was rediscovered at Venice " (pp. 150, 151 ; see also p. 274).

Not all Germans are like that. Dr. Blass, Professor of classical philology, in 1895 edited the Acts with Latin notes as if it had been a book of Thucydides ; combined with much learning and common sense he has the unusual gift of a sense of humour, which he uses with a light and sure touch on the ' theologians ' ; [1] the want of this

[1] Perhaps one or two specimens should be given ; after mentioning the conclusions which ' critics ' bent on destruction drew from certain correspondences between acts done by St. Peter and by St. Paul, he goes on :

" But that man who tells lies on behalf of Paul has shown incredible moderation in his lying. He was distressed when he saw that it was related how Peter had recalled Dorcas to life while yet he had nothing like it handed down about Paul ; so he has made up a fable about a young man, Eutychus, but has so made it up that from his story itself it may possibly seem that

sense, and of the qualities—literary and otherwise—which accompany it (however much learning may be there) gives a sort of ponderous stupidity to much German thinking. Marquardt, too, cites St. Luke on an " Italic Cohort " (Acts x. 1 ; see Ramsay, p. 261) just as if he were a secular historian. Nor are all destructive ' critics ' Germans. But certainly the origin, methods, tone and a very large part of the writing is German.

We can all of us remember how before the War most things German were held up to our admiration (as sure to be on a higher level), including their criticism. The War soon showed their limitations—that in many ways their stupidity was phenomenal—for instance, as to understanding the character and feelings and probable action

Eutychus was not really dead. For where Paul says : ' Trouble not yourselves, for his life is in him,' what is the meaning but this ; ' he is not really dead ' ? [That should be their view ; but in his note to xx. 10 Dr. Blass leaves the question open.] And so all that cleverness comes to this, that those theologians please themselves and their school, while the things themselves remain as they were from the beginning : ' for even deity is deprived of this power alone, to make what has been done not to have happened,' as the tragedian Agathon says. For this ought to be a special comfort to simple and credulous people, that things are not in the least affected by men's opinions, and, while the things abide, false opinions must necessarily pass away some time. For though all the many Epicureans through all those many centuries persistently denied that the sun was much larger than it seemed, they could not lessen the size of that heavenly body even by one inch."

And again, as to the appearances of angels and other miracles recorded, " to believe which is quite unworthy of a wise man, especially at the present day." . . . Why should I, a classical scholar, now argue that those things may be true ? Myself, I leave these matters to the theologians, not that I think them fit judges, but because such things certainly belong to them more than to classical scholars. Let them then sit on the judgment-seat, let them forbid that there should be angels ; what compelling force their judgment can have is for them to see to " (*Prolegomena*, p. 8).

of those who were not Germans [1]—a rather important point in historical investigation. As for contemporary history, her 'intellectuals'—Professors, 'critics' and clergy—were like the rest of the population in believing, as they were told, and as they wished to believe, (1) that Germany had not brought on the War, (2) that there had been no specially evil behaviour on the part of the soldiers—though in both cases evidence to the contrary was easily available. And the form of Christianity which denies the facts of the Gospel and the Deity of our Lord hardly came out well in practical results—the value of its symbolic teaching [2] seems (though there were many fine exceptions) to have been about that of the present Russian rouble.

XVIII

THE VIRGIN BIRTH

It will be well, especially after what has been referred to above about St. Luke, to say something about his

[1] Germany's "Nemesis is to misunderstand the world. She blundered as to what Belgium would do, what France would do, what Russia would do; and she most desperately blundered as to what England would do. And she expected American sympathy" (Owen Wister, *The Pentecost of Calamity*, p. 82).

Whether the contempt for truth, in other matters, of a people who, Maeterlinck said, "Lie with every breath they breathe" can have failed to infect the intellectual sincerity of the learned is a point on which people can form their own opinion.

[2] The Rev. T. J. Hardy says, "During all the time I was in Germany (1891, etc.) and on subsequent visits, I never met a Lutheran pastor who was not frankly 'unitarian.' I met a good many. They recited the Apostles' Creed in their Churches and expounded it in their classes; but they held it avowedly in a 'symbolic' sense, having no ascertained connection with historic fact" (*At the Back of the War*, p. 12).

record of our Lord's Birth—historical evidence which some 'Modernists' do not like and put aside without argument (*e.g.* p. 288; imagine scientific investigation conducted on these lines!). And it will probably be best to quote a passage on the subject by Canon Vernon Storr,[1] as certain not to be exaggerated, since he attaches less importance to the fact than some do.

"Over against all attempts to explain away the Virgin Birth stand these facts. There exist in St. Matthew and St. Luke two independent narratives, contradictory [2] in not a few particulars, yet agreeing on the central point. The narratives are sober and restrained, with none of the more extravagant features which characterize the Apocryphal Gospels of the Infancy. St. Luke's story in particular is intensely personal, and plainly suggests a woman's point of view. Research has proved St. Luke's accuracy as a historian; and Professor Ramsay has vindicated his trustworthiness in the matter of the census, which belongs to this cycle of narrative. Early in the second century the belief in the Virgin Birth seems to have become part of the accepted creed of the Church. There is no evidence that in our Lord's lifetime the Jews had any suspicion of any irregularity in His birth. Had there been such, they would have made a damaging use of it. If our Lord was born of a Virgin mother, would not the fact have been naturally concealed by Mary and Joseph, and, when revealed later on, revealed only to a few intimates, until the time came for publication? There is (though it is, of course, conjecture) considerable plausibility in the suggestion that the fact was made known to some of the women, who ministered to our Lord, and were intimate with Mary, and that St. Luke derived his knowledge from them."

[1] In a lecture which was printed in the *Church Times* of 3rd Feb. 1922; it has been reprinted in *Fundamentals of the Faith*.

[2] Or are they mainly complementary? Not that it matters much; see p. 75.

Canon Storr does not think "that a man cannot honestly believe in the essential Divinity of Christ who is not prepared to accept the miraculous birth"; and he quotes with approval "some words from Bishop Gore's recent book *Belief in God*. He writes: 'Certainly nothing concerning the birth of Christ was part of that assurance on the basis of which faith in Jesus was claimed. I may add that it ought not to this day to form part of the basis of the claim.'" Canon Storr then says:

"What I do feel, however, is this; that if disbelief in the story should become general the effect upon the popular mind is likely to be serious. I think the quality of Christian faith will be in danger of suffering deterioration, because it is a fact that in the popular mind the essential Divinity of Christ is closely bound up with the belief that He was miraculously born. I do not think that can be denied. And, after all, though the average man may not be a great thinker, he has a sense of the congruity of facts, and he feels instinctively that, if the miracle of the Resurrection came at the end of our Lord's earthly life, it was fitting that a miracle should usher in that life. Is his instinctive feeling wrong or absurd? And are we wrong, if we adduce to supplement the actual evidence for the Virgin Birth general considerations derived from the whole supernatural character of Christ's Person and work? The greatest miracle of all is His Personality. If to that you add His Resurrection as also a fact which you can accept, I think you will feel that there is a real congruity in His miraculous birth." [1]

It should be added that the section of St. Luke giving the account is 'hall-marked' to a quite extraordinary degree. Its "style is strangely Semitic"; there are in

[1] See also Dr. Sanday's admirable account of the whole matter as written in 1905 in *Outlines of the Life of Christ*, pp. 191 ff., 202 ff.

the Song of Zacharias 'plays on words'—such as the Jewish prophets, as well as Aeschylus and Shakespeare, use—upon the Hebrew names: John, Johanan, "the grace, or mercy of Jehovah" (or of "Yahweh," if preferred), or "Jehovah has been gracious"; Zachariah, "remembered by Jehovah"; Elizabeth, Elisheba, "the oath of God"—in i. 72, 73.[1] And verses 74 and 75, whatever we may now read into them, simply could not have been composed after the Ascension—such an idea was, and must have been, so expressed (as in Acts i. 6), for the last time before that.

Here—in view of this guaranteed historical record—one may just notice the strange position of some who ought to know better, whom one has seen putting aside the setting of the Nativity—the details which, from their simple beauty as well as pathos, have been the joy and inspiration of so many generations of Christians—as a 'beautiful story,' and therefore presumably untrue. That is to say, that God, who inspires splendid deeds and fine characters and makes the sunsets and the flowers, cannot possibly have arranged a beautiful setting for the entrance of His Son into this world—some man must have the credit of that. Even Dr. Bethune-Baker's theory of the development of God will not help,—as if He had not then reached such a stage—for flowers and the colours and sparkle of the sea date from before the Christian era, and even many myriads of years ago, as we know from the rocks and the coal-measures, there

[1] See Alford's *Greek Testament*, quotation from Wordsworth, and Hastings' *Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels*, articles "Luke" and "Zachariah."

There is no doubt what the names mean and therefore no doubt of the 'puns.'

were beautiful shells and beautiful plants. But the 'Modernist' God, tied and bound by 'laws,' is in practice a very impersonal Being, whatever He may be in their theory.

XIX

THE RESURRECTION

The accounts of our Lord's Resurrection which the evidence gives are almost equally disliked by 'Modernists.' It is not proposed here to go into them in detail or to show how various theories attempting to explain them away have fallen almost by their own weight—through their own intrinsic absurdity.

"And no difficulty of weaving the separate incidents into an orderly well-compacted narrative[1] can impugn the unanimous belief of the Church which lies behind them, that the Lord Jesus Christ rose from the dead on the third day and appeared to the disciples. . . . [The] description of the facts rests on excellent evidence. The 'third day' is hardly less firmly rooted in the tradition of the Church than the Resurrection itself. We have it not only in the speech ascribed to St. Peter (Acts x. 40), but in the central testimony of St. Paul, and then in the oldest form of the Apostles' Creed. . . . We must needs regard it as original. . . . The process of so trimming down the elements that we call supernatural in the Gospel narratives, as to bring them within the limits of every-day experience, . . . we must needs think has failed. The facts are too obstinate, the evidence for them is too strong; and the measures which we apply are too narrow and bounded. It is better to keep substantially the form which

[1] It is not at all impossible, only we cannot be sure that our own particular plan is the right one.

a sound tradition has handed down to us, even though its contents in some degree pass our comprehension." [1]

" Indeed, taking all the evidence together, it is not too much to say that there is no single historic incident better or more variously supported than the Resurrection of Christ. Nothing but the antecedent assumption that it must be false could have suggested the idea of deficiency in the proof of it. . . . And the evidence by which the special Revelation is supported is such as would in any ordinary matter of life be amply sufficient to determine our action and belief." [2]

To these we may add the opinion of a Professor of History and of one who wrote, and republished, it at a time when the mechanical view of the world was near its high-water mark :

" For some of the Evangelical miracles there is a concurrence of evidence which, when fairly considered, is very great indeed ; for example, for the Resurrection, for the appearance of Christ to St. Paul, for the general fact that Christ was a miraculous healer of disease. The evidence by which these facts are supported cannot be tolerably accounted for by any hypothesis except that of their being true." [3]

And yet apparently the elimination of the Resurrection is to many ' Modernists ' one of " the main facts of historical criticism " ; [4] things do get called by strange

[1] Sanday, as above, pp. 180, 183, 184.

[2] Westcott, *The Gospel of the Resurrection* (1879 ed.), p. 137.

[3] Sir J. R. Seeley (Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge), *Ecce Homo*, p. 4 (1904 ed. ; the first edition was published in 1865).

[4] *The Modern Churchman*, as above, p. 340, also pp. 339, 332, 326. One is tempted to quote two lines of an ancient philosopher and poet, but they are far too plain-spoken to translate :

" Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque
Inversis quae sub verbis latitantia cernunt."

Lucr. i. 641.

names. St. Paul (as we have seen [1]) stakes the whole truth of Christianity, as well as belief in the immortality of the soul, on the fact of Christ's resurrection, as a real event happening in this world and, like other such facts, capable of proof.

Since our Lord's resurrection and ours are closely connected both actually and in thought, it may be that belief in the former has suffered from the 'materialistic' way in which the general resurrection has until lately been commonly regarded in the West (Eastern views having often been much more spiritual [2])—the belief that the actual material or 'matter' [3] of the body will rise again; though what St. Paul says about "a spiritual body" and "our habitation which is from heaven" (1 Cor. xv. 44; 2 Cor. v. 1 ff.) should have prevented this. But the relation between Christ's resurrection and ours is a general one, of principle, only. Our bodies will need to be—and no doubt will be—fitted for a new sphere or condition of existence of which at present we have no conception. Our Lord rose to show His victory over death and over sin (and probably nothing less than His rising again could have done that effectively and given His Kingdom a chance of growing up in the world); also to commission His disciples, in this world, in the way that our evidence represents: for those purposes He required, and took to Himself, such a body—continuous with the one which He

[1] p. 43.

[2] There is a curious illustration of this in Bede, *Hist. Eccl.* II. i.

[3] No doubt these words have become rather inappropriate of late years since the atoms have fallen from their high position and have been divided up into sort of centres of force; but they are the best, or the only, words that we have in common use.

had had and yet far different,—as was altogether adapted for His and His Father's purposes.

If that was so, and if it was justified by results, do we, who believe in God, need to be hampered as to our belief in evidence by bondage to the mechanical theory which saw its high-water-mark last century—which, avowedly or practically, shut out God from His own universe? [1]

To many 'Modernists' the 'value' of the Resurrection, whether of Christ or of us, is the immortality of the soul. But there is plainly no sufficient ground for asserting that the two come to the same thing. We know practically nothing of the soul except in connection with a body; and though we believe (both from Christianity as a revelation and perhaps also from various more or less obscure indications) that the soul has an existence of its own, we certainly cannot affirm that it could 'function' satisfactorily without some organ or set of instruments analogous to what we call a 'body.' A pianist cannot play without a piano, and most of us cannot do elaborate calculations without at least a pencil and paper. When people have gone into any details about 'disembodied spirits' they never fail to attribute to them action which either certainly is or quite possibly may be conditional on the possession of a body, though bodies are, as St. Paul says, of many kinds; 'Nature' shows us that God's resources and contrivances are infinite. But it really seems as if we should have to add to the 'Modernist' dogmas a further one—that a soul can be complete and perfect in and by itself, which is, to say the least, unproved, and is not in accordance with what we know.

[1] See above, pp. 5, 6.

The belief in "Christ's miraculous birth" (and no doubt also that in His Resurrection) is, even to a revolutionary 'Modernist,' "of high religious value which Christianity must conserve" (p. 288). How the plant is to go on flowering without its root is a problem which we have already considered. It appears that the process is supposed to have been that "these things [that He was born of a Virgin and claimed to be divine] were ascribed to Him, whether rightly or wrongly, because in His actual life He was obviously unique" (p. 220). We will not stop to dwell on the 'begging of questions' and contempt of evidence which is so constant among them. But really such processes require some time—the idea of Christ must be fully formed and the 'beautiful thought' of the supposed fact (the same one—not different 'husks' to hold the 'kernel' or 'value') must come to be generally accepted in the Church. There really does not seem time for it; in some cases it is specially impossible.[1] There is also a further difficulty. One can hardly doubt that ideas of such "high religious value" must in the "spiritual experiences" of the early Church, in "the full flood of religious inspiration" (p. 326), have had the Holy Spirit as their responsible author. But they are, it is affirmed, untrue in fact. Now it is of no use to talk about 'the childhood of the race,' to say that people of those ages had to be taught by fairy-tales or myths; they were not so childish as all that. Our Lord's hearers knew very well what a parable was and did not confuse it with history; they did not ask what became of the Unjust Judge, or in what part of Palestine the vineyard was situated where the labourers killed the owner's son. And

[1] See above, pp. 70 ff., 82 ff., 84.

one would hardly like to accuse God's Holy Spirit of fraud. Is it not just possible that God might really have both caused the fact and taught its lesson ?

XX

'NATURE-MIRACLES' AND OTHERS.

Until comparatively lately it was necessary, in order to keep the mechanical order intact and to avoid believing anything which could not be reduced to a ' law ' already known, and so as not to have to think otherwise than in accustomed grooves (one of those non-rational motives which really influence opinions so largely),[1] that the ' modern thinker ' should deny the reality of all the occurrences usually known as ' miracles.' The sagacity and insight with which some of them claimed (and claim) to reconstruct the history appears to have been non-existent ; it certainly did not enable ' critics ' to distinguish between one kind of wonder-working and another. So much had to be torn out of our Lord's life that the picture of Him left was ' legendary ' and very vague, and a great many of His sayings—which were inseparably attached to miracles—had to be attributed to invention, a notion which makes considerable demands on the credulity of the common-sense, non-theological Christian.

Then, through no merit or work of the ' Modernist ' theologian (German or English), relief came :

" But now all those recent lines of research and experiment, which we sum up under the head of psycho-therapy, confirm in substance the stories of healing, of insight and

[1] See above, p. 66 ff.

intuition. They are no longer 'miracles' in any sense which sees in them evidence of a divine intervention working outside or above the laws of nature" (p. 216).

Or, as another says:

"The richness of His spiritual life was associated with rare psychical strength. His power to cure mental disorder was remarkable" (p. 254).

It would perhaps be cruel to suggest a doubt whether our Lord's powers, as they are described, did not differ in kind from 'psycho-therapy'—or, if they did not, whether His knowledge of things unknown for many centuries after His time on earth would not in itself constitute a 'miracle.' With some forcing, certain facts recorded can somehow be pressed into the pigeon-hole now provided; or we may say that by cutting down one thing and stretching another they can be made to fit the Victorian bed; and any interference of God with His irremovable viceroys, the 'laws of nature,' can be eliminated, so far.

But the relief is incomplete. There is a number of miracles—the 'nature-miracles'—which cannot be got into the pigeon-hole (or the bed) at all—which involve some definite reversal of the natural physical order—among these are the Miraculous Birth and the Resurrection, of which we have already spoken; but there are a good many others; and it appears that, as regards these, "the evidence, externally considered, is equally good for all classes of miracles."[1] And many (at least) of these have attached to them words which our Lord said—in fact, it appears to be often on account of these words that they were specially recorded at all; and (as

[1] Sanday, as above, p. 108.

a non-Christian and a Rationalist said) "who among his disciples or among their proselytes was capable of inventing the sayings ascribed to Jesus?" [1] Here is another difficulty—or incredibility—to be got over.

But even that is not the end; the account of our Lord's Temptation is most difficult and intractable. As Dr. Sanday wrote:

"It suits exactly and wonderfully the character of Jesus as we can now see it, but not as it was seen at the time. . . . But whoever first told the story of the Temptation saw it as a whole. We have therefore already drawn the inference that it was first told by none other than Jesus Himself. . . . There is nothing in the Gospels that is more authentic." [2]

"The account of the temptation, from whatever source derived, has a very striking internal consistency, a certain inimitable probability of improbability, if the expression may be allowed. . . . The story of Christ's temptation is as unique as Christ's character. It is such a temptation as was never experienced by any one else, yet just such a temptation as Christ, and Christ in those peculiar circumstances, might be expected to experience. . . . We are to conceive Him . . . as becoming now for the first time conscious of miraculous powers. Now none of our biographies point this out, and yet it is visibly the key to the whole narration. What is called Christ's temptation is the excitement of his mind which was caused by the nascent consciousness of supernatural power." [3]

Many of us will probably think that to speculate in detail on our Lord's consciousness, in the absence of all analogy, is rather groping in the dark, but if we left out

[1] John Stuart Mill, *Three Essays on Religion*, p. 253. He does not believe in miracles, but what he says would equally apply to our Lord's words connected with miracles, or spoken after His Resurrection; this he seems to have forgotten.

[2] As above, p. 110.

[3] Seeley, as above, p. 4.

the words " nascent " and " for the first time " it would not be any serious loss. He was, at all events, just beginning His public life—His ' mission ' ; how was He to use the supernatural powers which the whole account assumes that He had? And the supernatural powers which He knew that He possessed, are in the first and second temptations, taking St. Matthew's order—perhaps also in that to ' worship the devil ' [1]—quite distinctly and unmistakably powers to change the natural physical order.

" No one, who reads the account of the temptation, can suppose for a moment that it was related with any reference to the credibility of miracles. But for that very reason its indirect bearing on their credibility is great." [2]

Finally, it is well to remember that the evidence for these miracles for some time did not depend on single observations recorded (correctly or otherwise) once for all, like those made at the time of an eclipse, nor only on the memories of a few which were written down in the Gospels or in the authorities lying behind these ; Quadratus—as quoted by Eusebius from a book of his, an early ' apology,' which was in his possession—says :

" The works of our Saviour were always with us. For they were true ; those who were healed, those who rose from the dead, who were seen not only while they were being healed and being raised, but also always present ; and not only while the Saviour sojourned [upon earth], but also when he had departed, they were there for a considerable time, so that some of them reached even to our own times." [3]

Certainly even partial disbelief has difficulties which are great and appear to be insuperable ; they seem hardly

[1] See Seeley, as above, p. 5 ff.

[2] Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, p. 89. [3] *Hist. Eccl.* iv. 3.

worth facing in the cause of *a priori* theories. But, on the other hand,

"If the Incarnation was a fact, and Jesus Christ was what He claimed to be, His miracles so far from being improbable, will appear the most natural things in the world. For no one will deny that, in this case, He could have worked them; and when we look at them, it seems likely that He would, for they harmonize completely with His whole character and work,—being mainly acts of charity and mercy, either to the bodies or the souls of men; and at the same time profoundly symbolical of spiritual truth. . . . They flow naturally from a Person who, despite His obvious humanity, impresses us throughout as being at home in two worlds. . . . His miracles did not prove His character, but they essentially confirmed the claim which His character meanwhile predisposed men to accept." [1]

XXI

RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

As we know, valuable as historical evidence is in a number of ways (among others, for justifying their belief for those Christians who require this, and for inducing others to make "the venture of faith"), it is by no means the only way in which conviction as to the truth of Christianity (as the word has been understood hitherto) is arrived at. Faith is a real organ or instrument for reaching facts, and for verifying them (as science does in its own department); this has been increasingly recognised:

"In the words of John Hunter, 'Do not think; try.' That is, in this case, try the only experiment available—

[1] Illingworth, as above, pp. 88-91.

the experiment of faith. Do the doctrine, and if Christianity be true, the verification will come, not indeed mediately through any course of speculative reason, but immediately by spiritual intuition. Only if a man has faith enough to make this venture honestly, will he be in a just position for deciding the issue. . . . It is a fact that Christian belief is much more due to doing than to thinking, as prognosticated by the New Testament. ' If any man will do His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God ' (St. John vii. 17)." [1]

The ' doing ' will reasonably include the use of the ' means of grace,' but will certainly not be limited to this, or it is likely to be quite useless.

To take another account of religious experience :

" There is an immense volume of evidence derived from this source in corroboration of the truth of Christianity, or of what amounts to the same thing, the Christian estimate of the Person of Christ. The singular attraction of this Person, the sense of what Christ has done, not only for mankind at large but for the individual believer, the sense of the love of God manifested in Him, have been so overpowering as to sweep away all need for other kinds of evidence. They create a passionate conviction that the religion which has had these effects cannot be wrong in its fundamental doctrine, the pivot of the whole." [2]

This " fundamental doctrine " thus so abundantly verified is plainly (as is said above) that " the Son of God . . . loved me and gave Himself for me." A doctrine which questions or denies our Lord's personal pre-existence, thus doing away with the chief motive for gratitude to Him, and further makes His Atoning Sacrifice a fiction or impossible, is quite incompatible with the other. In trying

[1] Romanes, *Thoughts on Religivn*, pp. 167, 168.

[2] Sanday, as above, p. 228.

to crush parts of Christianity into a pigeon-hole of revived Stoic metaphysics "the pivot of the whole" is smashed.

XXII

"THE FOURTH GOSPEL"

There is another point of great importance, occurring chiefly, though by no means exclusively, in one of these papers, which ought to be considered; but, before approaching this, it will be well to say a little, as shortly as possible, about what, in order not to beg questions, is often called "the Fourth Gospel."[1] The chief, and perhaps the only real difficulty, about accepting it as "St. John's Gospel" or "the Gospel according to St. John" (as it had always been called) is that in it our Lord's style or manner of expressing Himself, and to some extent the subjects with which He deals (which are, so to speak, more theological), and, as it is contended, what He says about them, differ from what we find in the other three Gospels. It is, on the other hand, right to remember, in estimating the weight of the opinions against its having been written by that Apostle, that the reasoning about it is apt to be biassed, —not only by other motives, already mentioned, which act against the 'received' view, but by the feeling which has already led the 'critics' to a number of false conclusions—dislike of agreeing to the 'traditional' account

[1] The view taken by the members of the Conference varies somewhat, but they are mostly agreed that while it is not history it is of value as theology; however, they fail to act on this belief, or they would be spared the necessity of much speculation. On p. 264 there are some reasonable and unprejudiced comments on the question as "a problem, not a *chose jugée*"; but the author seems to consider internal evidence only.

of our Lord's life, both before and after the Crucifixion, for various reasons, but chiefly because it involves the Catholic view as to His Person and His teaching. This is not dependent for its proof upon the authenticity of this Gospel; but certainly, if St. John wrote it, it becomes even more difficult to make out any reasonable case against the Catholic or orthodox belief. Not that all those who do not think that John wrote the Gospel are, even unconsciously, actuated by this feeling or prejudice (on the other hand, Dr. James Drummond, a Unitarian, was convinced that St. John was the author); but it has certainly both increased the number of opinions against the authenticity and impelled many to discover more or less reasonable, or plausible, grounds to urge against it. As Dr. Blass, whom we have quoted before (and who was in a position to know his own theological countrymen), wrote in 1895:

"The case of John is very greatly prejudiced by the fact that it is almost a necessity either to charge him with lying, which they refuse to do, or to believe about Christ what he asks for, which they refuse much more, or to deny that John wrote these things."[1]

Now, the external evidence for John the Apostle being the author is enormously strong. It will be well to give some of it.

Late in the second century, Irenaeus, who was born in Asia Minor, and became Bishop of Lyons, writing to one Florinus, who had taken up some 'Modernist' notions of the time, says:

"These doctrines the presbyters who were before us,

[1] *Acta Apostolorum*, p. 9. "Johanis causa eo maxime urguetur, quod," etc. It is not possible to say whether he meant by 'maxime,' 'chiefly,' or as above.

who had companied with the Apostles, did not hand on to you. For while I was still a boy I saw you in lower Asia with Polycarp, faring splendidly in the royal court and trying to stand in favour with him. For I remember better the things of that time than those that happen lately. For what we learn as children, growing with the soul, become one with it; so that I can tell both the place in which the blessed Polycarp used to sit and converse, and how he came forward and came in, and the stamp of his life, and his personal appearance, and the discourses that he used to make to the people, and how he used to tell of his intercourse with John, and with the rest who had seen the Lord, and how he used to call to mind their words, and what things they were that he had heard from them about the Lord; and about His mighty works, and about His teaching, how Polycarp having received them from eye-witnesses of the Word of Life used to relate them in all ways agreeing with the Scriptures [*or*, used to relate them all in agreement with the Scriptures]. These things, thanks to the mercy of God to me, I used to hear attentively then, noting them down not on paper but in my own heart, and ever, thanks to the grace of God, I ruminate on them properly."[1]

There is a shorter statement to a similar effect made by Irenaeus (*Contra Haereses*, iii. 4):

"Polycarp, who was not only instructed by Apostles and had lived with many who had seen the Christ, but had also been established by Apostles in Asia, in the Church at Smyrna, as Bishop, whom we ourselves have seen in our early manhood (for he survived a long time and when he was a very old man departed this life after a glorious and most splendid martyrdom), always taught these things which he learnt from the Apostles, which also the Church hands down, and which only are true."

Polycarp, as he told the Proconsul at his trial, had been

[1] Eusebius, *Eccl. Hist.* v. 20.

a Christian eighty-six years.[1] A short time before his martyrdom (which took place in A.D. 155 or, less probably, in 158) [2] Polycarp paid a visit to Rome, partly (it appears) [3] in order to discuss with Anicetus, its Bishop, the disagreement as to the right day for keeping Easter, whether it should necessarily be on a Sunday, or on the 14th day of Nisan, whatever day of the week that might be; the latter was the custom of Lower Asia, in which Smyrna and Ephesus were, the former was that of the vast majority of Churches.

"But" (says Irenaeus [4]) "this subject they did not make a cause of strife between themselves. For neither could Anicetus persuade Polycarp not to keep (the 14th day), since he had always kept it with John the disciple of our Lord and with the rest of the Apostles with whom he lived, nor did Polycarp persuade Anicetus to keep it," and change the Roman custom, but they agreed to differ.

Irenaeus is quite unhesitating as to the fourth gospel having been written by St. John, without emphasising or arguing the point as if it were disputed, which it was not except by a small and obscure sect or *coterie*, the 'Alogi,' and that on grounds which do not appeal as reasonable.[5] After a very short account of each of the first three Gospels, he says of the fourth:

"Then John, the disciple of the Lord, who also leaned on His breast, he also published his Gospel, while he lived at Ephesus in Asia." [6]

There is much other external evidence, but this should be sufficient. It seems quite impossible (1) that Polycarp

[1] Letter of the Smyrnaeans, c. ix.
[2] See *Dict. Chr. Biog.*, art. "Polycarpus of Smyrna."
[3] Eusebius, *Eccl. Hist.* iv. 14, on the authority of Irenaeus.
[4] Eusebius, v. 24.
[5] See *Dict. Chr. Biog.*, art. "Alogi." [6] iii. 1.

should not have known whether John the Apostle wrote the Gospel or not, (2) that Irenaeus should not have known what Polycarp thought, or rather knew.

It is not the case, either, that all the external evidence is on one side, and all the internal is on the other. Both Lightfoot and Westcott[1] have brought out and marshalled in detail evidence from the Gospel itself of the strongest kind, that it was written by a Jew, and a Jew of Palestine, a contemporary, an eye-witness, and by St. John.

If the Gospel had been some ordinary literary work, so attested, its authorship would probably not be disputed except by a few 'cranks,' though ample scope would be left for discussing it in detail, in its relation to the other three Gospels.

But it largely gives our Lord's words in a style and form which are certainly different from most of these as given in the 'Synoptic' Gospels. On the other hand, there is one passage in two of these (St. Matt. xi. 25 ff., especially *v.* 27, "All things have been delivered unto me of my Father," etc.; St. Luke x. 21 ff.) which would seem quite at home in St. John's Gospel.[2] So that it becomes very doubtful whether our Lord had only one mode of speaking, under different circumstances. Sometimes certainly, and sometimes probably, the author of "the Fourth Gospel" adds comments of his own. But in general, if St. John wrote it, it is reasonable to suppose that he would give our Lord's words as far as he could, and at all events that he gave His meaning and thought, of which, as an inti-

[1] *The Fourth Gospel; Evidences External and Internal of its Johannean Authorship*, by Ezra Abbot and others (Lightfoot's part was first published in the *Expositor* of March, 1890).
Westcott, *The Gospel according to St. John.*

[2] For further correspondences see Armitage Robinson, *The Historical Character of St. John's Gospel* (9d.), p. 28 ff.

mate personal friend of His, he was obviously better able to judge than a German professor or an English clergyman living eighteen centuries afterwards. And as to accurate memory, " we must bear in mind the extraordinary powers of the ancient and Eastern mind in this direction." [1] But this difficulty, whatever it amounts to, only touches the long ' discourses ' ; about much of the Gospel it does not arise at all.

Largely in consequence of the immensely strong external evidence, certain compromises or ' halfway houses ' have arisen—that there is historical matter in the Gospel, derived from St. John, and the like : but, besides other difficulties, the attestation (probably by the Elders of Ephesus) in c. xxi. 24 (*not* including *v.* 25) is altogether against them. Even if this applies directly to the addition of c. xxi. to the rest of the Gospel, it plainly endorses practically the authorship of the earlier part ; and " the disciple," it is expressly said, not only " beareth witness of these things," but ' wrote ' them.

If anyone by using his judgment is convinced that ' the Fourth Gospel ' was written by St. John, he will be in excellent company, particularly so far as English scholars are concerned.

[1] P. L. Snowden, " Dr. Rashdall's Theory of the Atonement," in *Theology*, Jan. 1922, p. 36.

As regards chapters xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, it has been suggested that St. John may have told the Blessed Virgin what our Lord had said, immediately after the Crucifixion, and afterwards too ; in that case his memory of them would be pretty fully preserved.

A Christian, of the ordinary kind, will be inclined to believe that the Holy Spirit may have helped in preserving all that was of importance in the New Testament intact. (See our Lord's promise in St. John xiv. 26). But this is a matter of faith ; it can hardly be used in argument, especially as against ' Modernists,' many of whom are inclined to rule out God's personal action so far as is possible—and beyond this too.

XXIII

A 'MODERNIST'S' CHRIST

After this preamble, we may come to Dr. Rashdall's assertions about our Lord's own view of Himself. It will perhaps be fairer to quote at some length (pp. 278, 279):

"Jesus did not claim Divinity for Himself. He may have called Himself, or more probably allowed Himself to be called, the Messiah or Son of God. But never in any critically well-attested sayings is there anything which suggests that His conscious relation to God was other than that of a man towards God—the attitude which He wished that all men should adopt towards God. The speeches of the Fourth Gospel, where they go beyond the Synoptic conception, cannot be regarded as history, valuable as they may be for theology. The doctrine of our Lord's divinity must be taken to express the Church's conception of what Jesus is or should be to His followers and to the world, not His own theory about Himself."

The number of questions here begged is startling; it would be difficult to rival it in the same number of lines. Possibly this was felt, for a long note is appended which purports to prove the assertions. ("This paper," we are told, "is printed exactly as it was delivered"; it is not clear whether this included the note or not.) It will perhaps be better, in any case, to print it:

"I do not know of any scholar, however orthodox and conservative, who affirms that the discourses of Christ in the Fourth Gospel are verbatim reports, or denies that they are more or less coloured by the ideas of the Evangelist. Their whole tone and style is obviously so different from that of the Synoptic Gospels, that if we accept the Synoptic discourses as substantially authentic (though not

of course in every detail, for there are considerable discrepancies between them), it is impossible to regard the Johannine discourses as equally accurate reports: and even in this Gospel few sentences (when taken apart from the Preface, which does not pretend to represent the words of Jesus, and other comments of the Evangelist) imply actual 'Godhead' in the sense of post-Nicene theology. 'Is it not written in your law, I said (to the Judges of Israel) Ye are gods? If he called them gods unto whom the word of God came . . . say ye of him, whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world, thou blasphemest, because I said, I am the Son of God?' The claim to be the Son of God does not *necessarily* imply 'Godhead.'"

That is the first half of the note, chiefly on St. John's Gospel, and one notices in the first place that the statement with which it begins does not correspond to facts, as they take place in this world; a good many learned 'critics' seem to have been so immersed in books as to have lost touch with life as it goes on upon this planet. For speeches, even now, are very seldom printed quite 'verbatim' (one wonders whether Dr. Rashdall has ever seen a really *verbatim* report of some ordinary speech; it is apt to be startling; but they are not published in that state); the standard, in length at all events, of a speech spoken usually is, and nearly always was, different from what it must be in writing. As written, it must be made manageable in length by omission or compression or by a combination of these, while it gives expression to the thought as spoken, and to the manner, so far as may be consistent with this. But the former point—the thought or sense—is by far the more important. And—at all events after some interval of time—a person who has been in touch with anyone's way of thinking is more likely than

anyone else to reproduce what he had said with substantial correctness.

This is well put by an 'orthodox scholar':

"A many-sided speaker will thus furnish materials for very different studies. But it would be wholly wrong to conclude that the sketch which preserves most literally those fragments of his words, which are capable of being so preserved, is more true than the sketch which gives a view of the ultimate principles of his doctrine. The former may give the manner and even the outward characteristics: the latter may reveal the soul."

And, to look at the matter from another point of view:

"The discovery of the law of phenomena does not make the record of the phenomena less correct than before in the hands of him who has ascertained it. On the contrary, such knowledge keeps the observer from many possibilities of error, while it enables him to regard facts in new relations, and to present them in such a way that they may suggest to others the general truth which he has gained." [1]

However, as to a good deal of the Gospel no such difficulty arises—as to those shorter sayings of our Lord's which appear clearly to stand out in the longer discourses as more or less quotations word for word, and still more as to those which unquestionably stand by themselves, which St. John might well remember; there are several characteristic ones from the time after the Resurrection. What Dr. Rashdall means by, or would accept as, sentences which "imply actual 'Godhead' in the sense of post-Nicene theology," I really do not know. It will perhaps be sufficient to point to some of the passages—not exactly 'few'—in this Gospel (outside of the Preface

[1] Westcott, *The Gospel according to St. John*, pp. cxv and lxxxv.

and of comments which are plainly made by the author) which imply that our Lord was a Divine Being, different from other men, having special relations, not shared by other men, with God the Father, and personal pre-existence, or some one or more of these characteristics :

" What things soever he [the Father] doeth, these the Son also doeth in like manner " : " For neither [*or*, not even] doth the Father judge any man, but he hath given all judgement unto the Son ; that all may honour the Son, even as they honour the Father " (v. 19, 22 and 23) : " I am come down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me " : " Not that any man hath seen the Father, save he which is from God, he hath seen the Father " (vi. 38 and 46) : " Ye are of this world ; I am not of this world " : " Before Abraham was [*or*, was born], I am " (viii. 23, 58) : " I and the Father are one " (x. 30) : " I am the resurrection and the life " (xi. 25) : " He that beholdeth me, beholdeth him that sent me " (xii. 45) : " He that hath seen me hath seen the Father. . . . Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father in me " : " If ye shall ask me anything in my name, that will I do " : " If a man love me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him and make our abode with him " (xiv. 9, 11, 14, 23) : " And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own self with the glory which I had with thee before the world was " (xvii. 5, compare xvi. 28).

Is it necessary to go on quoting ? Are these sentences ' few,' or are they ambiguous, especially as they support each other ?

St. Thomas' full and explicit confession (xx. 28-29) is of course equivalent to a statement by our Lord, for He at once endorsed it.

Perhaps even more striking—a set of statements which, when combined, can, one would think, point to nothing

else but the 'orthodox' doctrine of the Blessed Trinity—is what is said about the Holy Spirit:

"I will ask (*or*, pray) the Father, and He shall give you another Comforter . . . even the Spirit of truth; The Comforter, even the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name: The Comforter, whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth which proceedeth from the Father: He shall glorify me, for he shall take of mine and shall declare it unto you. All things whatsoever the Father hath are mine: therefore said I, that he taketh of mine, and shall declare it unto you" (xiv. 16, 17, 26; xv. 26; xvi. 14, 15).

These quotations are abbreviated by omissions, to bring together the main statements, but they do not lose by their context, and they do not need a commentary. And what St. Paul says about the Holy Spirit (as well as St. Luke xxiv. 49, and Acts i. 4; ii. 33) seems certainly to presuppose some such teaching by our Lord.

The passage quoted from Psalm lxxxii. is a strong *a fortiori* argument. The Judges were commissioned by God to do His work; the Messiah was *specially* "sanctified and sent into the world." Our Lord's claim was to be the Messiah. The Jews spoke of the Christ as "the Son of God"; there are, of course, various kinds of Sonship; it may be by adoption; some Jews no doubt did not think out clearly what the title meant; others had mistaken ideas about it; but to many of them "the boundary-line separating it [the Messiahship] from Divine Personality is of the narrowest."[1]

Edersheim in speaking of the Jews may be presumed to know what he is talking about, even if he did not so fully support what he says by quotations. Any other

[1] Edersheim, *The Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, I. p. 171 ff.

nation but the Jews, with their stern monotheism (in theory at least) which had been fixed and stiffened by ages of conflict, would certainly have said that this Viceroy, prepared in heaven and discharging functions peculiar to God, was God (as an adjective) or *a* God. And such a view appears to be reasonable. But what our Lord seems to have desired was that men should believe that He was the Messiah—if possible, by their own observation of Him and of His works and words; what this Messiah was (though in the meanwhile He would not refrain from speaking or suggesting truth) they would learn more fully, at all events after His Resurrection, when "a new force was making itself felt; Christ who had died upon the Cross was actually doing things."[1] But before this, as has just been said, the Messiah was to act, and He did act, as God, and the unbelieving Jews (in spite of God's endorsement of Christ's position by miracles), since they would not acknowledge Him as Messiah ('begging the question' that He was not), treated such claims as blasphemy, and it was for this that He was condemned to death.

Even apart from these considerations, to make an (apparently) lesser claim plainly does not deny the greater, any more than a Minister who said that he was a Member of Parliament would deny that he was in the Ministry.

It should just be noticed incidentally that the passage in which Psalm lxxxii. is cited gives striking support to St. John's historical accuracy; for (besides "the peculiarly Hebraistic mode of designating a quotation from the Psalms")[2] on a quite superficial reading (only), it is liable

[1] Sermon by Archbishop Gregg in the *Guardian* of 3rd March, 1922. (See above, p. 72.)

[2] Edersheim, as above, II. p. 231.

to misunderstanding, and the author of the Preface would have been most unlikely to 'create' it; it seems to be 'hall-marked' as our Lord's words.

To pass to the second half of the note (one sentence being here repeated):

"The claim to be the Son of God does not *necessarily* imply 'Godhead.' This requires to be still more remembered in the Synoptists. The Jews, however highly some of them may have exalted the Messiah, never thought of him as God or as equal with God. However close the union which the Christ of the Synoptists feels to exist between Himself and God, the distinction is always preserved. The claim that He would judge the world (if actually made) would not imply 'Godhead.' *Cf.* Acts xvii. 31: 'A day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousness by *the man* whom he hath ordained.' It is clear that till the Confession at Caesarea Philippi, Jesus had not claimed to be the Messiah or Son of God, and (if we accept all the words subsequently said to have been uttered by Him) He never claimed more than this. Even Luke x. 22, though it implies a very high conception of His own Divine Mission, does not imply 'Godhead.'"

Something has been said about some of the points in this already, and so far as there may be a contradiction between Dr. Rashdall and Edersheim, there is, one would suppose, no doubt which, on the subject of Jewish belief, is the better authority. As to the distinction between Himself and God being preserved by Christ, of course it was, since He *was* a man on earth [1] (and has never laid

[1] Even supposing that He had not realised His Deity while on earth on account of His 'humbling' or 'emptying' Himself, that would not in the least prove that it was not the truth. (As a pure *argumentum ad hominem*—most of us certainly are not conscious that we have a part of deity in us as our Lord had, only in a less degree. But that we really have this, is a 'Modernist' dogma; see above). However, Dr. Sanday never

His Manhood aside). May one suggest that 'Modernists' did not discover this fact (as they constantly seem to imagine), but that two General Councils of the Catholic Church were assembled in order to fix the belief in the reality of His Manhood which the Church held, as against those who denied or were undermining it?[1] That we should be able to explain it is another thing altogether; it is not the only one of God's mysteries (though perhaps the greatest) which we cannot understand; but scientific students are more or less content to work with what they do know about electricity without demanding that what it is should first be known and thus the root-facts about it explained; nor do they ask for adhesion to some unproved hypothesis meant to explain its nature, like the chief dogma of revolutionary 'Modernism.'

Thus, too, as to the bit of St. Paul's speech at Athens (with "*the man*" underlined); the Apostle was quite right—and besides what *could* he have said to give the Athenians some elementary notion of the Christian faith? That "the man" was not an ordinary man is pointed out in the next sentence by the mention of His Resurrection.

But the most astounding thing of all is the question raised whether our Lord "actually made the claim" that He would judge the world. Besides what He is stated to have said about the Day of Judgment at the same time as He spoke about the destruction of Jerusalem (St. Mark

said a more reasonable word than this about what is called the Kenosis—that "we should not be surprised if a yet further examination of the subject should result rather in a list of *tacenda* than of *praedicanda*." (As above, p. 233.) We have no analogy to go by.

[1] See above, p. 57: the work of Chalcedon had to be confirmed.

xiii.), there is the description of "the Son of Man," the King coming to judge the world, which is generally supposed to be a most characteristic address of His, in St. Matt. xxv. 31 ff.; this is preceded by the parable of the Ten Virgins and of the Talents ("The bridegroom" and "the man going to another country" obviously cannot stand for God the Father). There is also the Parable of the Pounds (St. Luke xix.), the meaning of which is equally plain.[1] One would have thought that all that was sufficient proof. A good many persons—some non-Christians among them[2]—have been quite convinced that "Never man spake like this man" (though the statement does occur in 'the Fourth Gospel'), and this has been thought specially true of the parables; thus, besides the records, the words are 'hall-marked' as genuine. But apparently no evidence will prove that recorded sayings which do not suit your theories are really authentic. The earliest Church[3] must have had quite a supply of anonymous geniuses, of extraordinary ability and unscrupulous daring, who invented sayings and parables to put into the mouth of the most wonderful man that ever lived (to place Him, for the moment, no higher than that), which have passed muster with some survivors of those who had known Him and with all Christians since, until, after many centuries, they were detected as at least doubtful by German and

[1] It is not in the least likely to be another version of the Parable of the Talents. Any intelligent man teaching, if he had found a good comparison or allegory to instil some lesson, would be likely to use it more than once, probably altering it in detail.

[2] See above, p. 91.

[3] See Sanday, as above, p. 220.

English scholars. And yet the sort of thing that inventors would have been likely to produce is illustrated by the Apocryphal Gospels with the 'Acts of Pilate.' Certainly 'Modernism' calls for much faith—or credulity.

In the second century a man named Marcion had taken up and developed certain notions, more or less 'modern' at the time, differing from the 'traditional' beliefs—from those handed down from the Apostles. These were, naturally, at variance with a large part of the New Testament, which he cut down accordingly, omitting books and parts of books; taking, one would think, for his model Procrustes, or rather the 'value' or 'symbolical meaning' of the story about him. "There is nothing new under the sun"—certainly not 'Modernism,' in its various features, and methods.

XXIV

THE CHRIST OF THE GOSPELS

Names and titles constantly change their 'content.' 'Messiah,' or 'Christ,' and 'Son of God' certainly had a different and higher meaning to our Lord—and under the influence of His teaching and His life (both before and after His Resurrection) they came to have a different meaning to the Apostles—from what they had had for the Jews, as was also the case, quite certainly and obviously, as regards the "Kingdom of Heaven"[1] or "of God." It will thus make things clearer if we look at the position which our Lord claimed and assumed, without

[1] See Edersheim, *e.g.* I. pp. 160 ff., 265 ff.

special regard to names or titles for the moment, though the meaning of these will have light thrown on them at the same time.

As regards St. Luke x. 22, anyone who reads it can judge for himself whether Dr. Rashdall's explanation of it is natural or possible. "The claim that He would judge the world . . . would not imply 'Godhead.'" Would it not? No reason is given. One would hardly think that "the Judge of all the earth" would hand over one of the very greatest of His functions to someone who was no more than a man, though if He was "both God and Man" there would be a special appropriateness and an evident security for justice in His doing so. As a sort of foretaste of His position as Judge, He enlarges and changes on His own authority the law given from God (St. Mark vii. 14 ff.; St. Matt. v. 21 ff., 27 ff., 33 ff., 38 ff., 43 ff.; vii. 29—"but *I* say unto you.")[1] As a further foretaste of the same power or right, He forgives sins (St. Mark ii.; St. Luke vii. 36 ff.). And He further gives authority to His Church to legislate and to forgive sins and to refuse them forgiveness, which anyone who himself had merely delegated authority would be unlikely to do. (St. Matt. xvi. 19; xviii. 18; St. John xx. 23; compare 1 Cor. v. 3-5, and 2 Cor. ii. 10, whether these refer to the same case or not.)

[1] One of the very moderate among the 'Modernists,' the Rev. R. G. Parsons, says: "Do we not put a wrong emphasis on His words if we interpret His, 'But I say unto you,' as though all the stress were on the '*I*,' instead of on what He *says*?" (p. 303). Unfortunately for this 'modern' suggestion, the Greek language (as 'every schoolboy knows') does not insert the personal pronoun except for emphasis: "Ἐγὼ δὲ λέγω ὑμῖν." It is really not safe to argue simply from what the not very learned clergyman, in the old libellous story, called "the inspired original."

As shown in the parables, too, His position is quite exceptional; in the Parable of the Vineyard (St. Luke xx. 9 ff.) the 'son' is sharply distinguished from the 'servants' (who are, no doubt, the prophets), and that 'son' is not a merely honorary or metaphorical title is pointed out by his being the 'heir.' In the Parables of the Talents and the Pounds, the person who judges the use of the 'gifts,' or rather loans made, has himself supplied them.

His claims to personal allegiance are tremendous: "whosoever shall lose his life for *my* sake and the gospel's"—whosoever shall be ashamed of *me* and of *my* words—(St. Mark viii. 35 ff.): "If any man cometh unto *me*, and hateth not his own father, and mother, and wife, and children . . . yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple" (St. Luke xiv. 26; and see *v.* 33 ff.). And, on the other hand, He makes promises which none but God can carry out—"Come unto *me* . . . and *I* will give you rest"—on condition of taking "*my* yoke" upon them (St. Matt. xi. 28 ff.; see also St. Mark x. 29, 30). God the Father seems to be ignored: though if "I and the Father are one," and if "I am in the Father and the Father in me," this is not so at all, but no "conception of His own Divine Mission" (p. 279) will justify the personal position assumed.

There is a curious sentence in the paper by Mr. Parsons mentioned above—"He was so much more concerned with His message than with Himself" (p. 302)—which is in a way true, but apt to be most misleading. He was certainly the most unselfish man that ever lived; on His own account He cared nothing what men thought of Him, and He appears clearly to have had a special dis-

taste for anything approaching to self-advertisement (St. Matt. xii. 15 ff.; St. Mark iii. 12). But He Himself —what He was, and what He was able to do for those who trusted Him personally—was a most important part of His message, in fact the centre of it all, as it has been to Christians ever since, and that not only as supplying absolute authority to His teaching (though it is required for that as well) but to give men power to follow it.

'Liberal Christianity' regarded, and to a large extent still regards our Lord as a very attractive religious genius (and nothing more) who taught the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of Man, and was—rather inexplicably—put to death for this. If He was divine at all, it was only as all men are divine, though perhaps in an unusually high degree—what this divinity amounts to we can have some notion from introspection of ourselves. Now it would not be fair to attribute anything like this view to a good many of the authors of these papers; in fact, with some of them it is a little difficult to see why they profess at all to differ from the 'orthodox' belief. But there are large traces (or something more) of that conception of Him both inside [1] and outside the report of the Conference. It will not do at all; it is not what the eye and ear-witnesses and those whom they informed present to us, it is quite unlike the picture printed on the minds of the Apostles; the portrait is hopelessly 'faked.' Our Lord Jesus Christ was either something much greater than that or He was much less.

[1] An Editorial in *Theology*, of Feb. 1922, unkindly prints an 'appreciation' of our Lord by Canon Barnes (p. 253 ff. of the Conference Report), side by side with a part of a life of Lord Shaftesbury; there is a dreadful similarity.

The old saying *aut deus, aut non homo bonus* is quite true. If His claims are not true in fact, 'superlative arrogance' is a mild and incomplete description of them —one might go much further but for dislike (and perhaps fear) of writing even hypothetical blasphemy.

And a most strange thing about it (if there is anything in the 'Liberal' view) is that in the middle of one of the greatest of these claims He says that He is "meek and lowly in heart," which, if He was just a man, He certainly was not; also that some of the very best of His saints—men who not only tried to imitate Him, but in whom, as they believed, 'Christ lived,' were humble to a degree which seems to the secular-minded really excessive.

XXV

THE CHRIST OF THE APOSTLES

One of the moderate 'Modernists' speaks of "the spiritual experiences of the writers of the New Testament, which constitute a deposit laid down by the full flood of religious inspiration" (p. 326); another (already quoted) says, "The Christian Church all down the ages has borne witness not only to the manhood, but to the Deity of Christ" (p. 308); another, among the most revolutionary of all, acknowledges that "the doctrine that He was God as well as man was an early result of reflection on the facts of their actual experience"—that of "the first generation of Christians"[1] (p. 287). If these statements are put

[1] This does, verbally, and should, on the evidence, include the Resurrection as a *fact*. But the author would doubtless not accept this 'result of their reflection' in any sense which they would have endorsed.

together, they fully justify, essentially though in outline, the ' orthodox ' view. But it may perhaps be as well to glance, as shortly as possible, at the main facts which they describe.

In the first place, it should be noticed, before we leave the Gospels, that the thought, and the language, of St. Paul and the other Apostles constitute in many points very strong corroborative testimony to the accuracy of these and to the full meaning of the words used by our Lord (such as those quoted above)—an insuperable barrier against their being eliminated or explained away. For, however humiliating it may be that learned ' Higher Critics ' should not be in a position freely to reconstruct our Lord's mind, life, and words (which is no doubt a fascinating intellectual exercise), yet those who were eye-witnesses themselves or had been informed by these had, as a matter of common sense, means of knowing—not guessing. Personal religious experience and inspiration would in many ways guarantee the truth of what the Evangelists say (especially if, as the Church believes, God was ' at the back of ' both), but it would not be in the least likely to supply the coincidences in such detail.[1]

It should also be remembered that there is most cogent evidence that the Apostles agreed about what our Lord was (and is). In the controversy which St. Paul had for so long with the ' ultra-Jewish wing ' of Christians, there is no sign of any difference of opinion on this point—the position of Christ. And yet if there had been such a

[1] 1 Cor. vii. 10 and 12 is one of the most obvious of these. On the whole matter, see Sanday, *Outlines of the Life of Christ*, pp. 230, 231.

difference it would have been bound to come out, for some at least of those among the Jewish Christians who distrusted St. Paul's views and action as regards the Gentiles would have found it a useful weapon, and St. Paul would not have been wanting in maintaining his belief. But there is no trace of any such opposition or controversy; and besides, Gal. ii. 2 ff. and 1 Cor. i. 12 ff. definitely exclude it.

Some 'Modernists' (*e.g.* the Rev. H. D. A. Major) are inclined to lay stress upon our Lord's not being called 'God' by St. Paul. Well, that is not certain one way or the other; Romans ix. 5 is or is not an example of His being called so according as it is punctuated (see Westcott and Hort's text); 2 Thess. i. 12 is probably not one, but Titus ii. 13 seems to be a pretty clear instance; however, everyone is not agreed that the Pastoral Epistles are by St. Paul.

Some little time must be allowed for the finding of appropriate language for new facts, particularly when there is no analogy for them already existing. And such hesitation and delay seems to be not unnatural; Jews, whose Monotheism was so unbending (at least in theory) might be shy of using words which could even appear to compromise this; while to polytheistic Gentiles to call Jesus 'θεός' would have merely suggested His inclusion in a very slightly enlarged Pantheon. It was quite sufficient to use other terms, not liable to misunderstanding—'Christ,' now possessing a meaning far beyond anything which the Jews or even the Apostles, while our Lord 'sojourned' on earth, had held; and 'Lord.' As to the latter title Mr. Major says (p. 271, note): "I do not mean *Maran*, but ὁ Κύριος. For the Greek-speaking Jew ὁ

Κύριος would mean Jehovah, but for the Greek-speaking Gentile it would mean the Head of a mystery cultus." Well, even that last might do to start with, but only as an outer doorway; if a Gentile Christian, or would-be Christian, thought that that was all that was meant when it was said that 'Jesus is Lord,' he would soon have been undeceived; among other things, a glance at almost any page of the LXX (all of 'the Scriptures' that there was, for a time) would have put him in touch with very different ideas. And that the Gentile converts were not kept 'in a water-tight compartment,' but might be supposed to know a great deal of the religion and religious history of the Jews is shown by St. Paul's many allusions to these in writing to Churches which were mixed or predominantly Gentile (see Romans iv. ix. x. and xi.; 1 Cor. x.; also 2 Cor. iii. 7 ff.; Gal. iii. 8 ff., iv. 21 ff.).[1]

But as regards the position and power which our Lord holds in St. Paul's belief, verified by his experiences, that is what only a Divine Being can have; to talk about His 'Mission' (as if that were all) ceases to be even plausible. From the time of St. Stephen, so soon after the Ascension, He is prayed to and believed to answer prayer and to rule events as He wills (*e.g.* Acts vii. 59, 60; ix. 17; 2 Cor. xii. 8, 9); so, too, Divine action on the individual Christian and on Churches is described by the 'mystical' expression

[1] On the mystery-religions, which seem to have had quite excessive importance attributed to them as bearing on Christianity, see a paper by A. E. J. Rawlinson, read at the Birmingham Church Congress, and printed in the *Pilgrim* of Jan. 1922, on "The Historical Grounds of Christian Belief." It appears that the doctrine of 'symbolical meaning' or 'values' was stated pretty fully by the Emperor Julian in connection with a mystery-religion, so that even that is not a 'modern' discovery; but what Christians cared for was *facts* (see p. 174 ff. of the issue referred to).

'in Christ' (*e.g.* 1 Thess. iv. 16; Rom. xii. 5; 2 Cor. v. 17, etc.). Or, conversely (so far as words go), Christ is 'in' the Christian (Rom. viii. 10; Gal. ii. 20; 2 Cor. xiii. 5). In these places Christ appears as doing Divine actions by Himself, in others He is 'bracketed with' God the Father; the Church of the Thessalonians is "in God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ"; he prays that "our God and Father himself and our Lord Jesus" may enable him to come to them, and goes on without a break to pray for the Thessalonians to 'the Lord'—as if it made no difference (i. 1; iii. 11, 12); 2 Thess. i. 12 (already referred to) is as strong and unmistakable in what it implies as if St. Paul had called Jesus 'God.' And these are the two earliest of St. Paul's Epistles; he was certainly not 'feeling his way' to making Christ Divine.

Another point which shows St. Paul's belief (or certainty) in a way which is not less unmistakable is what both St. Luke, his companion, and he himself say about the Holy Spirit. The Holy Ghost sends Barnabas and Saul on their first missionary expedition, but on another later journey of St. Paul 'the Spirit of Jesus' will not let them go into Bithynia (Acts xiii. 2 and xvi. 7): in Romans viii. 9 'the Spirit of God' and the 'Spirit of Christ' are one and the same, it does not matter to St. Paul which It or He is called—plainly, "I and the Father are one."[1]

These are the facts which St. Paul believed, or knew; names and titles are of use or of weight only as expressing or suggesting these. And if St. Paul does not—or does not often—speak of Jesus Christ as 'God,' he states that He was so, quite formally and deliberately; our Lord, before He 'sojourned' on earth, was already "in the

[1] See above, pp. 104, 105.

form of God " ;[1] and " in Him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily " (Phil. ii. 6 ; Col. ii. 9).

St. John, or " the author of the Fourth Gospel," seems quite certainly to have spoken of our Lord as " God only-begotten." [2]

As regards the Holy Spirit, Canon Barnes says of our Lord (p. 257) :

" Can we say further that He was central as Redeemer and Saviour ? I think that we are forced to do so if, and only if, we accept St. Paul's identification of the living Christ and the Holy Spirit. . . . And, because we cannot for any practical purpose separate the risen Jesus from the Inner Light which is the source of all our religious experience, we identify the Lord with the Spirit."

Do we ? The benighted ' traditionalist ' might say that the signs of the Holy Spirit's personal action, some of which are quoted above—far above our understanding as all these things naturally are—do not very well fit this new theological dogma of the ' practical ' Duality of God, and that it seems strange that in the last verse of 2 Cor. St. Paul should have mentioned our Lord twice. What St. Paul says, when taken together, does really seem to fit better with the old belief in a Trinity, with the Holy

[1] Canon Glazebrook (p. 207), in trying to make out that St. Paul did not think Our Lord was a *real* man, (1) lays stress on " *the form* of a servant," and ignores the use of the *same word*, in the same sentence, about His Godhead ; also the minor fact that σχῆμα has other meanings besides ' fashion ' ; see Liddell and Scott, 1883 ed., " character, characteristic property." This interpretation of the language is stated to be " as Harnack points out " ; according to it Jesus would have no *real* existence as God, either. Can persons who blunder in this reckless way really expect that their judgment should carry weight ?

[2] See Westcott, as above, i. 66-68.

Ghost "proceeding from the Father and the Son" (or "from the Father through the Son"),[1] and One with Them.

XXVI

THE CHRIST OF THE APOSTLES' FOLLOWERS

It may be as well just to glance at a little (only) of the evidence as to what the Apostles had thought and taught which is embodied in the scanty writings of the earliest generation of Christians—of Clement of Rome, of Ignatius, and of Polycarp—who succeeded them. Not only are God and our Lord 'coupled' or 'bracketed' as they are by St. Paul,[2] but Polycarp speaks of "our Lord and God Jesus Christ";[3] Ignatius, of "our God, Jesus Christ"[4] and of "the passion of my God";[5] this last is an 'inexact' theological expression: but what he means and believes (or knows) is thoroughly clear; he speaks of our Lord as One

"who is timeless, invisible, made visible for our sakes; who is beyond the touch of our hands, who is beyond suffering, yet suffered for our sake, who in every way endured on our account."[6]

(Just before, he had said, "Let not those who seem to be plausible and bring forward novel teaching dismay

[1] See above, p. 105.

[2] *E.g.* Polycarp, *Epistle to the Philippians*, Preface or Inscription and c. v.; Ignatius, *Epistle to Polycarp*, Inscription; *Epistle to the Smyrnaeans*, Inscription; *To the Ephesians*, c. xxi.

[3] *Ep. to the Philippians*, c. xii. (either once or twice, see Lightfoot).

[4] *Ep. to the Romans*, Inscr. and c. iii.

[5] Rom. c. vi.

[6] *Ep. to Polycarp.*, c. iii.

you "—for there were 'Modernists,' of sorts, even in those days.) Clement of Rome distinctly implies or speaks of a Trinity in action (c. xlii.)—not, of course, by that name, which was not yet used; so does Ignatius: the Ephesians are

"stones of a temple made ready beforehand for a building of God the Father, being raised to the heights by the engine of Jesus Christ, which is the Cross, using as your rope the Holy Spirit. And your faith is the windlass, and love is the way [*or*, inclined plane] which leads up to God."[1]

Ignatius insists strongly on the Virgin Birth.[2] The approximate dates are these—Clement wrote between A.D. 92 and 101; Polycarp, 110-117; and Ignatius within the same limits.

One is tempted to ask what the revolutionary 'Modernist' can mean when he says that he believes in "one Catholic and *Apostolic* Church." To the plain man he believes nothing of the kind, though no doubt according to the doctrine of 'symbolism' and 'values' all words may mean almost anything.

XXVII

HOW CREEDS CAME

Some of us (including persons of more or less 'orthodox' Christian belief) regret that the teaching of the New Testament was ever formulated. And yet a Creed such as the Apostles' Creed—a "fixed traditional standard of teaching . . . was the rallying and steadying centre of

[1] c. ix. [2] The same, cc. xviii. and xix.

Catholic Christianity, which kept it straight in the midst of Gnostic extravagances and among the perils of philosophical speculation," [1] for there were already 'Modernists' of sorts in the world. And in any case further thought was unavoidable; men will exercise their minds (even on matters beyond human intelligence); and the Christian faith had to be stated and defended as against unbelievers and against 'heretics' and those whom they were influencing, many of whom could understand it better if it were put more or less in a philosophical way.

"It was inevitable that in the early centuries there should be a great amount of tentative thinking. But little by little this was sifted out." And the decisions eventually reached were "the outcome of a long evolution, every step in which was keenly debated by minds of great acumen and power, really far better equipped for such discussions than the average Anglo-American mind of to-day." However, throughout "it is not free speculation, but reflexion upon *data* given by the Bible," [2] the *data* being mainly the words of Christ and of those who knew and had been taught by Him and the facts of His life. "The development of doctrine which subsequently took place was in essence little more than a gradual thinking out of what was involved in the original Christian faith." [3] Anyone can test this for himself by comparing the passages which have been quoted (and others) with the Catholic belief in the Deity and Humanity of Christ and in the Blessed Trinity.

Perhaps the process of thought which really led to the

[1] Sanday, as above, p. 226.

[2] Sanday, as above, pp. 225, 226 and 223.

[3] A. E. J. Rawlinson in the *Pilgrim*, Jan. 1922, p. 176.

fixing of the Nicene faith was (in the main, consciously or not) something like this: Christians (educated and uneducated) had learnt from the facts and experience recorded, and from their own experience as well, that 'the Son is God' and that 'the Holy Ghost is God.' They also believed (or knew) that 'the Father is God' and that God is one. If, therefore, God was to be one, a place must be found for the Son and the Holy Spirit in the very Being (or Essence, or 'Substance') of God. This, merely paraphrased in theological language, is the Trinity in Unity; our forefathers were fortunate in being able to speak in wholly untechnical language of the Oneness and the Threeness of God.[1]

The Church was not anxious to define. St. Hilary of Poitiers (in the *De Trinitate*, ii. 1, 2), after saying that "God's words" in the last two verses of St. Matthew's Gospel really contain all that it is necessary for us to know "of the mystery of man's salvation," goes on to say:

"But we are driven by the faults of heretics and blasphemers to do things that are unlawful, to climb heights, to speak out things unutterable, to dare what is forbidden. And though it is by faith alone that we ought to fulfil what is commanded us, that is, to adore the

[1] "God indeed, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, lives ever in Threeness of Persons (háda) and in Oneness of one Godhead," *Homilies of Ælfric* in Thorpe's *Analecta Anglo-Saxonica*, p. 71 (about A.D. 1000).

So too in the thirteenth century:

> In truth the holy faith this is
> That one God in threeness
> And threeness in oneness
> Worship we the more and less,

quoted by Gibson, *The Three Creeds*, p. 27, from a metrical version of the Athanasian Creed given by Hickes. (Both are modernised).

Father, and to worship (*venerari*) the Son with Him, and be filled with the Holy Spirit, we are compelled to stretch out our poor language (*sermonis nostri humilitatem*) to the things that cannot be described, and are forced into a fault by the fault of others; so that things which ought to have been confined to reverent meditation (*contineri religione mentium*) are now brought out into the peril of human utterance."

Professor Turner says:

"The later growths at least of the Creed were due not so much to any positive liking for definitions of faith as to the need of some plain statement that such and such an interpretation of the fundamental Christian data, recommended as the last word in theology, was, on the contrary, either disastrously one-sided or actually false. Without Arius there would have been no Nicene Creed." [1]

A somewhat similar but fuller statement is that by Sir A. J. Balfour: [2]

"Whatever opinion the reader may entertain of the decisions at which the Church arrived on the doctrine of the Trinity, it is at least clear that they were not in the nature of explanations. They were, in fact, precisely the reverse. They were the negation of explanations. The various heresies which it combated were, broadly speaking, all endeavours to bring the mystery as far as possible into harmony with contemporary speculations, Gnostic, Neo-Platonic, or Rationalising, to relieve it from this or that difficulty: in short, to do something towards 'explaining' it. The Church held that all such explanations or partial explanations inflicted irremediable impoverishment on the idea of the Godhead which was essentially involved in the Christian revelation. They insisted on preserving that

[1] "Development and its Limitations," in *Theology*, March, 1922, p. 143.

[2] Now Lord Balfour.

idea in all its inexplicable fulness; and so it has come about that while such simplifications as those of the Arians, for example, are so alien and impossible to modern modes of thought that if they had been incorporated with Christianity they must have destroyed it, the doctrine of Christ's Divinity still gives reality and life to the worship of millions of pious souls, who are wholly ignorant both of the controversy to which they owe its preservation, and of the technicalities which its discussion has involved." [1]

XXVIII

THE TRINITY

The revolutionary 'Modernist,' though he could hardly dispute Sir Arthur Balfour's right to give an opinion on a point touching philosophy, would not accept this at all. A good many of the 'Modern Churchmen,' and especially Dr. Rashdall (*e.g.* p. 286), think that the latest philosophy (only) can lay down the law as to what is to be believed; this has to be 'reasonable' [2]—that is to say, what human intelligence (apart from revelation) would suggest. That any man should make such a claim really suggests a cheesemite (whose mind certainly has some very distant affinities with man's) informing his fellows as to the nature of the being who makes cheeses. The Hebrew Prophets knew better than that, and so did St. Paul.[3] A higher

[1] *The Foundations of Belief*, p. 279. Just before, he says, "If their meaning could be exhausted by one generation they would be false for the rest. It is because they can be charged with richer and richer content as our knowledge slowly grows to a fuller harmony with the Infinite Reality that they may be counted among the most precious of our inalienable possessions."

[2] See also his letter in the *Guardian*, of Oct. 21st, 1921.

[3] See, *e.g.* Is. lv. 8, 9; 1 Cor. xiii. 12.

quality of reasonableness is shown in what a great student of science, already quoted, says :

" As to the Trinity, the plurality of persons is necessarily implied in the companion doctrine of the Incarnation. So that at best there is here but one difficulty. . . . ' But it is opposed to common sense.' No doubt, utterly so ; but so it *ought* to be if true. Common sense is merely a register of common experience ; but the Incarnation, if it ever took place, whatever else it may have been, at all events cannot have been a common event. . . . On antecedent grounds there *must* be mysteries unintelligible to reason as to the nature of God, etc., supposing a revelation to be made at all. . . . Why again stumble *a priori* over the doctrine of the Trinity—especially as man himself is a triune being, of body, mind (*i.e.* reason), and spirit (*i.e.* moral, aesthetic, religious faculties). The unquestionable union of these no less unquestionably distinct orders of being in man is known immediately as a fact of experience, but is as unintelligible by any process of logic or reason as is the alleged triunity of God." [1]

The *Homilies of Ælfric*, already quoted, compare the Trinity to the soul made up of memory, understanding and will ; yet " it is one soul, and one life, and one being [*or*, ' substance '] which has these three things in it together working indivisibly." [2] They also have a good parable of the same thing :

" The sun that shines above us is a material thing, and yet it has three properties in it ; one is the bodily substance, that is, the sun's orb ; the second is the beam or brightness, always [coming] from the sun, which gives light to all the earth ; third is the heat, which comes with the beam to us. The beam is ever from the sun, and ever with it, and the Son of the Almighty God is ever begotten

[1] Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion*, pp. 175, 176.

[2] Thorpe, as above, pp. 70, 71.

of the Father, and ever dwelling with him. About him says the Apostle that he was the brightness of his Father's glory. The sun's heat goes forth from it and from its beam; and the Holy Ghost goes [proceeds] ever from the Father and from the Son alike. About him [*or*, it] is thus written: There is no man that may hide himself from its heat." [1]

There is also a 'philosophical' doctrine of a Trinity, according to which the Second Person or *Logos* is "God immanent in humanity, revealing Himself in history, and manifested in His fullness in Jesus Christ. . . . More shortly: the Father is God transcendent, the Son is God immanent objectively (or, made objective, *objectivé*), the Holy Spirit is the immanent God subjectively (*subjectif*) and these three are only one." This is very much like the theory or theories of Dr. Rashdall and others mentioned above; and the distinction of the 'Persons' does not seem to be really more than in our thought.[2] In any case, the Christian doctrine starts with the Deity of Jesus Christ, as One who being 'only-

[1] P. 67. This is probably derived, but I do not know its precise source; there is a part of the illustration in Tertullian, see *Dict. Chr. Biog.* iv. p. 861. Athanasius, *De Decretis Nicaenae Synodi*, 20, speaks of a man holding the decisions of the Council rightly, as looking upon the relations of the Son of God to the Father, "as is the ray to the light (ὅπως ἐστι τὸ ἀπαύγασμα πρὸς τὸ φῶς) and from it receiving the image of the truth" (in Migne, *Patr. Gr.* xxv.). Of course, the whole comparison is originally derived from Hebrews i. 3.

It is perhaps hardly necessary to say that none of these comparisons can be pressed; none is likely to give more than a rough and distant analogy. But at all events they show that it is not true that the same cannot be both one and three.

[2] Quoted in an article by the Rev. H. D. A. Major in the *Hibbert Journal* for Jan. 1922, p. 214 note.

It is nearly, though not exactly, the same as 'Modalist Monarchianism,' or as 'Sabellianism,' which caused so much trouble at Rome in the third century and shortly before.

begotten,' came down from heaven, and the belief in the Trinity was founded on this. There does not seem to be any other reason for believing it at all. And to alter or 'restate' facts to suit philosophical, unverified, guesswork is of course profoundly 'unscientific.' It must, naturally, be remembered (as it is fully recognised) that the word 'Person' is not a term of scientific accuracy, but only the best that has been devised, to give the nearest approach that we can make to a statement (*not* explanation) of Divine facts which are in their nature really beyond our intelligence—a fact which 'Modernists' seem constantly to forget.

The 'Modernists' are rather fond of calling those who do not agree with them about the Blessed Trinity 'Tritheists' (p. 286) [1] in a way that reminds one of little boys shouting slanders after some unpopular person. It is no doubt possible or probable that anyone writing about God's secrets or 'mysteries' should be 'inexact'—seeing them 'in a riddle': but all that the accusation can really mean is that, if those persons, theologians or others, were writing about some fact in nature, what they say might imply 'Tritheism.' It is altogether possible and reasonable to believe that two apparently inconsistent statements, on such 'mysteries,' may be the nearest that we men can get to the truth. (Somewhat in the same way it is not easy to reconcile God's love with His perfect justice; we certainly cannot do it in detail and the attempt has sometimes led to unpleasant conclusions; apart from the Atonement it is of course altogether impossible.) But to whittle down facts so as to force them into apparent consistency is sure to distort one or the

[1] See also Mr. Major in the *Guardian*, 23rd Dec. 1921.

other. And to say that any 'orthodox' and fairly educated member of the Church of England disbelieves in the Unity of God is "simply absurd." On Trinity Sunday it is specially enforced—even to the deposition of the main principle of the Eucharistic Service; it is stated several times over in the Athanasian Creed, as well as shortly but unmistakably at the end of many of the Collects; some think that this form was meant to terminate them all in the English Prayer Book, as it did in the Middle Ages.

A little similar is Dr. Rashdall's condemnation (p. 280) of the Sunday School teacher who encourages his class to say that Jesus is God without adding, 'and man'; since they are constantly seeing and very possibly are at that moment looking at pictures of our Lord as a quite ordinary man, that would seem rather unnecessary, unless there were signs of their ignoring the fact; in teaching we generally (if we are at all sensible) confine ourselves to telling people what they do not, or may not, know already; in describing a bird—say, a thrush—to a town child we should not mention to him that it has wings, claws, and a beak, but the points which mark it out from other birds.

In the early days of art, in some nations, artists were very conscientious; they knew that a flower looked different as seen from above and that the side view was imperfect; also that a quadruped had four legs and a front and another side, all of which were not seen from one side. So the Egyptians tried to represent the complete flower, and in 'Mycenaean' or in early Greek pottery there are portentous creatures, meant to represent the whole animal, but unlike anything that can be seen in

this world. It was found, as artists learnt wisdom, that it was better to look at one side at a time, and represent that, and again, as circumstances required, another point of view, both the artist and his public knowing quite well all the time that there were more sides to the object than one.

Whether the writers criticised elaborately by Dr. Rashdall (while he tries to prove that all, or almost all, Christians are heretics) have stated theological matters as accurately as can be done, avoiding all misleading, or disproportioned statements, need not be discussed. It is some consolation to know that all statements about such things are quite sure to be at least inadequate; besides (and in consequence of) the limitation of our knowledge, the words that would be necessary for accurate definition do not exist. We cannot treat the nature of God with scientific accuracy as if it were that of a plant or of some animal [1]—a fact which 'Modernists' often forget.[2]

However, in any case, we should attach less importance to what Dr. Rashdall says, since in one case—an im-

[1] Though our real knowledge about even these soon reaches its limits.

[2] The following statement seems eminently reasonable.

"The Word did not acquire personality by the Incarnation. He is spoken of throughout, not as a principle or an energy, but, whatever may be the inherent imperfection of such language, as a Person.

So far, perhaps, we can see generally a little of the Truth, but the attempt to express the Truth with precision is beset with difficulty and even with peril. Thus in using the words 'personality' and 'impersonal' in relation to Christ, it is obviously necessary to maintain the greatest reserve. For us 'personality' implies limitation or determination, *i.e.* finiteness in some direction. As applied to the divine nature therefore the word is not more than a necessary accommodation required to give such distinctness to our ideas as may be attainable." And so on. Westcott, *The Gospel according to St. John*, i. pp. 20, 21.

portant one—he has been shown to be quite incorrect. "From the point of view of later theology (he says) it cannot be too strongly asserted that Athanasius was an Apollinarian" (p. 279). But in the *Guardian* of Nov. 11th Canon Lacey showed, by quotations—some of them quite indisputable in meaning—that that was not so. However, even without this, the position of one who accuses almost all Christian theologians of theological error, as a preliminary to stating a doctrine which diverges very much more from the Catholic faith, is a strange one.

XXIX

A THIRD CENTURY 'MODERNIST'

The claim of the revolutionary 'Modernists,' *e.g.* Dr. Rashdall and Mr. Major,[1] that their views are 'orthodox' is simply amazing. That they may be 'reasonable' is of course a matter of opinion (though they seem to show small signs of it), but the other is merely a matter of comparison and historical evidence. Something (and perhaps enough) has been said above about the denial, and the questioning, of our Lord's personal pre-existence. That is either fact or fiction. The unambiguous statement of it as fact is found in St. Paul (not to speak of "the Fourth Gospel"), and it was henceforth (with very few exceptions)[2] held by all Christians, both orthodox and heretical.

[1] "That a sense at once reasonable and orthodox can be given to the Creeds and other authoritative formulae about the Divinity of Christ": Dr. Rashdall in the *Guardian* of 21st Oct. 1922; Mr. Major makes a similar claim in that of 23rd Dec.

[2] See Sanday, as above, pp. 222-224.

It may be interesting to look for a moment at the way in which its denial was received a little more than half a century before the Council of Nice. Shortly before A.D. 264 the teaching of Paul of Samosata, Bishop of the great leading see of Antioch, began to cause scandal, and St. Dionysius, Bishop of Alexandria, took the matter up and got a council summoned to deal with the matter in or about the year mentioned above; St. Firmilian, the friend of St. Cyprian, presided. But Paul was "a dissembling and a guileful[1] person"; he protested that he had been misunderstood; that his language bore a perfectly orthodox meaning; that he had consistently followed the doctrine of the Apostles. The Bishops returned to their homes, thanking God for their unanimity of belief. But before long they found that they had been taken in; and another synod was held at which Paul promised to renounce his errors. This promise he did not keep; and a third synod was held, towards the end of A.D. 269, at which Paul's real views were with much trouble elicited from him; "His heresy and his blasphemy against Christ" (as Eusebius calls them[2]) were at last detected and proved. He was condemned and deposed, though he was not got rid of from the Cathedral of Antioch until Zenobia, his patroness, had been defeated by Aurelian two years afterwards.

According to the fuller accounts of his views, these were:

That Christ "was not before Mary . . . His pre-existence was simply in the Divine foreknowledge.[3] . . .

[1] "Κρυψίνουν ὄντα καὶ ἀπατηλόν." Eusebius, *Eccl. Hist.* vii. 29.

[2] "Τὴν αἵρεσιν καὶ τὴν εἰς Χριστὸν βλασφημίαν αὐτοῦ." *Eccl. Hist.* vii. 28.

[3] See above, p. 38 ff.

[Paul represented] the Logos of God as merely that which intelligence or reason is in the human heart . . . He allowed of no difference in kind between the indwelling of the Logos in Christ and in any other human being, only one of degree, the Logos having dwelt and operated in Him after a higher manner than in any other man.[1] This indwelling was not that of a person, but of a quality." . . . The "Jesus Christ from below" "by advancement (or progress) was made God." [2] . . . "Therefore, although he called Christ God, it was not as God by His nature, but by progressive development, ἐξ ἀνθρώπων γέγονε Θεός. . . . . He taught also that as the Logos is not a Person, so also the Holy Spirit is impersonal; a Divine virtue belonging to the Father, and distinct from Him only in conception."

Eusebius speaks of him (more shortly) as

"having low and degraded views about Christ, contrary to the teaching of the Church, that he had been an ordinary man by nature." [3]

And the synodical letter of the Council says:

"For he does not choose to confess with us that the Son of God has come down from heaven," but says "'that Jesus Christ is from beneath.'" [4]

[1] "ἐνοικῆσαι ἐν ἀυτῷ τὴν σοφίαν ὡς ἐν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ:" quoted (with more) from Epiphanius (*Haer.*, 65) and elsewhere in *Dict. Chr. Biog.*, article "Paulus of Samosata").

[2] "Κάτωθεν," "ἐκ προκοπῆς τεθεοποιῆσθαι," quoted in *Dict. Chr. Biog.*, as above, from which also the quotations in English are made.

[3] "Ταπεινὰ καὶ χαμαιπετῆ περὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παρὰ τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν διδασκαλίαν φρονήσαντος, ὡς κοινοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἀνθρώπου γενομένου.'" Eusebius, as above, vii. 27.

[4] "τὸν μὲν γὰρ υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐ βούλεται συνομολογεῖν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ κατεληλυθέναι . . . λέγει Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν κάτωθεν." As above, vii. 30.

They seem to have regarded this confession as the very centre of the Christian faith, and so, with the belief in the Sacrifice of the death of Christ, it has been in practice from the first. Both are denied, or explained away, by revolutionary 'Modernism.' It is hardly necessary to draw attention in detail to the coincidences of this with the views of the early 'Modernist'; and it is plain what Christians of the time thought of any such views some fifty years before Athanasius, the "innovator," came upon the scene. Paul of Samosata appears to have been the spiritual grandfather of Arius,[1] who, however, did not question that central belief of our Lord's pre-existence, but His eternal pre-existence; thus he left some possibility of holding to the heart of Christianity.

XXX

SOME THINGS THAT 'MODERNISM' INVOLVES

Mr. Major, after laying down "that the consciousness of Jesus was a full human consciousness, and that it was not supernatural or miraculous in any sense that cannot be attributed to a human personality" (and so on; how does he know?); and that any pre-existence of His—even that of "every human infant" is at most not impossible, does not follow Paul of Samosata in objecting to hymns or prayer to Christ; "the language of Devotion permits this"—that He should be called 'My God' (p. 277). And in an article in the *Hibbert Journal* of Jan. 1922 he lays great stress on 'Christ-worship' (the want of it

[1] See *Dict. Chr. Biog.*, art. "Lucianus (12)."

among the Unitarians is, it appears, one main reason why he does not join them). One is glad that it should be so; his heart (or his religious experience) is more orthodox than his head (or his philosophical guesses). But "*lex orandi* is *lex credendi*"; thus Jesus Christ "from being one of men, has become God,"[1] though He is, to Mr. Major, plainly not so in the same sense as the Father is. Thus there are two Gods, a greater and a lesser;[2] all the intellectuality of 'Modernism' brings us to something closely resembling an inferior form of Arianism—inferior, because the main motives for love and thankfulness to Christ (which that heresy in some measure left) have been made at best weak and uncertain. Is not the poor 'traditionalist,' whose views, after all, do coincide with those of the vast majority of Christian thinkers, some of whom were 'giants,'[3] more reasonable after all? At least he is more consistent.

And it is not only that our Lord's position is changed—for the worse. It is, on this 'Modernist' theory, no longer true that "God so loved the world that he gave his *only-begotten* Son" or that He "spared not his *own* son but delivered him up for us all";[4] it was just one of countless numbers, all sons in the same general sense. However, Jesus Christ was, we may still suppose, in some way commissioned by God; the "very high conception of His own Divine Mission" (p. 279 note) was, one supposes, not an illusion. And yet God, who had sent Him, did not arrange that the facts about His life and words

[1] See above, p. 133.

[2] Though, if we accept the 'Modernist' metaphysical dogma, it seems arbitrary to exclude all other men; see above, pp. 17, 20.

[3] Sanday, as above, p. 227.

[4] "Τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ," Rom. viii. 32.

should be certainly known; they were encumbered with legend until the 'Modernists' arose, and even now what He said is, it appears, largely uncertain. His life was cut short before He had half taught the Apostles, and that not for any high purpose—that He might "be a sacrifice for sin" as well as "an ensample of godly life." And the Apostles, whom He left to carry on His teaching, made immense and radical blunders about Him, which went on being believed by wise and unwise for about eighteen hundred years, until some clever theologians detected them. Is not this all dreadfully futile? The very first article of the Creed is false. God the Father is not 'Almighty' nor 'Ruler of All'; and that His "never-failing providence ordereth all things in heaven and earth" must be a delusion. The fact (on this theory) is that, though His intentions may be most benevolent, He is, like some other autocrats, so hampered by the red tape of an obstinate and hide-bound bureaucracy of 'laws of nature,' that He cannot well carry these out.

All this seems rather incredible. At all events this Ruler of the Universe is not the Father who takes care even of sparrows, and much more of men. The fact is that a mechanical account of the Universe will not go with the Christian religion; trying to combine them is like riding two horses at once which are going in different directions. To drag down God's working to the level of our own experience and knowledge not only 'impoverishes' Christianity, but deprives it of the credibility which the view of it as being plainly something beyond the present reach, or invention, of human minds has seemed to so many to give it.

XXXI

CONCLUSIONS

To sum up, it seems unlikely that we shall kill Christianity to make ' Modernism ' king ; certainly, fair statements of the substitute will hardly help on such a change.

For, to begin with, those who thus stand as ' Modern Churchmen ' do not agree ; some of them are far nearer to the benighted ' traditionalists ' than to the extremists of the Conference—in fact, but for their burning desire to be ' modern,' it is sometimes not easy to see how they differ from the ' orthodox.' Some of them put some things well ; many of us would say that the collection of papers is ' good in parts ' ; but there is not much that has not been said as well, or better, before.[1]

There is a great carelessness often shown in the treatment of evidence. Texts that seem useful for the purpose are seized on, while words or sentences which show clearly that the author's belief was not as they would like to have it are simply ignored. A text is changed (unconsciously, no doubt) so that it seems to support an argument, and passages are paraphrased in a way which amounts to misquotation. History—sometimes unquestionably false—is made and ' suborned ' for a purpose. What some of the statements made imply or involve has plainly not been thought out. Arguments used are extraordinarily weak or are plainly fallacious.[2]

[1] Perhaps Canon Barnes' remarks on " the enlarged view of the universe due to modern science " (pp. 258-260), is the best thing in the collection.

[2] Is this due to infection from the doctrine of ' values ' and of ' symbolical meanings ' ? Juggling with words and intellectual insincerity are not good for the mind.

And assertions without even an attempt at proof are common.

The revolutionary substitutes suggested do not, as they profess to do, make belief easier. For in order to make this ' possible ' it is necessary first to accept a theory or dogma which certainly cannot be proved, and to many of us seems in itself altogether improbable, even leaving out of the question the opinions of the writers of the New Testament, " which constitute a deposit laid down by the full flood of religious inspiration," as another member of the Conference says (p. 326).

And if we wish to keep the belief in our Lord's pre-existence, or rather a sort of bloodless shadow of it, some ' Modernists ' will expect us to believe, as the price of this, in the pre-existence of all men (which cannot be proved and does not seem likely), while another, who himself attempts to draw out the very life-blood from the Christian religion, says that this is unorthodox (see above, p. 18). But in any case the substitution of metaphysical theories or dogmas or guesses, as preliminary articles of faith, for beliefs which really have some claim to be founded on evidence and verified by experience does not seem a good exchange. There are other unproved dogmas and incredibilities which have been noticed already. It is all rather like taking an expensive ticket to go and shop in a town where things are said to be a little cheaper.

What has been said further already on the ' impoverishment ' of the Christian religion need not be repeated. It is, by the revolutionaries, brought down to the level of human thought (as if man were indeed " the measure of all things," God included), and so loses all possibility of

being divine, transcendent, and mysterious fact, corresponding to a mind greater than ours.

Perhaps, too, little more need be said of the ' symbolical meaning ' or ' values ' theory, which professes to save something from the wreck. Since the main point of the statements thus explained away is that they are statements of fact, and since they are ' hall-marked ' as such, the theory is either fraudulent or a very ill-timed joke perpetrated bysomeonewith his sense of humour undeveloped. There is some reason to suppose (or to hope) that it was made in Germany, where that state of mind, or ' mentality,' is common, though, as we have seen, certainly not universal.[1]

Lastly, these extremist doctrines are not even ' modern.' They rest on a metaphysical theory or guess which is like part of the Stoic philosophy, and the religion founded on them is very similar to that of Paul of Samosata (which the Christians of his time thought ' low and degraded '), and in a less degree to that of Arius and Eusebius of Nicomedia, who also anticipated the ' Modernists ' in some of their arguments.

[1] See above, pp. 76 and 78 ff.

The following account, which is also a parable, was not written to order—that it should have been written is an ' undesigned coincidence '—but I know that the writer of the letter would have been glad to have it used, having a strong sense of humour and enough love for the Christian religion (not for a ' substitute ' or set of ' substitutes '), to give his life for the practical side of it.

" *P.S.*—This week a calf died. A few days afterwards our cowman came running with—as I thought—another sick calf in his arms ; but no—it was the dead calf's skin stuffed with grass, and sticks in its legs. You stand it upright, and the mother licks it whilst she is being milked—it keeps her quiet." Randolph, *Arthur Douglas*, pp. 110, 111.

Parables are seldom perfect and the counterpart of the real calf is not dead, nor even moribund.

XXXII

MODERNIST ETHICS

So far, we have considered, in the main, whether the revolutionary doctrines are, in themselves, true. But it is necessary, before concluding, to look at another side of the question—namely, whether such views can be honestly held and maintained by a clergyman of the Church of England. The two things are obviously not the same; one may be fully convinced (for instance) that the Papal claims are unfounded, but no one would say that if a Roman Catholic priest had come to the same conclusion he would have a right to retain his position in the Roman Church because he had arrived at the truth. The question is not one of truth, but of honour and of morals. Of course no one is bound to believe or pretend to believe what he thinks to be untrue, but it may be necessary for him to rectify his position when it becomes no longer a possible one for him.

The East seems to " think on similar lines " ; an ' Indian Priest ' says :

" The one thing that now puzzles the Oriental is that, while the Hindu priest or Musulman Maulvi would, upon relinquishing any part of his faith, cease to retain his office as priest or Maulvi, yet in the English Church he finds these Modern Churchmen draw comfortable emoluments from a Church the doctrines of which, they maintain, they cannot hold." [1]

The Church of England to which a clergyman gives pledges may be regarded from more than one point of view. For some of us it is a part of the Catholic Church,

[1] Letter in the *Guardian*, 3rd March, 1922.

" the Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth," and so, as the Article says, it " has authority in controversies of faith," in which character, with one voice (and not merely in some of its parts), it has already rejected doctrines wholly or practically identical with those now presented to us as new discoveries. (This, however, has not prevented various members of the Catholic Church from looking into them and their likes with complete candour, so far as they have been able, prepared not only to go wherever reason and evidence led, but to abide by and act upon the consequences—a state of mind and course of action which 'Modernists' seem to find it difficult to understand.) But since any such religious view would be by no means universally accepted, the Church of England may be regarded purely from the secular side, as any agnostic might look at it; that view will be, so far as it goes, quite a true and a sound one; the religious view, if added, would only strengthen the case. From the worldly point of view, then, the Church of England is a large, important, and ancient society, possessing a great number of members, an organisation, and funds partly handed down to it from earlier days, partly contributed now from time to time. Through various causes it has come into a close connection with the State, which, however, in the last resort controls all other societies, religious and otherwise, as well. This society was founded for certain purposes, for maintaining the worship of God, for teaching the Christian religion, and for the relief of the poor and the general uplifting of the population.[1] Its

[1] It is interesting to notice that this secular view is stated, as being quite sound so far as it goes, in the petition by Parliament to the King about 'Provisions,' at Carlisle in 1306. *Rolls of Parliament*, i. p. 219.

laws and by-laws were fixed at various times; they were revised as to some points, chiefly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and have not been radically altered since.

It was never recognised by this society that everyone who held office in it might teach whatever he imagined to be the Christian religion. What the teaching was to be was strictly laid down, and at the Reformation this strictness was, on the whole, increased.

In order to secure that the teaching should be on the lines which the society thought good and true, certain expressions of opinion and pledges have been and are exacted from the officers of the society as a condition of being appointed to its offices. No one can be appointed to most offices in the Church, whether paid or otherwise, without having been first ordained. And he cannot be ordained without having given pledges that he holds and will teach the views which the society holds. These are the declaration:

"I assent to the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion, and to the Book of Common Prayer and of the ordering of Bishops, Priests, and Deacons. I believe the Doctrine of the Church of England, as therein set forth, to be agreeable to the Word of God; and in Public Prayer and Administration of the Sacraments I will use the Form in the said Book prescribed, and none other, except so far as shall be ordered by lawful Authority." [1]

And in the Service for the Ordination of Deacons they are asked, "Do you unfeignedly believe all the Canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments?" and answer, "I do believe them."

[1] *The Prayer Book Interleaved*, p. 9.

It is to be noticed that agreement with the Thirty-nine Articles is stated in a vague and general way, and that that is intentional since the words were in 1865 changed to this form from something much more stringent, the form generally used being as follows: "I, *A.B.*, do willingly and from my heart subscribe to the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion of the United Church of England and Ireland, and to the three articles in the Thirty-sixth Canon, and to all things therein contained"; [1] also that, as regards the Scriptures, 'unfeignedly' means what it says, *i.e.* 'sincerely,' or 'without pretence or evasion.' However, the pledges certainly mean something; the Articles comprise one (VIII.) which speaks strongly of the Three Creeds; and since these are in their nature a sort of essence, centre, or part most important to be known and held of "the Doctrine of the Church of England" to which the candidate agrees, it cannot be reasonably held that any vagueness of assent includes them. But in any case, all clergymen are pledged to them in other ways. They are pledged to use the Prayer Book "in Public Prayer and Administration of the Sacraments," and so, if they keep their promise, they must use all three Creeds, the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds very frequently.

Now (to confine ourselves to one of these), the Nicene Creed (as we have seen) contradicts the 'Modernist' theories over and over again—flatly, in the words "The only-begotten Son of God." It also proceeds to make nonsense of them: "If we believe that every human soul reveals, reproduces, incarnates God *to some extent*; if we believe that in the great ethical teachers of mankind, the great religious personalities, the founders, the reformers of

[1] Gibson, *The Thirty-Nine Articles*, p. 62.

religions, the heroes, the prophets, the saints, God is more fully revealed than in other men " (p. 283), and that His revelation in Christ is only different in degree and not in kind (which is what Dr. Rashdall states unquestionably, though it is to some extent obscured by the use of the ambiguous word ' unique '), and if we also believe the Nicene Creed, then Mahomet was " *to some extent* " " begotten, not made," [1] and Socrates, Havelock, Jeremiah, and St. Francis had some share in ' making all things ' ; though since it is, according to the same authority, unorthodox (p. 280) to believe that any human soul pre-exists, one does not quite see how they can have done it.

It is quite plain that the revolutionary ' Modernist ' does not believe this Creed (or the others either) according to any meaning of the word that is really possible—that in saying, ' I believe ' so-and-so, when he does not believe anything of the kind, he is (with however praiseworthy intentions) simply " saying the thing which is not."

Let us see, for a moment, how a similar case would work out in a purely secular society, say, one for the support and propagation of the doctrines of ' Free Trade.' The Society is going to appoint an assistant-secretary and some lecturers. Most certainly, unless their views are thoroughly well known already, they will be asked questions about them before they are appointed. After a time one of them sees reason to alter his opinions ; if he is an honest man, he will say so, and resign ; otherwise unpleasant things will be said of, and probably to, him ;

[1] Further, in the same document, it is stated that God the Father is " Maker . . . of all things visible and invisible," and the whole of Mahomet must belong to one or the other of these divisions.

and the final result will be the same. If he followed the 'Modernist' plan he might go on holding his office and disseminating his new views, and if he were brought up before the Committee, he would say that he did not take the words 'Free Trade' in the ordinary sense or as they did; that he was convinced that really Free Trade was more likely to come about if a small tariff were imposed; one can imagine the sort of contempt with which "children of this world" of average honesty would receive such an attempt at evasion.

Or let us imagine such an imitation in a joint-stock company. A director signs a report, showing a good prospect of profits, which he does not think is true; he excuses to himself his doing so and continuing to hold his directorship by explaining that 'profit' may be taken in a 'non-literal' sense; that it is really 'profit'[1] in a higher sense that employment should be given, and that trade, or a neighbourhood, should be developed. If the company failed and he were prosecuted for fraud, the plea of such a 'symbolical meaning' would hardly help him—unless it led to enquiries as to his mental condition and the exchange of a prison for a lunatic asylum.

St. Peter thought that presbyters should be "ensamples to the flock." It appears that, if the sheep follow this example, they will lose their name for honest dealing, and may even find themselves in gaol.

Most persons who have personally no 'axe to grind' and can look upon the matter impartially will think that in this case no 'expert's' opinion is needed. But if such an opinion should be desired, there is a particularly sound

[1] He might even think of what St. Paul says about Onesimus in *Philemon*, *v.* 11.

and impartial one that can be cited ; Henry Sidgwick was Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge, 1883-1900 ; he was not an orthodox Christian and had considerable sympathy with much of the ' Modernist ' view of religion.[1] He had in 1895 given an address on " The Ethics of Religious Conformity," which was also published ; Dr. Rashdall questioned parts of this, and Sidgwick replied in an article on " Clerical Veracity," [2] so that the matter was properly threshed out. The whole is worth reading ; but some few extracts only can be given, which, however, will show clearly the view of the expert.

' Mr. Rashdall ' (as he then was) had ' misunderstood ' what the Professor had said—which is not uncommon in controversy where the real contention is difficult or impossible to answer. Sidgwick quotes his own words, and goes on :

" My contention is simply that the widest license of variation that can be claimed must stop short of the permission to utter a hard, flat, unmistakable falsehood, and this is what a clergyman does who says solemnly—in the recital of the Apostles' Creed—' I believe in Jesus Christ . . . who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary,' when he really believes that Jesus was, like other human beings, the son of two human parents. He utters of course a similar falsehood in affirming the belief that Jesus ' on the third day rose again from the dead,' when he does not believe that Jesus had a continued life as an individual after death, and a life in some sense corporeal. But since the conception of the resurrection body . . . is somewhat ambiguous and obscure, I propose in this discussion to concentrate

[1] See *Practical Ethics*, esp. pp. 140, 141.

[2] Both in *Practical Ethics*, p. 113 ff. and p. 142 ff.

attention mainly on the first-mentioned statement, which presents a perfectly simple and definite issue." [1]

This is additional insincerity besides what has been just pointed out. But the statements in the Nicene Creed, which Dr. Rashdall is in Church constantly saying that he believes—that Jesus Christ was "the only-begotten Son of God" and so on—are quite as plainly and harshly incompatible with Dr. Rashdall's other statements; and the verdict would necessarily be the same.

The ridiculous doctrine of a right to interpret statements of *facts* as 'symbolical,' in what sense you please, had already been discovered or imported; it is dealt with as an impartial, clear-sighted, and honourable man ('expert' or not) would be bound to deal with it:

Mr. Rashdall suggests that the phrase [from the Apostles' Creed] may be used to mean that Jesus was without sin from His birth; but I find it difficult to treat the suggestion seriously. A metaphor, to be undeceptive, must be accepted as such by hearers as well as speakers. . . . And Mr. Rashdall hardly suggests that they [*i.e.* "any part of any congregation"] would now so understand it, but he seems to think that they might be educated up to accept the meaning; I do not believe such education to be possible; but granting it possible, I submit that to save the statement from unveracity it must be made after the education has been performed, and not before." [2]

We hear statements (how far they are true I have no means of knowing) as to bishops giving dispensation to men wishing to be ordained to "say the thing which is

[1] Pp. 146, 147. He adds in a note (with reasons), "I think that a large measure of interpretation of the term 'body' may be legitimately claimed by any one who affirms a belief in the 'resurrection of the body'." Certainly; see above, p. 86.

[2] Pp. 170, 171.

not "—exercising a right which they do not possess. As to this Sidgwick says: "A private explanation to a bishop and an incumbent is not sufficient; it would only make them accomplices in deception." [1] And he sums up his views thus:

"He (the clergyman) should be in a position to speak frankly to thoughtful members of his flock, and such frank speaking should be reconcilable with the solemn expression of beliefs which his office prescribes. The Preacher has said that there is 'a time to speak and a time to keep silence,' and this ancient wisdom is not yet antiquated. But he has not said that there is a time to speak truly and a time to speak falsely; and I think that, in religious matters, the common sense of Christendom will reject this addition to the familiar proverb." [2]

However, the 'Modernist' has a weapon left. Much as from under the walls of his Crystal Palace he hurls promiscuously accusations of heresy, so it is his way (not on this occasion only) to try to clear himself by saying that all clergymen are dishonest; this would have greater force if the form of subscription to the Articles had remained as it was.[3] However, Dr. Rashdall says:

"If the liberal clergy are dishonest because they understand some words of the formularies in a more or less non-literal sense,[4] then the great mass of clergy are dishonest, since they do not (for instance) in the obvious and literal sense 'unfeignedly believe all the canonical Scriptures of the Old and New Testament,' or mean by 'He

[1] P. 171. [2] Pp. 176, 177.

[3] On this see Sidgwick, as above, pp. 148, 153.

[4] The minimising is to be noticed. For the 'Modernist,' besides the Creeds, a large part of the Prayer Book, including the Communion Service, and most of the Baptismal Service would need 'decoding.'

descended into Hell' anything like what the words were originally intended to convey. Nor probably does Mr. Champneys."[1]

Of the two instances given, the former is only plausible; the latter, hopeless. A very great many clergymen do believe the Bible in a very real way; it is not very clear what the pledge does mean, precisely, but it says nothing about 'verbal inspiration' or authorship or date of books, and what is said in the Articles about Holy Scripture does not go very far and the answer in the Ordering of Priests is on similar lines; it appears to be legitimate to interpret the one by the other more or less, both being agreed to as rules of the same Church or Society. But it rather looks as if Dr. Rashdall attaches some mysterious sense to the word 'unfeignedly.'

As for the actual words "He descended into Hell," it is hardly doing Dr. Rashdall an injustice to think that he must be suggesting that 'Hell' necessarily means 'Gehenna,' and that the earliest notion attached to the words was that of "the Harrowing of Hell," so dear to the Middle Ages. But Sanday thinks that the words were originally inserted in the Creed because "the doctrine of the descent" was "naturally associated with the burial"; others think that they are against Apollinarianism or Docetism.[2] Though the belief was also naturally associated with what St. Peter said in his Epistle (I. iii. 19; iv. 6), it need not mean any more than that our Lord went through all that a man goes through

[1] Letter in the *Guardian* of 4th Nov. 1921. On these points see Sidgwick, as above, pp. 148, 153, 162, 163.

[2] Quoted from *Journal of Theological Studies*, iii. 16, by Gibson, *The Three Creeds*, p. 70. See also quotation from Harnack there, which seems to be in the same direction.

down to, and including, his resurrection (see Acts ii. 25 ff.).

That the word 'hell' was ambiguous, covering both 'Sheol' or 'Hades' and 'Gehenna,' was certainly known when the Creed was inserted in the Prayer Book—and most of us were informed of the fact at an early period of our lives. There are various passages of the Authorised Version both in the Old and New Testaments where the former meaning is pretty plain (*e.g.* 2 Sam. xxii. 6; Ps. cxxxix. 8; Rev. vi. 8); and if a clergyman, being (as he was supposed to be; see rubric before the Ordination Services) "learned in the Latin tongue," looked up the Creed in its original form, he would find that the words were "*ad inferos*," or "*infernum*," or "*inferna*," all quite neutral words [1] for the abode of the dead. Moreover, the word retained an ambiguous sense until a much later time, so that Pope (translating lines of Homer already quoted [2]) could use it for 'Hades':

> "Who dares think one thing, and another tell,
> My heart detests him as the gates of Hell."

Further, if one is to look more closely into the matter at all, the Church of England plainly intended to leave the meaning of the clause open. In the sixteenth century this was much discussed and various explanations of it were given. But Article III. omits a clause of explanation that was in the version of 1553, substituting nothing for it, but leaving only the bare statement.[3] This is a

[1] See Gibson, *The Thirty-Nine Articles*, p. 163.

[2] See above, p. 42, note.

[3] See Gibson, as above, p. 159 ff., and Kidd, *The Thirty-Nine Articles*, pp. 80 ff. and 114.

further instance of 'Modernist' recklessness as to facts alleged in argument.

However, the whole line of argument has no soundness in it. One would be sorry to think that all the clergy are, in some measure, dishonest, and the lay 'expert' quoted plainly does not think so. But, if they were, that would not really help the revolutionary 'Modernist,'[1] any more than it helps a drowning man to drag down his fellows. A horse does not cease to be black because others are of various shades of grey; it is not strictly honest to be careless about returning borrowed pencils, but that does not make forgery also a trifling crime.

There is one more claim which 'Modernists' sometimes make—that the clergy are not bound to believe the Creeds any more than the laity are. This is absurd from any point of view, but most especially from the secular standpoint. Whatever obligation there is upon a lay member of the Church of England and of the Catholic Church to believe the Creeds is ecclesiastical and religious, not one of ethics and honour. A layman has not qualified for office in the Church and for paid posts by expressing his belief in certain facts, and by promising to repeat constantly a number of statements to the same effect and also prayers implying them, as a clergyman has. If he cannot keep his promise without continually "saying the thing which is not," the position is, one would have thought, an impossible one to an honourable man. A good many such have taken the only way out of it, while many who would naturally have wished to be ordained

[1] But it is not impossible that fear of exasperating reckless mudthrowers makes some of the clergy less plain-spoken than they would otherwise be.

have stood out, when the divergence of their belief was very much less than that involved in 'Modernist' opinions.

Finally, it may be worth while to quote the confession of a specially candid 'Modernist' (the Rev. Harold Anson) on this subject:

"I am sure that modernist theologians will forgive me if I say that their highly ingenious explanations of the creed, which they have made in order to retain our position in the Church, explanations which the highest authorities explicitly accept, and which, on the whole I think we are justified, in a time of transition, in making, won't appear to those who come after us very worthy of admiration. I fear they will regard us (unjustly, I think) as bold, bad men with quite insufficiently developed consciences, and will marvel at our long toleration of subterfuge. I cannot regard it as anything but a most unsatisfactory and temporary expedient, until we poor old crabs have developed a new shell" (p. 336).

This is another way of stating "the depressing and demoralising conclusion that no clergyman can possibly speak the truth in the sense in which a plain layman understands truth-speaking; so that any clergyman may lie without scruple in the cause of religious progress, with a view to aiding popular education in the new theology, and still feel that he is as veracious as his profession allows him to be." [1]

The view as to the prospects of 'Modernism' seems unduly sanguine. As for the reference to the bishops, one hopes that it is a libel, since "the bishop cannot license a deacon or priest to speak falsely to his congregation," [2] and he is also definitely and absolutely pre-

[1] Sidgwick, as above, pp. 154, 155. He goes on, "Or perhaps I should rather say that Mr. Rashdall's conception of substantial veracity is what grammarians call proleptic," etc.; see above, p. 147.

[2] As above, p. 153.

cluded as an honourable man, by a promise solemnly given at his consecration, from attempting to allow anything of the kind.[1]

St. Paul had something strong to say about "doing evil that good may come"; but perhaps to 'the modern mind' his ethics are as obsolete as his religion. 'Modernism' tends not only to 'impoverish' the Christian religion but to lower the standard of morals.

[1] "*The Archbishop.* Are you ready, with all faithful diligence, to banish and drive away all erroneous and strange doctrine contrary to God's Word; and both privately and openly to call upon and encourage others to the same?

Answer. I am ready, the Lord being my helper."

(*The Consecration of Bishops.*) That these 'Modernist' doctrines are 'erroneous' can, of course, be disputed. That they are 'strange' and 'contrary to God's Word' appears to be beyond dispute.

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